Brain-inspired conscious computing architecture

What type of artificial systems will claim to be conscious and will claim to experience qualia? The ability to comment upon physical states of a brain-like dynamical system coupled with its environment seems to be sufficient to make claims. The flow of internal states in such system, guided and limited by associative memory, is similar to the stream of consciousness. Minimal requirements for an artificial system that will claim to be conscious were given in form of specific architecture named articon. Nonverbal discrimination of the working memory states of the articon gives it the ability to experience different qualities of internal states. Analysis of the inner state flows of such a system during typical behavioral process shows that qualia are inseparable from perception and action. The role of consciousness in learning of skills, when conscious information processing is replaced by subconscious, is elucidated. Arguments confirming that phenomenal experience is a result of cognitive processes are presented. Possible philosophical objections based on the Chinese room and other arguments are discussed, but they are insufficient to refute claims articon’s claims. Conditions for genuine understanding that go beyond the Turing test are presented. Articons may fulfill such conditions and in principle the structure of their experiences may be arbitrarily close to human

Consciousness is learning: predictive processing systems that learn by binding may perceive themselves as conscious

Machine learning algorithms have achieved superhuman performance in specific complex domains. Yet learning online from few examples and efficiently generalizing across domains remains elusive. In humans such learning proceeds via declarative memory formation and is closely associated with consciousness. Predictive processing has been advanced as a principled Bayesian inference framework for understanding the cortex as implementing deep generative perceptual models for both sensory data and action control. However, predictive processing offers little direct insight into fast compositional learning or the mystery of consciousness. Here we propose that through implementing online learning by hierarchical binding of unpredicted inferences, a predictive processing system may flexibly generalize in novel situations by forming working memories for perceptions and actions from single examples, which can become short- and long-term declarative memories retrievable by associative recall. We argue that the contents of such working memories are unified yet differentiated, can be maintained by selective attention and are consistent with observations of masking, postdictive perceptual integration, and other paradigm cases of consciousness research. We describe how the brain could have evolved to use perceptual value prediction for reinforcement learning of complex action policies simultaneously implementing multiple survival and reproduction strategies. 'Conscious experience' is how such a learning system perceptually represents its own functioning, suggesting an answer to the meta problem of consciousness. Our proposal naturally unifies feature binding, recurrent processing, and predictive processing with global workspace, and, to a lesser extent, the higher order theories of consciousness.Comment: This version adds 5 figures (new) and only modifies the text to reference the figure

THE PSYCHOMOTOR THEORY OF HUMAN MIND

This study presents a new theory to explain the neural origins of human mind. This is the psychomotor theory. The author briefly analyzed the historical development of the mind-brain theories. The close relations between psychological and motor systems were subjected to a rather detailed analysis, using psychiatric and neurological examples. The feedback circuits between mind, brain, and body were shown to occur within the mind-brain-body triad, in normal states, and psycho-neural diseases. It was stated that psychiatric signs and symptoms are coupled with motor disturbances; neurological diseases are coupled with psychological disturbances; changes in cortico-spinal motor-system activity may influence mind-brain-body triad, and vice versa. Accordingly, a psychomotor theory was created to explain the psychomotor coupling in health and disease, stating that, not themind-brain duality or unity, but themind-brain-body triad as a functional unit may be essential in health and disease, because mind does not end in the brain, but further controls movements, in a reciprocal manner; mental and motor events share the same neural substrate, cortical, and spinalmotoneurons;mental events emerging from the motoneuronal system expressed by the human language may be closely coupled with the unity of the mind-brain-body triad. So, the psychomotor theory rejects the mind-brain duality and instead advances the unity of the psychomotor system, which will have important consequences in understanding and improving the human mind, brain, and body in health and disease

Executive attention, task selection and attention-based learning in a neurally controlled simulated robot

We describe the design and implementation of an integrated neural architecture, modelled on human executive attention, which is used to control both automatic (reactive) and willed action selection in a simulated robot. The model, based upon Norman and Shallice's supervisory attention system, incorporates important features of human attentional control: selection of an intended task over a more salient automatic task; priming of future tasks that are anticipated; and appropriate levels of persistence of focus of attention. Recognising that attention-based learning, mediated by the limbic system, and the hippocampus in particular, plays an important role in adaptive learning, we extend the Norman and Shallice model, introducing an intrinsic, attention-based learning mechanism that enhances the automaticity of willed actions and reduces future need for attentional effort. These enhanced features support a new level of attentional autonomy in the operation of the simulated robot. Some properties of the model are explored using lesion studies, leading to the identification of a correspondence between the behavioural pathologies of the simulated robot and those seen in human patients suffering dysfunction of executive attention. We discuss briefly the question of how executive attention may have arisen due to selective pressure

Can Rats Reason?

Since at least the mid-1980s claims have been made for rationality in rats. For example, that rats are capable of inferential reasoning (Blaisdell, Sawa, Leising, & Waldmann, 2006; Bunsey & Eichenbaum, 1996), or that they can make adaptive decisions about future behavior (Foote & Crystal, 2007), or that they are capable of knowledge in propositional-like form (Dickinson, 1985). The stakes are rather high, because these capacities imply concept possession and on some views (e.g., Rödl, 2007; Savanah, 2012) rationality indicates self-consciousness. I evaluate the case for rat rationality by analyzing 5 key research paradigms: spatial navigation, metacognition, transitive inference, causal reasoning, and goal orientation. I conclude that the observed behaviors need not imply rationality by the subjects. Rather, the behavior can be accounted for by noncognitive processes such as hard-wired species typical predispositions or associative learning or (nonconceptual) affordance detection. These mechanisms do not necessarily require or implicate the capacity for rationality. As such there is as yet insufficient evidence that rats can reason. I end by proposing the ‘Staircase Test,’ an experiment designed to provide convincing evidence of rationality in rats

Enhancing Nervous System Recovery through Neurobiologics, Neural Interface Training, and Neurorehabilitation.

After an initial period of recovery, human neurological injury has long been thought to be static. In order to improve quality of life for those suffering from stroke, spinal cord injury, or traumatic brain injury, researchers have been working to restore the nervous system and reduce neurological deficits through a number of mechanisms. For example, neurobiologists have been identifying and manipulating components of the intra- and extracellular milieu to alter the regenerative potential of neurons, neuro-engineers have been producing brain-machine and neural interfaces that circumvent lesions to restore functionality, and neurorehabilitation experts have been developing new ways to revitalize the nervous system even in chronic disease. While each of these areas holds promise, their individual paths to clinical relevance remain difficult. Nonetheless, these methods are now able to synergistically enhance recovery of native motor function to levels which were previously believed to be impossible. Furthermore, such recovery can even persist after training, and for the first time there is evidence of functional axonal regrowth and rewiring in the central nervous system of animal models. To attain this type of regeneration, rehabilitation paradigms that pair cortically-based intent with activation of affected circuits and positive neurofeedback appear to be required-a phenomenon which raises new and far reaching questions about the underlying relationship between conscious action and neural repair. For this reason, we argue that multi-modal therapy will be necessary to facilitate a truly robust recovery, and that the success of investigational microscopic techniques may depend on their integration into macroscopic frameworks that include task-based neurorehabilitation. We further identify critical components of future neural repair strategies and explore the most updated knowledge, progress, and challenges in the fields of cellular neuronal repair, neural interfacing, and neurorehabilitation, all with the goal of better understanding neurological injury and how to improve recovery

"Consciousness". Selected Bibliography 1970 - 2001

This is a bibliography of books and articles on consciousness in philosophy, cognitive science, and neuroscience over the last 30 years. There are three main sections, devoted to monographs, edited collections of papers, and articles. The first two of these sections are each divided into three subsections containing books in each of the main areas of research. The third section is divided into 12 subsections, with 10 subject headings for philosophical articles along with two additional subsections for articles in cognitive science and neuroscience. Of course the division is somewhat arbitrary, but I hope that it makes the bibliography easier to use. This bibliography has first been compiled by Thomas Metzinger and David Chalmers to appear in print in two philosophical anthologies on conscious experience (Metzinger 1995a, b). From 1995 onwards it has been continuously updated by Thomas Metzinger, and now is freely available as a PDF-, RTF-, or HTML-file. This bibliography mainly attempts to cover the Anglo-Saxon and German debates, in a non-annotated, fully formatted way that makes it easy to "cut and paste" from the original file. To a certain degree this bibliography also contains items in other languages than English and German - all submissions in other languages are welcome. Last update of current version: July 13th, 2001

Emerging Consciousness as a Result of Complex-Dynamical Interaction Process

A quite general interaction process within a multi-component system is analysed by the extended effective potential method, liberated from usual limitations of perturbation theory or integrable model. The obtained causally complete solution of the many-body problem reveals the phenomenon of dynamic multivaluedness, or redundance, of emerging, incompatible system realisations and dynamic entanglement of system components within each realisation. The ensuing concept of dynamic complexity (and related intrinsic chaoticity) is absolutely universal and can be applied to the problem of consciousness that emerges now as a high enough, properly specified level of unreduced complexity of a suitable interaction process. This complexity level can be identified with the appearance of bound, permanently localised states in the multivalued brain dynamics from strongly chaotic states of unconscious intelligence, by analogy with classical behaviour emergence from quantum states at much lower levels of world dynamics. We show that the main properties of this dynamically emerging consciousness (and intelligence, at the preceding complexity level) correspond to empirically derived properties of natural versions and obtain causally substantiated conclusions about their artificial realisation, including the fundamentally justified paradigm of genuine machine consciousness. This rigorously defined machine consciousness is different from both natural consciousness and any mechanistic, dynamically single-valued imitation of the latter. We use then the same, truly universal concept of complexity to derive equally rigorous conclusions about mental and social implications of the machine consciousness paradigm, demonstrating its indispensable role in the next stage of civilisation development

Executive functions in insight versus non-insight problem solving: an individual differences approach

Original article can be found at: http://www.informaworld.com/smpp/title~content=t713685607~db=all Copyright Informa / Taylor and FrancisThis study investigated the roles of the executive functions of inhibition and switching and of verbal and visuo-spatial working memory capacities in insight and non-insight tasks. Eighteen insight tasks, 10 non-insight tasks and measures of individual differences in working memory capacities, switching and inhibition were administered to 120 participants. Performance on insight problems was not linked with executive functions of inhibition or switching but was linked positively to measures of verbal and visuo-spatial working memory capacities. Non-insight task performance was positively linked to the executive function of switching (but not to inhibition) and to verbal and visuo-spatial working memory capacities. These patterns regarding executive functions were maintained when the insight and non-insight composites were split into verbal and spatial insight and non-insight composite scores. The results are discussed in relation to dual processing accounts of thinking.Peer reviewe

The propositional nature of human associative learning

The past 50 years have seen an accumulation of evidence suggesting that associative learning depends oil high-level cognitive processes that give rise to propositional knowledge. Yet, many learning theorists maintain a belief in a learning mechanism in which links between mental representations are formed automatically. We characterize and highlight the differences between the propositional and link approaches, and review the relevant empirical evidence. We conclude that learning is the consequence of propositional reasoning processes that cooperate with the unconscious processes involved in memory retrieval and perception. We argue that this new conceptual framework allows many of the important recent advances in associative learning research to be retained, but recast in a model that provides a firmer foundation for both immediate application and future research