High level cognitive information processing in neural networks

Two related research efforts were addressed: (1) high-level connectionist cognitive modeling; and (2) local neural circuit modeling. The goals of the first effort were to develop connectionist models of high-level cognitive processes such as problem solving or natural language understanding, and to understand the computational requirements of such models. The goals of the second effort were to develop biologically-realistic model of local neural circuits, and to understand the computational behavior of such models. In keeping with the nature of NASA's Innovative Research Program, all the work conducted under the grant was highly innovative. For instance, the following ideas, all summarized, are contributions to the study of connectionist/neural networks: (1) the temporal-winner-take-all, relative-position encoding, and pattern-similarity association techniques; (2) the importation of logical combinators into connection; (3) the use of analogy-based reasoning as a bridge across the gap between the traditional symbolic paradigm and the connectionist paradigm; and (4) the application of connectionism to the domain of belief representation/reasoning. The work on local neural circuit modeling also departs significantly from the work of related researchers. In particular, its concentration on low-level neural phenomena that could support high-level cognitive processing is unusual within the area of biological local circuit modeling, and also serves to expand the horizons of the artificial neural net field

Attitudes in context: Automatic, systematic, and lateral minority and majority influence

Dickel N. Attitudes in context: Automatic, systematic, and lateral minority and majority influence. Bielefeld: Universitätsbibliothek; 2012

Literal Perceptual Inference

In this paper, I argue that theories of perception that appeal to Helmholtz’s idea of unconscious inference (“Helmholtzian” theories) should be taken literally, i.e. that the inferences appealed to in such theories are inferences in the full sense of the term, as employed elsewhere in philosophy and in ordinary discourse. In the course of the argument, I consider constraints on inference based on the idea that inference is a deliberate acton, and on the idea that inferences depend on the syntactic structure of representations. I argue that inference is a personal-level but sometimes unconscious process that cannot in general be distinguished from association on the basis of the structures of the representations over which it’s defined. I also critique arguments against representationalist interpretations of Helmholtzian theories, and argue against the view that perceptual inference is encapsulated in a module

A functional-cognitive framework for attitude research

In attitude research, behaviours are often used as proxies for attitudes and attitudinal processes. This practice is problematic because it conflates the behaviours that need to be explained (explanandum) with the mental constructs that are used to explain these behaviours (explanans). In the current chapter we propose a meta-theoretical framework that resolves this problem by distinguishing between two levels of analysis. According to the proposed framework, attitude research can be conceptualised as the scientific study of evaluation. Evaluation is defined not in terms of mental constructs but in terms of elements in the environment, more specifically, as the effect of stimuli on evaluative responses. From this perspective, attitude research provides answers to two questions: (1) Which elements in the environment moderate evaluation? (2) What mental processes and representations mediate evaluation? Research on the first question provides explanations of evaluative responses in terms of elements in the environment (functional level of analysis); research on the second question offers explanations of evaluation in terms of mental processes and representations (cognitive level of analysis). These two levels of analysis are mutually supportive, in that better explanations at one level lead to better explanations at the other level. However, their mutually supportive relation requires a clear distinction between the concepts of their explanans and explanandum, which are conflated if behaviours are treated as proxies for mental constructs. The value of this functional-cognitive framework is illustrated by applying it to four central questions of attitude research

Carving Cognition at its Joints: Insights from the Interaction between Explicit and Implicit Social Cognition

The distinction of cognition into kinds of cognitive process has proven theoretically fruitful and empirically compelling, but there remain significant challenges in deciding how best to carve cognition. First, it is unclear how to design measurement procedures that select distinct kinds of cognitive processing as exclusively as possible and, conversely, how to interpret the results of different kinds of measurement procedure. Second, the distinction between kinds of cognition must be specified with enough precision to derive empirically testable and falsifiable predictions. Third, there must be a reasonable explanation, ultimately compatible with phylogenetic evidence, for the existence of the specified distinction between kinds of cognition. The present research investigates the mutual influences between implicit and explicit self-knowledge and the influence of perceived validity on implicit and explicit evaluations. The findings challenge existing specifications of the distinction between kinds of cognition, which suggest that implicit cognition should be less sensitive than explicit cognition to situational context. As an alternative, it is suggested that the key distinction between kinds of cognition involves the capacity for quantification, which is a result of differences in the principles of lower-level and higher-level mental representation. Specifically, lower-level cognition is assumed to be holistic, rooted in distributed representations, whereas higher-level cognition is assumed to be symbolic, rooted in localist representations. Interaction between these processes therefore involves quantifying across holistic tokens to produce symbolic types. This perspective has important implications for theory and measurement in empirical psychology

An Investigation into Hybrid Models of Mindreading: A Dual Type Theory Account

Mindreading, or attributing mental states to others, involves instances of simulation and theory; but there is controversy over which one of these methods is the primary, or default, mechanism. I propose that mindreading is a theory-based process, such that we utilize theory over simulation when both are available and reliable. To argue my position, I suggest that theory has been inaccurately portrayed in past discussion and that we possess two types: a connectionist network (tt1) and a traditional, conceptual folk-psychology (tt2). By dividing theory in this way, we can explain common phenomena of mindreading that other theory-based accounts do not explicitly imply. Previously used as evidence for a simulation-based model, these phenomena are now compatible with a Dual Type Theory Account. Additionally, the distinction between type 1 and type 2 theory invites a new argument for primacy by appealing to the cognitive resources required by a mechanism, such that the primary method will be the one that requires the least amount of effort and is available in every case. Since tt1 is effortless and automatic, it is likely the default process. Tt1 provides us with a modular, fast, unconscious mindreading tool that is not dependent on conceptual knowledge, yet it can be influenced and adjusted by tt2 via supervised learning

The epiphenomenal mind

The Epiphenomenal Mind is both a deflationary attack on the powers of the human mind and a defence of human subjectivity. It is deflationary because in the thesis I argue that consciousness is an epiphenomenal consequence of events in the brain. It is a defence of human subjectivity because I argue that the mind is sui generis real, irreducible, and largely an endogenous product (i.e. not dependent on society or its resources). Part I is devoted to arguing that the conscious mind is epiphenomenal. Arguing from, the irreducibility of mental states, the causal closure of the physical domain, and the principle of causal explanatory exclusion, I seek to demonstrate that all theories of mental causation necessarily violate one or more of these premises. Contemporary approaches to mental causation come under two broad categories, those that argue that mental events are supervenient on physical events (such as Davidson, Kim and Horgan) and those (like Haskar) who argue that the mind is an emergent property of the brain. Supervenience based theories, I argue, end up reducing mental states in their search for a theory of mental causation and emergence based theories end up violating the principle of the causal closure of the physical. In part II, I explore some of the consequences of epiphenomenalism for social theory. This exploration comes in the context of a defence of human subjectivity against (i.) those sociological imperialists who view the mind and self as a 'gift of society', and (ii.) social situationalists who have abandoned the concept of action and an interest in 'what's in the head' of the actor, in favour of a concept of social action which views behaviour as action only to the extent that it is socially meaningful. The conclusion is that the social sciences should return to an interpretative style (Weberian) methodology