40 research outputs found
A Comprehensive Survey on the Implementations, Attacks, and Countermeasures of the Current NIST Lightweight Cryptography Standard
This survey is the first work on the current standard for lightweight
cryptography, standardized in 2023. Lightweight cryptography plays a vital role
in securing resource-constrained embedded systems such as deeply-embedded
systems (implantable and wearable medical devices, smart fabrics, smart homes,
and the like), radio frequency identification (RFID) tags, sensor networks, and
privacy-constrained usage models. National Institute of Standards and
Technology (NIST) initiated a standardization process for lightweight
cryptography and after a relatively-long multi-year effort, eventually, in Feb.
2023, the competition ended with ASCON as the winner. This lightweight
cryptographic standard will be used in deeply-embedded architectures to provide
security through confidentiality and integrity/authentication (the dual of the
legacy AES-GCM block cipher which is the NIST standard for symmetric key
cryptography). ASCON's lightweight design utilizes a 320-bit permutation which
is bit-sliced into five 64-bit register words, providing 128-bit level
security. This work summarizes the different implementations of ASCON on
field-programmable gate array (FPGA) and ASIC hardware platforms on the basis
of area, power, throughput, energy, and efficiency overheads. The presented
work also reviews various differential and side-channel analysis attacks (SCAs)
performed across variants of ASCON cipher suite in terms of algebraic,
cube/cube-like, forgery, fault injection, and power analysis attacks as well as
the countermeasures for these attacks. We also provide our insights and visions
throughout this survey to provide new future directions in different domains.
This survey is the first one in its kind and a step forward towards
scrutinizing the advantages and future directions of the NIST lightweight
cryptography standard introduced in 2023
Security analysis of NIST-LWC contest finalists
Dissertação de mestrado integrado em Informatics EngineeringTraditional cryptographic standards are designed with a desktop and server environment in mind, so, with the
relatively recent proliferation of small, resource constrained devices in the Internet of Things, sensor networks,
embedded systems, and more, there has been a call for lightweight cryptographic standards with security,
performance and resource requirements tailored for the highly-constrained environments these devices find
themselves in.
In 2015 the National Institute of Standards and Technology began a Standardization Process in order to select
one or more Lightweight Cryptographic algorithms. Out of the original 57 submissions ten finalists remain, with
ASCON and Romulus being among the most scrutinized out of them.
In this dissertation I will introduce some concepts required for easy understanding of the body of work, do
an up-to-date revision on the current situation on the standardization process from a security and performance
standpoint, a description of ASCON and Romulus, and new best known analysis, and a comparison of the two,
with their advantages, drawbacks, and unique traits.Os padrões criptográficos tradicionais foram elaborados com um ambiente de computador e servidor em mente.
Com a proliferação de dispositivos de pequenas dimensões tanto na Internet of Things, redes de sensores e
sistemas embutidos, apareceu uma necessidade para se definir padrões para algoritmos de criptografia leve, com
prioridades de segurança, performance e gasto de recursos equilibrados para os ambientes altamente limitados
em que estes dispositivos operam.
Em 2015 o National Institute of Standards and Technology lançou um processo de estandardização com o
objectivo de escolher um ou mais algoritmos de criptografia leve. Das cinquenta e sete candidaturas originais
sobram apenas dez finalistas, sendo ASCON e Romulus dois desses finalistas mais examinados.
Nesta dissertação irei introduzir alguns conceitos necessários para uma fácil compreensão do corpo deste
trabalho, assim como uma revisão atualizada da situação atual do processo de estandardização de um ponto
de vista tanto de segurança como de performance, uma descrição do ASCON e do Romulus assim como as
suas melhores análises recentes e uma comparação entre os dois, frisando as suas vantagens, desvantagens e
aspectos únicos
Conditional Cube Attacks on Ascon-128 and Ascon-80pq in a Nonce-misuse Setting
Ascon-128 and Ascon-80pq use 12-round Ascon permutation for initialization and finalization phases and 6-round Ascon permutation for processing associate data and message. In a nonce-misuse setting, we present a new partial-state-recovery conditional-cube attack on Ascon-128 and Ascon-80pq, where 192 bits out of 320-bit state are recovered. For our partial state-recovery attack, its required data complexity, , is about and its required memory complexity, , is negligible. After a 192-bit partial state is recovered, in a nonce-misuse setting, we can further recover the full 320-bit state with time complexity, , and then we can recover the secret key with extra data complexity of , extra time complexity of , and memory complexity of . A similar attack of recovering the partial state was independently developed by Baudrin et al. at NIST fifth Lightweight Cryptography workshop. Note that our attack does not violate the NIST LWC security requirements on Ascon-128 and Ascon-80pq as well as the designers\u27 claims
Resistance of Ascon Family against Conditional Cube Attacks in Nonce-Misuse Setting
Ascon family is one of the finalists of the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) lightweight cryptography standardization process. The family includes three Authenticated Encryption with Associated Data (AEAD) schemes: Ascon-128 (primary), Ascon-128a, and Ascon-80pq. In this paper, we study the resistance of the Ascon~family against conditional cube attacks in nonce-misuse setting, and present new state- and key-recovery attacks. Our attack recovers the full state information and the secret key of Ascon-128a using 7-round Ascon-permutation for the encryption phase, with data and time. This is the best known attack result for Ascon-128a as far as we know. We also show that the partial state information of Ascon-128 can be recovered with data. Finally, by assuming that the full state information of Ascon-80pq was recovered by Baudrin et al.\u27s attack, we show that the 160-bit secret key of Ascon-80pq can be recovered with time. Although our attacks do not invalidate designers\u27 claim, those allow us to understand the security of Ascon in nonce-misuse setting
Key-dependent cube attack on reduced Frit permutation in Duplex-AE modes
Frit is a new lightweight 384-bit cryptographic permutation proposed by Simon et al., which is designed for resisting fault injection and performs competitively in both hardware and software. Dobraunig et al. first studied Frit in EM construction, and left an open problem to explore the security of Frit in a sponge or duplex modes. In this paper, by introducing a new key-dependent cube attack method, we partially answer the open question by Dobraunig et al. and give some key-recovery attacks on the rounded-reduced Frit used in duplex authenticated encryption mode (Frit-AE). Our results cover all the versions of Frit-AE and include some practical key-recovery attacks that could recover the key within several minutes
Revisiting Higher-Order Differential-Linear Attacks from an Algebraic Perspective
The Higher-order Differential-Linear (HDL) attack was introduced by Biham \textit{et al.} at FSE 2005, where a linear approximation was appended to a Higher-order Differential (HD) transition.
It is a natural generalization of the Differential-Linear (DL) attack.
Due to some practical restrictions, however, HDL cryptanalysis has unfortunately attracted much less attention compared to its DL counterpart since its proposal.
In this paper, we revisit HD/HDL cryptanalysis from an algebraic perspective and provide two novel tools for detecting possible HD/HDL distinguishers, including:
(a) Higher-order Algebraic Transitional Form (HATF) for probabilistic HD/HDL attacks;
(b) Differential Supporting Function (\DSF) for deterministic HD attacks.
In general, the HATF can estimate the biases of -order HDL approximations with complexity where is the algebraic degree of the function studied.
If the function is quadratic, the complexity can be further reduced to .
HATF is therefore very useful in HDL cryptanalysis for ciphers with quadratic round functions, such as \ascon and \xoodyak.
\DSF provides a convenient way to find good linearizations on the input of a permutation, which facilitates the search for HD distinguishers.
Unsurprisingly, HD/HDL attacks have the potential to be more effective than their simpler differential/DL counterparts.
Using HATF, we found many HDL approximations for round-reduced \ascon and \xoodyak initializations, with significantly larger biases than DL ones.
For instance, there are deterministic 2-order/4-order HDL approximations for \ascon/\xoodyak initializations, respectively (which is believed to be impossible in the simple DL case).
We derived highly biased HDL approximations for 5-round \ascon up to 8 order, which improves the complexity of the distinguishing attack on 5-round \ascon from to calls.
We also proposed HDL approximations for 6-round \ascon and 5-round \xoodyak (under the single-key model), which couldn\u27t be reached with simple DL so far.
For key recovery, HDL attacks are also more efficient than DL attacks, thanks to the larger biases of HDL approximations.
Additionally, HATF works well for DL (1-order HDL) attacks and some well-known DL biases of \ascon and \xoodyak that could only be obtained experimentally before can now be predicted theoretically.
With \DSF, we propose a new distinguishing attack on 8-round \ascon permutation, with a complexity of .
Also, we provide a new zero-sum distinguisher for the full 12-round \ascon permutation with time/data complexity. We highlight that our cryptanalyses do not threaten the security of \ascon or \xoodyak
Cryptanalyse d'un chiffrement symétrique à bas coût soumis à la compétition de standardisation du NIST : ASCON
International audienceIn this document I present the main aspects of my first research experience as an intern at Inria supervised by Anne Canteaut & Léo Perrin within the COSMIQ team from March to August 2021.We focus on Ascon, a lightweight symmetric cipher submitted to the current NIST standardization process. We mostly analyze different properties which could lead to cube attacks. A presentation of Ascon and a non-exhaustive literature review are drawn as complements to the chronological overview of the work done during these six months. They altogether enable to assess the hindsight obtained month after month.This internship is part of the requirements to get my Master’s degree from UVSQ (Université de Versailles Saint-Quentin-en-Yvelines, M2 Algèbre appliquée)
MILP-aided Cube-attack-like Cryptanalysis on Keccak Keyed Modes
Cube-attack-like cryptanalysis was proposed by Dinur et al. at EUROCRYPT 2015, which recovers the key of Keccak keyed modes in a divide-and-conquer manner. In their attack, one selects cube variables manually, which leads to more key bits involved in the key-recovery attack, so the complexity is too high unnecessarily.
In this paper, we introduce a new MILP model and make the cube attacks better on the Keccak keyed modes. Using this new MILP tool, we find the optimal cube variables for Keccak-MAC, Keyak and Ketje, which makes that a minimum number of key bits are involved in the key-recovery attack. For example, when the capacity is 256, we find a new 32-dimension cube for Keccak-MAC that involves only 18 key bits instead of Dinur et al.\u27s 64 bits and the complexity of the 6-round attack is reduced to from .
More impressively, using this new tool, we give the very first 7-round key-recovery attack on Keccak-MAC-512. We get the 8-round key-recovery attacks on Lake Keyak in nonce-respected setting. In addition, we get the best attacks on Ketje Major/Minor. For Ketje Major, when the length of nonce is 9 lanes, we could improve the best previous 6-round attack to 7-round. Our attacks do not threaten the full-round (12) Keyak/Ketje or the full-round (24) Keccak-MAC. When comparing with Huang et al.\u27s conditional cube attack, the MILP-aided cube-attack-like cryptanalysis has larger effective range and gets the best results on the Keccak keyed variants with relatively smaller number of degrees of freedom
Meet-in-the-Middle Preimage Attacks on Sponge-based Hashing
The Meet-in-the-Middle (MitM) attack has been widely applied to preimage attacks on Merkle-Damg{\aa}rd (MD) hashing. In this paper, we introduce a generic framework of the MitM attack on sponge-based hashing. We find certain bit conditions can significantly reduce the diffusion of the unknown bits and lead to longer MitM characteristics. To find good or optimal configurations of MitM attacks, e.g., the bit conditions, the neutral sets, and the matching points, we introduce the
bit-level MILP-based automatic tools on Keccak, Ascon and Xoodyak. To reduce the scale of bit-level models and make them solvable in reasonable time, a series of properties of the targeted hashing are considered in the modelling, such as the linear structure and CP-kernel for Keccak, the Boolean expression of Sbox for Ascon. Finally, we give an improved 4-round preimage attack on Keccak-512/SHA3, and break a nearly 10 years’ cryptanalysis record. We also give the first preimage attacks on 3-/4-round Ascon-XOF and 3-round Xoodyak-XOF