The Good Samaritan and the Hygienic Cook: A Cautionary Tale About Linguistic Data

When developing formal theories of the meaning of language, it is appropriate to consider how apparent paradoxes and conundrums of language are best resolved. But if we base our analysis on a small sample of data then we may fail to take into account the influence of other aspects of meaning on our intuitions. Here we consider the so-called Good Samaritan Paradox (Prior, 1958), where we wish to avoid any implication that there is an obligation to rob someone from "You must help a robbed man". We argue that before settling on a formal analysis of such sentences, we should consider examples of the same form, but with intuitively ?different entailments ? such as "You must use a clean knife" ? and also actively seek other examples that exhibit similar contrasts in meaning, even if they do not exemplify the phenomena that is under investigation. This can refine our intuitions and help us to attribute aspects of interpretation to the various facets of meaning

Designing Normative Theories for Ethical and Legal Reasoning: LogiKEy Framework, Methodology, and Tool Support

A framework and methodology---termed LogiKEy---for the design and engineering of ethical reasoners, normative theories and deontic logics is presented. The overall motivation is the development of suitable means for the control and governance of intelligent autonomous systems. LogiKEy's unifying formal framework is based on semantical embeddings of deontic logics, logic combinations and ethico-legal domain theories in expressive classic higher-order logic (HOL). This meta-logical approach enables the provision of powerful tool support in LogiKEy: off-the-shelf theorem provers and model finders for HOL are assisting the LogiKEy designer of ethical intelligent agents to flexibly experiment with underlying logics and their combinations, with ethico-legal domain theories, and with concrete examples---all at the same time. Continuous improvements of these off-the-shelf provers, without further ado, leverage the reasoning performance in LogiKEy. Case studies, in which the LogiKEy framework and methodology has been applied and tested, give evidence that HOL's undecidability often does not hinder efficient experimentation.Comment: 50 pages; 10 figure

Deontic ‘cocktail’ according to E. Mally’s receipt

In 1926, Ernst Mally, an Austrian logician, has introduced a system of deontic logic in which he has proposed three fundamental distinctions which proved to be important in the context of the further development of the logic of norms. It is argued that in his philosophical considerations Mally has introduced a number of important distinctions concerning the very concept of norm, but by getting them confused in introducing the subsequent formalisms he failed to formally preserve them. In some of his philosophically made distinctions Mally apparently foresaw contemporary trends in logic of norms. To some extent this particular feature of Mally’s system open wide opportunities to reconstruct –– with the corresponding renovations — his illformed Deontik into many nowadays known systems of logic of norms and thus provides a fertile ground for this kind of research

Harnessing Higher-Order (Meta-)Logic to Represent and Reason with Complex Ethical Theories

The computer-mechanization of an ambitious explicit ethical theory, Gewirth's Principle of Generic Consistency, is used to showcase an approach for representing and reasoning with ethical theories exhibiting complex logical features like alethic and deontic modalities, indexicals, higher-order quantification, among others. Harnessing the high expressive power of Church's type theory as a meta-logic to semantically embed a combination of quantified non-classical logics, our work pushes existing boundaries in knowledge representation and reasoning. We demonstrate that intuitive encodings of complex ethical theories and their automation on the computer are no longer antipodes.Comment: 14 page

How Knowledge Affects Obligations:a Study on the Logic of Knowledge-Based Obligations

A doctor generally does not have an obligation to treat a person if the doctor does not know that he/she is ill. But when the doctor knows the person is ill, the doctor ought to treat him/her. So what we ought to do depends a lot on what we know at that moment. This thesis provides a logical formalization of the concept of knowledge-based conditional obligation which paraphrases `A ought to be achieved by an agent under the condition that he/she knows B'. This notion is characterized by a sound and strongly complete axiomatization in this thesis. Furthermore, the framework is dynamified in order to show how knowledge change affects obligation change. Accordingly, those situations where agents' obligations are updated by their dynamic information can be modelled. Besides information change, norm change may also lead to new obligations. The notion of relativized conditional obligations is proposed for conceptualizing obligations induced by different normative systems. Several types of updates on normative systems are studied. They bring about new obligations or defeat original obligations in different ways. In the final chapters, this thesis jumps out of the approach of `ought-to-be' obligations and conceptualizes the notion of knowledge-based `ought-to-do' obligation based on dynamic epistemic logic. The basic idea of defining this notion is that an action ought to be done if and only if the action always improves the initial situation to a better situation. A sound and strongly complete axiom system is also established

Temporal Alethic Dyadic Deontic Logic and the Contrary-to-Duty Obligation Paradox

A contrary-to-duty obligation (sometimes called a reparational duty) is a conditional obligation where the condition is forbidden, e.g. “if you have hurt your friend, you should apologise”, “if he is guilty, he should confess”, and “if she will not keep her promise to you, she ought to call you”. It has proven very difficult to find plausible formalisations of such obligations in most deontic systems. In this paper, we will introduce and explore a set of temporal alethic dyadic deontic systems, i.e., systems that include temporal, alethic and dyadic deontic operators. We will then show how it is possible to use our formal apparatus to symbolise contrary-to-duty obligations and to solve the so-called contrary-to-duty (obligation) paradox, a problem well known in deontic logic. We will argue that this response to the puzzle has many attractive features. Semantic tableaux are used to characterise our systems proof theoretically and a kind of possible world semantics, inspired by the so-called T× W semantics, to characterise them semantically. Our models contain several different accessibility relations and a preference relation between possible worlds, which are used in the definitions of the truth conditions for the various operators. Soundness results are obtained for every tableau system and completeness results for a subclass of them

Actualism, Possibilism, and the Nature of Consequentialism

The actualism/possibilism debate in ethics is about whether counterfactuals of freedom concerning what an agent would freely do if they were in certain circumstances even partly determines that agent’s obligations. This debate arose from an argument against the coherence of utilitarianism in the deontic logic literature. In this chapter, we first trace the historical origins of this debate and then examine actualism, possibilism, and securitism through the lens of consequentialism. After examining their respective benefits and drawbacks, we argue that, contrary to what has been assumed, actualism and securitism both succumb to the so-called nonratifiability problem. In making this argument, we develop this problem in detail and argue that it’s a much more serious problem than has been appreciated. We conclude by arguing that an alternative view, hybridism, is independently the most plausible position and best fits with the nature of consequentialism, partly in light of avoiding the nonratifiability problem