29 research outputs found
Stream ciphers: A Practical Solution for Efficient Homomorphic-Ciphertext Compression
International audienceIn typical applications of homomorphic encryption, the first step consists for Alice to encrypt some plaintext m under Bob’s public key pk and to send the ciphertext c = HEpk(m) to some third-party evaluator Charlie. This paper specifically considers that first step, i.e. the problem of transmitting c as efficiently as possible from Alice to Charlie. As previously noted, a form of compression is achieved using hybrid encryption. Given a symmetric encryption scheme E, Alice picks a random key k and sends a much smaller ciphertext c′ = (HEpk(k), Ek(m)) that Charlie decompresses homomorphically into the original c using a decryption circuit CE−1 .In this paper, we revisit that paradigm in light of its concrete implemen- tation constraints; in particular E is chosen to be an additive IV-based stream cipher. We investigate the performances offered in this context by Trivium, which belongs to the eSTREAM portfolio, and we also pro- pose a variant with 128-bit security: Kreyvium. We show that Trivium, whose security has been firmly established for over a decade, and the new variant Kreyvium have an excellent performance
The MILP-Aided Conditional Differential Attack and Its Application to Trivium
Conditional differential attacks were proposed by Knellwolf et al. at ASIACRYPT 2010 which targeted at cryptographic primitives based on non-linear feedback shift registers. The main idea of conditional differential attacks lies in controlling the propagation of a difference through imposing some conditions on public/key variables. In this paper, we improve the conditional differential attack by introducing the mixed integer linear programming (MILP) method to it. Let be a set of conditions that we want to impose, where (resp. ) represents key (resp. public) variables and needs evaluating. Previous automatic conditional differential attacks evaluate just in order with the preference to zero. Based on the MILP method, conditions in could be automatically analysed together. In particular, to enhance the effect of conditional differential attacks, in our MILP models, we are concerned with minimizing the number of 1\u27s in and maximizing the number of weak keys.
~~~We apply our method to analyse the security of Trivium. As a result, key-recovery attacks are preformed up to the 978-round Trivium and non-randomness is detected up to the 1108-round Trivium of its 1152 rounds both in the weak-key setting. All the results are the best known so far considering the number of rounds and could be experimentally verified. Hopefully, the new method would provide insights on conditional differential attacks and the security evaluation of Trivium
Ten years of cube attacks
In 2009, Dinur and Shamir proposed the cube attack, an algebraic cryptanalysis technique that only requires black box access to a target cipher. Since then, this attack has received both many criticisms and endorsements from crypto community; this work aims at revising and collecting the many attacks that have been proposed starting from it.
We categorise all of these attacks in five classes; for each class, we provide a brief summary description along with the state-of-the-art references and the most recent cryptanalysis results. Furthermore, we extend and refine the new notation we proposed in 2021 and we use it to provide a consistent definition for each attack family. Finally, in the appendix, we provide an in-depth description of the kite attack framework, a cipher independent tool we firstly proposed in 2018 that implements the kite attack on GPUs. To prove its effectiveness, we use Mickey2.0 as a use case, showing how to embed it in the framework
Fault Analysis of the KATAN Family of Block Ciphers
In this paper, we investigate the security of the KATAN family of block ciphers against differential fault attacks. KATAN consists of three variants with 32, 48 and 64-bit block sizes, called KATAN32,KATAN48 and KATAN64, respectively. All three variants have the same key length of 80 bits. We assume a single-bit fault injection model where the adversary is supposed to be able to corrupt a single random bit of the internal state of the cipher and this fault injection process can be repeated (by resetting the cipher); i.e., the faults are transient rather than permanent. First, we determine suitable rounds for effective fault injections by analyzing distributions of low-degree (mainly, linear and quadratic) polynomial equations obtainable using the cube and extended cube attack techniques. Then, we show how to identify the exact position of faulty bits within the internal state by precomputing difference characteristics for each bit position at a given round and comparing these characteristics with ciphertext differences (XOR of faulty and non-faulty ciphertexts) during the online phase of the attack. The complexity of our attack on KATAN32 is 2^59 computations and about 115 fault injections. For KATAN48 and KATAN64, the attack requires 2^55 computations (for both variants), while the required number of fault injections is 211 and 278, respectively
Security in 1-wire system : case study : Home automation /
La automatización de viviendas es un campo de la tecnologÃa que siempre se encuentra en crecimiento, desarrollando sistemas que reducen los costos de los dispositivos.
Por esto, se ha logrado que la domótica esté al alcance de todos. Desde la aparición
de productos que permiten crear tu propio sistema domótico, y la reciente popularidad que ha tenido el Internet de las cosas (IoT), la industria de la automatización
de viviendas ha cambiado mucho. Tener la habilidad de controlar dispositivos a
través de Internet crea numerosas vulnerabilidades al sistema, permitiendo a un atacante controlar y ver todo lo que ocurre. En este trabajo se estudia un sistema
domótico que usa 1-wire como protocolo de comunicación. Originalmente, el sistema
carece de seguridad. Nuestro objetivo es implementar seguridad de la información a
través de la encriptación de los comandos del sistema, para asà poder proveer Confidencialidad, Integridad y Disponibilidad (CIA). Los resultados muestran no sólo la
implementación exitosa del módulo criptográfico dentro del sistema domótico para
proveer seguridad, sino que también se demuestra que añadir este proceso no afectarÃa
el modo en que el usuario maneja sus dispositivos.Incluye referencias bibliográfica
On Selection of Samples in Algebraic Attacks and a New Technique to Find Hidden Low Degree Equations
The best way of selecting samples in algebraic attacks against block ciphers is not well explored and understood. We introduce a simple strategy for selecting the plaintexts and demonstrate its strength by breaking reduced-round KATAN, LBLOCK and SIMON. For each case, we present a practical attack on reduced round version which outperforms previous attempts of algebraic cryptanalysis whose complexities were close to exhaustive search. The attack is based on the selection of samples using cube attack and ELIMLIN which was presented at FSE'12, and a new technique called proning. In the case of LBLOCK, we break 10 out of 32 rounds. In KATAN, we break 78 out of 254 rounds. Unlike previous attempts which break smaller number of rounds, we do not guess any bit of the key and we only use structural properties of the cipher to be able to break a higher number of rounds with much lower complexity. We show that cube attacks owe their success to the same properties and therefore, can be used as a heuristic for selecting the samples in an algebraic attack. The performance of ELIMLIN is further enhanced by the new proning technique, which allows to discover linear equations that are not found by ELIMLIN
Advanced Algebraic Attack on Trivium
This paper presents an algebraic attack against Trivium
that breaks 625 rounds using only bits of output
in an overall time complexity of Trivium computations.
While other attacks can do better in terms of rounds (), this is a practical attack with a very low data usage (down from output bits) and low computation time (down from ).
From another angle, our attack can be seen as a proof of concept:
how far can algebraic attacks can be pushed when several known
techniques are combined into one implementation?
All attacks have been fully implemented and tested; our figures
are therefore not the result of any potentially error-prone extrapolation, but results of practical experiments
Bitstream Modification of Trivium
In this paper we present a bitstream modification attack on the Trivium cipher, an international standard under ISO/IEC 29192-3. By changing the content of three LUTs in the bitstream, we reduce the non-linear state updating function of Trivium to a linear one. This makes it possible to recover the key from 288 keystream bits using at most operations. We also propose a countermeasure against bitstream modification attacks which obfuscates the bitstream using dummy and camouflaged LUTs which look legitimate to the attacker. We present an algorithm for injecting dummy LUTs directly into the bitstream without causing any performance or power penalty