112,487 research outputs found
Conceptual Role Semantics, the Theory Theory, and Conceptual Change
The purpose of the paper is twofold. I first outline a philosophical theory of concepts based on conceptual role semantics. This approach is explicitly intended as a framework for the study and explanation of conceptual change in science. Then I point to the close similarities between this philosophical framework and the theory theory of concepts, suggesting that a convergence between psychological and philosophical approaches to concepts is possible. An underlying theme is to stress that using a non-atomist account of concepts is crucial for the successful study of conceptual development and changeāboth for the explanation of individual cognitive development and for the study of conceptual change in science
Revisiting Dummett's Proof-Theoretic Justification Procedures
Dummettās justification procedures are revisited. They are used as background for the discussion of some conceptual and technical issues in proof-theoretic semantics, especially the role played by assumptions in proof-theoretic definitions of validity
Conceptual role semantics and the reference of moral concepts
This paper examines the prospects for a conceptual or functional role theory of moral concepts. It is argued that such an account is well-placed to explain both the irreducibility and practicality of moral concepts. Several versions of conceptual role semantics for moral concepts are distinguished, depending on whether the concept-constitutive conceptual roles are wide or narrow normative or non-normative and purely doxastic or conative. It is argued that the most plausible version of conceptual role semantics for moral concepts involves only ānarrowā conceptual roles, where these include connections to motivational, desire-like, states. In the penultimate section it is argued, contrary to what Wedgwood, Enoch and others have claimed, that such an account of moral concepts cannot plausibly be combined with the claim that moral concepts refer to robust properties
A probabilistic framework for analysing the compositionality of conceptual combinations
Conceptual combination performs a fundamental role in creating the broad
range of compound phrases utilised in everyday language. This article provides
a novel probabilistic framework for assessing whether the semantics of conceptual
combinations are compositional, and so can be considered as a function of
the semantics of the constituent concepts, or not. While the systematicity and
productivity of language provide a strong argument in favor of assuming compositionality,
this very assumption is still regularly questioned in both cognitive
science and philosophy. Additionally, the principle of semantic compositionality
is underspecified, which means that notions of both "strong" and "weak"
compositionality appear in the literature. Rather than adjudicating between
different grades of compositionality, the framework presented here contributes
formal methods for determining a clear dividing line between compositional and
non-compositional semantics. In addition, we suggest that the distinction between
these is contextually sensitive. Compositionality is equated with a joint probability distribution modeling how the constituent concepts in the combination
are interpreted. Marginal selectivity is introduced as a pivotal probabilistic
constraint for the application of the Bell/CH and CHSH systems of inequalities.
Non-compositionality is equated with a failure of marginal selectivity, or violation
of either system of inequalities in the presence of marginal selectivity. This
means that the conceptual combination cannot be modeled in a joint probability
distribution, the variables of which correspond to how the constituent concepts
are being interpreted. The formal analysis methods are demonstrated by applying
them to an empirical illustration of twenty-four non-lexicalised conceptual
combinations
Inferentialism
This article offers an overview of inferential role semantics. We aim
to provide a map of the terrain as well as challenging some of the inferentialistās
standard commitments. We begin by introducing inferentialism and
placing it into the wider context of contemporary philosophy of language. Ā§2
focuses on what is standardly considered both the most important test case
for and the most natural application of inferential role semantics: the case
of the logical constants. We discuss some of the (alleged) benefits of logical
inferentialism, chiefly with regards to the epistemology of logic, and consider
a number of objections. Ā§3 introduces and critically examines the most influential
and most fully developed form of global inferentialism: Robert Brandomās
inferentialism about linguistic and conceptual content in general. Finally, in
Ā§4 we consider a number of general objections to IRS and consider possible
responses on the inferentialistās behalf
Why Philosophers Shouldnāt Do Semantics
The linguistic turn provided philosophers with a range of reasons for engaging in careful investigation into the nature and structure of language. However, the linguistic turn is dead. The arguments for it have been abandoned. This raises the question: why should philosophers take an interest in the minutiae of natural language semantics? Iāll argue that there isnāt much of a reason - philosophy of language has lost its way. Then I provide a suggestion for how it can find its way again
A defence of Hart's semantics as nonambitious conceptual analysis
Two methodological claims in Hart's The Concept of Law have produced perplexity: that it is a book on āanalytic jurisprudenceā 1 and that it may also be regarded as an essay in ādescriptive sociology.ā 2 Are these two ideas reconcilable? We know that mere analysis of our legal concepts cannot tell us much about their properties, that is, about the empirical aspect of law. We have learned this from philosophical criticisms of conceptual analysis; yet Hart informs us that analytic jurisprudence can be reconciled with descriptive sociology. The answer to this puzzle lies in the notion of nonambitious conceptual analysis. The theorist analyzes concepts but accepts the limitations of conceptual analysis and therefore uses empirical knowledge and substantive arguments to explain, refine, or perhaps refute initial insights provided by intuitions. This is the conclusion that this paper arrives at as an argumentative strategy to defend Hart's legal theory from the criticisms of Stavropoulos and Dworkin. The latter argues that Hart's legal theory cannot explain theoretical disagreements in law because he relies on a shared criterial semantics. Stavropoulos aims to show that Hart's semantics is committed to ambitious conceptual analysis and relies on the usage of our words as a standard of correctness. Both attacks aim to show that the semantic sting stings Hart's legal theory. This essay refines both challenges and concludes that not even in the light of the most charitable interpretation of these criticisms is Hart's legal theory stung by the semantic sting. This study defends the view that Hart's methodological claims were modest and that he was aware of the limits of conceptual analysis as a philosophical method. He was, this study claims, far ahead of his time.
1 H.L.A Hart, THE CONCEPT OF LAW (1994).
2 Id
Conceptual Role Accounts of Meaning in Metaethics
This paper explains three ways to develop a conceptual role view of meaning in metaethics. First, it suggests that thereās a way to combine inspiration from noncognitivism with a particular form of the conceptual role view to form a noncognitivist view with distinctive advantages over other noncognitivist views. Second, it suggests that thereās also a way to combine a strong commitment to cognitivism with a different form of the conceptual role view to form a version of cognitivism with distinctive advantages over other cognitivist views. Finally, it suggests that there's another way to think of the conceptual role view in metaethics is as opening up the space for a third way, beyond cognitivism and noncognitivism
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