6,426 research outputs found

    Talking Nets: A Multi-Agent Connectionist Approach to Communication and Trust between Individuals

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    A multi-agent connectionist model is proposed that consists of a collection of individual recurrent networks that communicate with each other, and as such is a network of networks. The individual recurrent networks simulate the process of information uptake, integration and memorization within individual agents, while the communication of beliefs and opinions between agents is propagated along connections between the individual networks. A crucial aspect in belief updating based on information from other agents is the trust in the information provided. In the model, trust is determined by the consistency with the receiving agents’ existing beliefs, and results in changes of the connections between individual networks, called trust weights. Thus activation spreading and weight change between individual networks is analogous to standard connectionist processes, although trust weights take a specific function. Specifically, they lead to a selective propagation and thus filtering out of less reliable information, and they implement Grice’s (1975) maxims of quality and quantity in communication. The unique contribution of communicative mechanisms beyond intra-personal processing of individual networks was explored in simulations of key phenomena involving persuasive communication and polarization, lexical acquisition, spreading of stereotypes and rumors, and a lack of sharing unique information in group decisions

    Filling the Gaps: Hume and Connectionism on the Continued Existence of Unperceived Objects

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    In Book I, part iv, section 2 of the Treatise, "Of scepticism with regard to the senses," Hume presents two different answers to the question of how we come to believe in the continued existence of unperceived objects. He rejects his first answer shortly after its formulation, and the remainder of the section articulates an alternative account of the development of the belief. The account that Hume adopts, however, is susceptible to a number of insurmountable objections, which motivates a reassessment of his original proposal. This paper defends a version of Hume's initial explanation of the belief in continued existence and examines some of its philosophical implications

    A Defence of Cartesian Materialism

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    One of the principal tasks Dennett sets himself in "Consciousness Explained" is to demolish the Cartesian theatre model of phenomenal consciousness, which in its contemporary garb takes the form of Cartesian materialism: the idea that conscious experience is a process of presentation realized in the physical materials of the brain. The now standard response to Dennett is that, in focusing on Cartesian materialism, he attacks an impossibly naive account of consciousness held by no one currently working in cognitive science or the philosophy of mind. Our response is quite different. We believe that, once properly formulated, Cartesian materialism is no straw man. Rather, it is an attractive hypothesis about the relationship between the computational architecture of the brain and phenomenal consciousness, and hence one that is worthy of further exploration. Consequently, our primary aim in this paper is to defend Cartesian materialism from Dennett's assault. We do this by showing that Dennett's argument against this position is founded on an implicit assumption (about the relationship between phenomenal experience and information coding in the brain), which while valid in the context of classical cognitive science, is not forced on connectionism

    High level cognitive information processing in neural networks

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    Two related research efforts were addressed: (1) high-level connectionist cognitive modeling; and (2) local neural circuit modeling. The goals of the first effort were to develop connectionist models of high-level cognitive processes such as problem solving or natural language understanding, and to understand the computational requirements of such models. The goals of the second effort were to develop biologically-realistic model of local neural circuits, and to understand the computational behavior of such models. In keeping with the nature of NASA's Innovative Research Program, all the work conducted under the grant was highly innovative. For instance, the following ideas, all summarized, are contributions to the study of connectionist/neural networks: (1) the temporal-winner-take-all, relative-position encoding, and pattern-similarity association techniques; (2) the importation of logical combinators into connection; (3) the use of analogy-based reasoning as a bridge across the gap between the traditional symbolic paradigm and the connectionist paradigm; and (4) the application of connectionism to the domain of belief representation/reasoning. The work on local neural circuit modeling also departs significantly from the work of related researchers. In particular, its concentration on low-level neural phenomena that could support high-level cognitive processing is unusual within the area of biological local circuit modeling, and also serves to expand the horizons of the artificial neural net field

    Connectionism and psychological notions of similarity

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    Kitcher (1996) offers a critique of connectionism based on the belief that connectionist information processing relies inherently on metric similarity relations. Metric similarity measures are independent of the order of comparison (they are symmetrical) whereas human similarity judgments are asymmetrical. We answer this challenge by describing how connectionist systems naturally produce asymmetric similarity effects. Similarity is viewed as an implicit byproduct of information processing (in particular categorization) whereas the reporting of similarity judgments is a separate and explicit meta-cognitive process. The view of similarity as a process rather than the product of an explicit comparison is discussed in relation to the spatial, feature, and structural theories of similarity

    A Cognitive Mind-map Framework to Foster Trust

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    The explorative mind-map is a dynamic framework, that emerges automatically from the input, it gets. It is unlike a verificative modeling system where existing (human) thoughts are placed and connected together. In this regard, explorative mind-maps change their size continuously, being adaptive with connectionist cells inside; mind-maps process data input incrementally and offer lots of possibilities to interact with the user through an appropriate communication interface. With respect to a cognitive motivated situation like a conversation between partners, mind-maps become interesting as they are able to process stimulating signals whenever they occur. If these signals are close to an own understanding of the world, then the conversational partner becomes automatically more trustful than if the signals do not or less match the own knowledge scheme. In this (position) paper, we therefore motivate explorative mind-maps as a cognitive engine and propose these as a decision support engine to foster trust.Comment: 5 pages, 4 Figures, Extended Version, presented at the 5th International Conference on Natural Computation, 200
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