Congestion dependencies in the European gas pipeline network during crises.

Conflicts, geo-political crises, terrorist attacks, or natural disasters can turn large parts of energy distribution networks off-line, creating unexpected congestion in the remaining infrastructure. Given the importance of the security of natural gas supply, we need models that enable the management of network congestion, especially during crises. We develop a decentralized model of congestion control to explore the effects of removing supply or transit countries from the network. Recently, in R. Carvalho et. al. PLoS ONE, Vol. 9, no. 3, 2014, we evaluated how cooperation between countries helps to mitigate the effect of crises. Here, we extend our previous results by exploring the structure of downstream and upstream congestion dependencies between countries

Assessing the impact of investments in Cross-border pipelines on the security of gas supply in the EU

The European Union (EU) is highly dependent on external natural gas supplies and has experienced severe gas cuts in the past, mainly driven by the technical complexity of the high-pressure natural gas system and political instability in some of the supplier countries. Declining indigenous natural gas production and growing demand for gas in the EU has encouraged investments in cross-border transmission capacity to increase the sharing of resources between the member states, particularly in the aftermath of the Russia-Ukraine gas crisis in January 2009. This article models the EU interconnected natural gas system to assess the impact of investments in the gas transmission network by comparing the performance of the system for scenarios of 2009 and 2017, using a mathematical optimization approach. The model uses the technical data of the infrastructures, such as production, storage, regasification, and exchange capacity through cross-border pipelines, and proposes an optimal collaborative strategy which ensures the best possible coverage of overall demand. The actual peak demand situations of the extreme cases of 2009 and 2017 are analyzed under hypothetical supply crises caused by geopolitical or commercial disputes. The application of the proposed methodology leads to results which show that the investments made in this system do not decongest the cross-border pipeline network but improve the demand coverage. Countries such as Spain and Italy experience a lower impact on gas supply due to the variety of mechanisms available to cover their demand. Furthermore, the findings prove that cooperation facilitates the supply of demand in crisis situations

The Economics of Natural Gas Infrastructure Investments - Theory and Model-based Analysis for Europe

Changing supply structures, security of supply threats and efforts to eliminate bottlenecks and increase competition in the European gas market potentially warrant infrastructure investments. However, which investments are actually efficient is unclear. From a theoretical perspective, concepts from other sectors regarding the estimation of congestion cost and efficient investment can be applied - with some extensions - to natural gas markets. Investigations in a simple analytical framework, thereby, show that congestion does not necessarily imply that investment is efficient, and that there are multiple interdependencies between investments in different infrastructure elements (pipeline grid, gas storage, import terminals for liquefied natural gas (LNG)) which need to be considered in an applied analysis. Such interdependencies strengthen the case for a model-based analysis. An optimization model minimizing costs can illustrate the first-best solution with respect to investments in natural gas infrastructure; gas market characteristics such as temperature-dependent stochasticity of demand or the lumpiness of investments can be included. Scenario analyses help to show the effects of changing the underlying model presumption. Hence, results are projections subject to data and model assumption - and not forecasts. However, as they depict the optimal, cost-minimizing outcome, results provide a guideline to policymakers and regulators regarding the desirable market outcome. A stochastic mixed-integer dispatch and investment model for the European natural gas infrastructure is developed as an optimization model taking the theoretical inter-dependencies into account. It is based on an extensive infrastructure database including long-distance transmission pipelines, LNG terminals and gas storage sites with a high level of spatial granularity. It is parameterized with assumptions on supply and demand developments as well as empirically derived infrastructure extension costs to perform model simulations of the European gas market until 2025. In the framework of the conservative demand forecast of the European Commission, efficient infrastructure expansion (starting from the 2010 infrastructure with all projects under construction being completed) is limited. The constant demand in combination with the newly created import capacities on the LNG (UK, Spain) and pipeline (Nord Stream, Medgaz) side means the gas infrastructure is well equipped to deal with declining European production. The reduction of flexibility provided by domestic production is compensated by flexible LNG imports if the global LNG market remains well supplied. Further scenario analyses illustrate the effects of changing the presumptions on supply and demand: A low LNG price does not increase LNG investments significantly, but reduces the requirements for pipeline investments in Europe, especially in East to West direction on the continent. An assumed decline in the flexibility of LNG imports in Europe, conversely, would greatly reduces efficient LNG capacity additions as the option to flexibly import natural gas is one of the favorable characteristics of such facilities. Consequently, investments in natural gas storage would have to increase substantially to provide flexibility through a different technology. This is also true if flexible LNG is replaced by either additional gas volumes imported via long-distance transmission pipelines from the Caspian region or if it is substituted by gas production from unconventional sources in Europe. Rising demand, intuitively, requires additional investments. The simulation of security of supply emergency scenarios demonstrates that redundant infrastructure capacities and gas stocks in excess of the volumes required to balance supply and demand can be efficient - even if the emergency probability is low. Modeling a one-month disruption of Russian transits via Ukraine and Belarus in 2020 shows that the infrastructure is rather resilient against such a threat. Reasons are alternative routes such as Nord Stream and the infrastructure investments made in the aftermath of the 2009 Ukraine transit disruption. Only limited additional investment in interconnection capacities between countries in Eastern Europe are found to be efficient. However, it also becomes evident that, with an emergency probability as low as two percent, it is efficient to stock up to 10 billion cubic meter of natural gas additionally in European gas storage facilities. Conversely, the infrastructure is found to be less resilient regarding a prolonged supply stop from North Africa as seen for Libya since February 2011. Italy would be affected particularly from a combined export disruption in Libya and Algeria, making significant investments in interconnections with Central and Northern Europe efficient. Additionally, further LNG import capacities would also be efficient to mitigate the consequences of a North African pipeline export stop. These investments in redundant import capacities become more efficient the higher the probability of the emergency. The analysis yields implications for natural gas infrastructure investments. With respect to the general results, it is illustrated how developments in one region (unconventional gas production, a new import corridor from the Caspian region) have significant implications for investments in geographically separated markets. The efficiency of investments in additional storage capacity is greatly affected by developments in the global LNG market and the composition of the European supply mix. Investments in redundant capacity to enhance security of supply are also found to be beneficial even if the probability of the respective emergency is low. However, it is also shown that a detailed analysis is required to identify specific, means-tested investment options - universal infrastructure standards may be of limited value. Furthermore, investments benefiting one region may efficiently take place outside the borders of that region. Important questions for further research, then, are (i) how these efficient investments can be incentivized through a regulatory framework and (ii) who bears their costs, which implicitly includes the question whether or not short-term security of supply is a public good. Regarding the applied analysis, further work may also target an improved modeling of interdependencies of the infrastructure system with natural gas consumption in the power and industry sectors (demand side management)

Impact of compressor failures on gas transmission network capability

National Grid, the gas operator in the United Kingdom, has experienced challenges in evaluating the capability of its gas transmission network to maintain function in the event of risks particularly to withstand the impact of compressor failures. We propose a mathematical programming model to support the operator in dealing with the problem. Several solution techniques are developed to solve the various versions of the problem efficiently. In the case of little data on compressor failure, an uncertainty theory is applied to solve this problem if the compressor failures are independent; while a robust optimisation technique is developed to solve it when they are not. Otherwise, when there are data on compressor failure, Monte Carlo simulation is applied to find the expected capability of the gas transmission network. Computational experiments, carried out on a case study at National Grid, demonstrate the efficiency of the proposed model and solution techniques. A further analysis is performed to determine the impact of compressor failures and suggest efficient maintenance policies for National Grid

Impact of compressor failures on gas transmission network capability

National Grid, the gas operator in the United Kingdom, has experienced challenges in evaluating the capability of its gas transmission network to maintain function in the event of risks particularly to withstand the impact of compressor failures. We propose a mathematical programming model to support the operator in dealing with the problem. Several solution techniques are developed to solve the various versions of the problem efficiently. In the case of little data on compressor failure, an uncertainty theory is applied to solve this problem if the compressor failures are independent; while a robust optimisation technique is developed to solve it when they are not. Otherwise, when there are data on compressor failure, Monte Carlo simulation is applied to find the expected capability of the gas transmission network. Computational experiments, carried out on a case study at National Grid, demonstrate the efficiency of the proposed model and solution techniques. A further analysis is performed to determine the impact of compressor failures and suggest efficient maintenance policies for National Grid

Training of Crisis Mappers and Map Production from Multi-sensor Data: Vernazza Case Study (Cinque Terre National Park, Italy)

This aim of paper is to presents the development of a multidisciplinary project carried out by the cooperation between Politecnico di Torino and ITHACA (Information Technology for Humanitarian Assistance, Cooperation and Action). The goal of the project was the training in geospatial data acquiring and processing for students attending Architecture and Engineering Courses, in order to start up a team of "volunteer mappers". Indeed, the project is aimed to document the environmental and built heritage subject to disaster; the purpose is to improve the capabilities of the actors involved in the activities connected in geospatial data collection, integration and sharing. The proposed area for testing the training activities is the Cinque Terre National Park, registered in the World Heritage List since 1997. The area was affected by flood on the 25th of October 2011. According to other international experiences, the group is expected to be active after emergencies in order to upgrade maps, using data acquired by typical geomatic methods and techniques such as terrestrial and aerial Lidar, close-range and aerial photogrammetry, topographic and GNSS instruments etc.; or by non conventional systems and instruments such us UAV, mobile mapping etc. The ultimate goal is to implement a WebGIS platform to share all the data collected with local authorities and the Civil Protectio

European energy security reimagined: mapping the risks, challenges and opportunities of changing energy geographies

Following the Paris Agreement, the energy landscape is changing more than ever. While these changes bring opportunity, they also come with risks, requiring traditional concepts of energy security to be reconsidered. These changes in the energy landscape are mirrored by shifting political balances as the world becomes increasingly multipolar, raising questions of which rules will govern energy systems, trade, markets and investment. As geopolitical turmoil comes closer to the EU’s borders, energy systems are becoming increasingly cross-border and regional in nature, intertwining interest in energy security. Cross-border initiatives in energy are proliferating across Eurasia, driven in part by the rise of China, with the potential to create new energy regions, corridors and geographies. These developments can lead to new geographies along infrastructure lines and could result in competitive regionalism and regulatory fault lines. This paper reflects an initial step to identify potential risks emerging in this new energy landscape and assess the ability of existing institutions and tools of governance to address them. The study aims to describe the risk landscape and governance shortcomings and identify actions the EU can take to both improve its existing external energy governance and empower existing institutions to address these risks. Ultimately, for the EU and Germany, the challenge will be to turn the potential risks of connectivity into opportunities and to help establish a level playing field that ensures competitiveness through common rules. (author's abstract

Enabling NATO’s Collective Defense: Critical Infrastructure Security and Resiliency (NATO COE-DAT Handbook 1)

In 2014 NATO’s Center of Excellence-Defence Against Terrorism (COE-DAT) launched the inaugural course on “Critical Infrastructure Protection Against Terrorist Attacks.” As this course garnered increased attendance and interest, the core lecturer team felt the need to update the course in critical infrastructure (CI) taking into account the shift from an emphasis on “protection” of CI assets to “security and resiliency.” What was lacking in the fields of academe, emergency management, and the industry practitioner community was a handbook that leveraged the collective subject matter expertise of the core lecturer team, a handbook that could serve to educate government leaders, state and private-sector owners and operators of critical infrastructure, academicians, and policymakers in NATO and partner countries. Enabling NATO’s Collective Defense: Critical Infrastructure Security and Resiliency is the culmination of such an effort, the first major collaborative research project under a Memorandum of Understanding between the US Army War College Strategic Studies Institute (SSI), and NATO COE-DAT. The research project began in October 2020 with a series of four workshops hosted by SSI. The draft chapters for the book were completed in late January 2022. Little did the research team envision the Russian invasion of Ukraine in February this year. The Russian occupation of the Zaporizhzhya nuclear power plant, successive missile attacks against Ukraine’s electric generation and distribution facilities, rail transport, and cyberattacks against almost every sector of the country’s critical infrastructure have been on world display. Russian use of its gas supplies as a means of economic warfare against Europe—designed to undermine NATO unity and support for Ukraine—is another timely example of why adversaries, nation-states, and terrorists alike target critical infrastructure. Hence, the need for public-private sector partnerships to secure that infrastructure and build the resiliency to sustain it when attacked. Ukraine also highlights the need for NATO allies to understand where vulnerabilities exist in host nation infrastructure that will undermine collective defense and give more urgency to redressing and mitigating those fissures.https://press.armywarcollege.edu/monographs/1951/thumbnail.jp