Introduction to Cirquent Calculus and Abstract Resource Semantics

This paper introduces a refinement of the sequent calculus approach called cirquent calculus. While in Gentzen-style proof trees sibling (or cousin, etc.) sequents are disjoint sequences of formulas, in cirquent calculus they are permitted to share elements. Explicitly allowing or disallowing shared resources and thus taking to a more subtle level the resource-awareness intuitions underlying substructural logics, cirquent calculus offers much greater flexibility and power than sequent calculus does. A need for substantially new deductive tools came with the birth of computability logic (see http://www.cis.upenn.edu/~giorgi/cl.html) - the semantically constructed formal theory of computational resources, which has stubbornly resisted any axiomatization attempts within the framework of traditional syntactic approaches. Cirquent calculus breaks the ice. Removing contraction from the full collection of its rules yields a sound and complete system for the basic fragment CL5 of computability logic. Doing the same in sequent calculus, on the other hand, throws out the baby with the bath water, resulting in the strictly weaker affine logic. An implied claim of computability logic is that it is CL5 rather than affine logic that adequately materializes the resource philosophy traditionally associated with the latter. To strengthen this claim, the paper further introduces an abstract resource semantics and shows the soundness and completeness of CL5 with respect to it.Comment: To appear in Journal of Logic and Computatio

An Objection to Naturalism and Atheism from Logic

I proffer a success argument for classical logical consequence. I articulate in what sense that notion of consequence should be regarded as the privileged notion for metaphysical inquiry aimed at uncovering the fundamental nature of the world. Classical logic breeds necessitism. I use necessitism to produce problems for both ontological naturalism and atheism

Bibliography on Realizability

AbstractThis document is a bibliography on realizability and related matters. It has been collected by Lars Birkedal based on submissions from the participants in “A Workshop on Realizability Semantics and Its Applications”, Trento, Italy, June 30–July 1, 1999. It is available in BibTEX format at the following URL: http://www.cs.cmu.edu./~birkedal/realizability-bib.html

Cirquent calculus deepened

Cirquent calculus is a new proof-theoretic and semantic framework, whose main distinguishing feature is being based on circuits, as opposed to the more traditional approaches that deal with tree-like objects such as formulas or sequents. Among its advantages are greater efficiency, flexibility and expressiveness. This paper presents a detailed elaboration of a deep-inference cirquent logic, which is naturally and inherently resource conscious. It shows that classical logic, both syntactically and semantically, is just a special, conservative fragment of this more general and, in a sense, more basic logic -- the logic of resources in the form of cirquent calculus. The reader will find various arguments in favor of switching to the new framework, such as arguments showing the insufficiency of the expressive power of linear logic or other formula-based approaches to developing resource logics, exponential improvements over the traditional approaches in both representational and proof complexities offered by cirquent calculus, and more. Among the main purposes of this paper is to provide an introductory-style starting point for what, as the author wishes to hope, might have a chance to become a new line of research in proof theory -- a proof theory based on circuits instead of formulas.Comment: Significant improvements over the previous version

Embodiment and embodied design

Picture this. A preverbal infant straddles the center of a seesaw. She gently tilts her weight back and forth from one side to the other, sensing as each side tips downward and then back up again. This child cannot articulate her observations in simple words, let alone in scientific jargon. Can she learn anything from this experience? If so, what is she learning, and what role might such learning play in her future interactions in the world? Of course, this is a nonverbal bodily experience, and any learning that occurs must be bodily, physical learning. But does this nonverbal bodily experience have anything to do with the sort of learning that takes place in schools - learning verbal and abstract concepts? In this chapter, we argue that the body has everything to do with learning, even learning of abstract concepts. Take mathematics, for example. Mathematical practice is thought to be about producing and manipulating arbitrary symbolic inscriptions that bear abstract, universal truisms untainted by human corporeality. Mathematics is thought to epitomize our species’ collective historical achievement of transcending and, perhaps, escaping the mundane, material condition of having a body governed by haphazard terrestrial circumstance. Surely mathematics is disembodied

Actors, actions, and initiative in normative system specification

The logic of norms, called deontic logic, has been used to specify normative constraints for information systems. For example, one can specify in deontic logic the constraints that a book borrowed from a library should be returned within three weeks, and that if it is not returned, the library should send a reminder. Thus, the notion of obligation to perform an action arises naturally in system specification. Intuitively, deontic logic presupposes the concept of anactor who undertakes actions and is responsible for fulfilling obligations. However, the concept of an actor has not been formalized until now in deontic logic. We present a formalization in dynamic logic, which allows us to express the actor who initiates actions or choices. This is then combined with a formalization, presented earlier, of deontic logic in dynamic logic, which allows us to specify obligations, permissions, and prohibitions to perform an action. The addition of actors allows us to expresswho has the responsibility to perform an action. In addition to the application of the concept of an actor in deontic logic, we discuss two other applications of actors. First, we show how to generalize an approach taken up by De Nicola and Hennessy, who eliminate from CCS in favor of internal and external choice. We show that our generalization allows a more accurate specification of system behavior than is possible without it. Second, we show that actors can be used to resolve a long-standing paradox of deontic logic, called the paradox of free-choice permission. Towards the end of the paper, we discuss whether the concept of an actor can be combined with that of an object to formalize the concept of active objects