On the limiting behavior of parameter-dependent network centrality measures

We consider a broad class of walk-based, parameterized node centrality measures for network analysis. These measures are expressed in terms of functions of the adjacency matrix and generalize various well-known centrality indices, including Katz and subgraph centrality. We show that the parameter can be "tuned" to interpolate between degree and eigenvector centrality, which appear as limiting cases. Our analysis helps explain certain correlations often observed between the rankings obtained using different centrality measures, and provides some guidance for the tuning of parameters. We also highlight the roles played by the spectral gap of the adjacency matrix and by the number of triangles in the network. Our analysis covers both undirected and directed networks, including weighted ones. A brief discussion of PageRank is also given.Comment: First 22 pages are the paper, pages 22-38 are the supplementary material

Item weighted Kemeny distance for preference data

Preference data represent a particular type of ranking data where a group of people gives their preferences over a set of alternatives. The traditional metrics between rankings don’t take into account that the importance of elements can be not uniform. In this paper the item weighted Kemeny distance is introduced and its properties demonstrated

Egalitarianism in the rank aggregation problem: a new dimension for democracy

Winner selection by majority, in an election between two candidates, is the only rule compatible with democratic principles. Instead, when the candidates are three or more and the voters rank candidates in order of preference, there are no univocal criteria for the selection of the winning (consensus) ranking and the outcome is known to depend sensibly on the adopted rule. Building upon XVIII century Condorcet theory, whose idea was to maximize total voter satisfaction, we propose here the addition of a new basic principle (dimension) to guide the selection: satisfaction should be distributed among voters as equally as possible. With this new criterion we identify an optimal set of rankings. They range from the Condorcet solution to the one which is the most egalitarian with respect to the voters. We show that highly egalitarian rankings have the important property to be more stable with respect to fluctuations and that classical consensus rankings (Copeland, Tideman, Schulze) often turn out to be non optimal. The new dimension we have introduced provides, when used together with that of Condorcet, a clear classification of all the possible rankings. By increasing awareness in selecting a consensus ranking our method may lead to social choices which are more egalitarian compared to those achieved by presently available voting systems.Comment: 18 pages, 14 page appendix, RateIt Web Tool: http://www.sapienzaapps.it/rateit.php, RankIt Android mobile application: https://play.google.com/store/apps/details?id=sapienza.informatica.rankit. Appears in Quality & Quantity, 10 Apr 2015, Online Firs