Computing large market equilibria using abstractions

Computing market equilibria is an important practical problem for market design (e.g. fair division, item allocation). However, computing equilibria requires large amounts of information (e.g. all valuations for all buyers for all items) and compute power. We consider ameliorating these issues by applying a method used for solving complex games: constructing a coarsened abstraction of a given market, solving for the equilibrium in the abstraction, and lifting the prices and allocations back to the original market. We show how to bound important quantities such as regret, envy, Nash social welfare, Pareto optimality, and maximin share when the abstracted prices and allocations are used in place of the real equilibrium. We then study two abstraction methods of interest for practitioners: 1) filling in unknown valuations using techniques from matrix completion, 2) reducing the problem size by aggregating groups of buyers/items into smaller numbers of representative buyers/items and solving for equilibrium in this coarsened market. We find that in real data allocations/prices that are relatively close to equilibria can be computed from even very coarse abstractions

A Primer on the Tools and Concepts of Computable Economics

Computability theory came into being as a result of Hilbert's attempts to meet Brouwer's challenges, from an intuitionistc and constructive standpoint, to formalism as a foundation for mathematical practice. Viewed this way, constructive mathematics should be one vision of computability theory. However, there are fundamental differences between computability theory and constructive mathematics: the Church-Turing thesis is a disciplining criterion in the former and not in the latter; and classical logic - particularly, the law of the excluded middle - is not accepted in the latter but freely invoked in the former, especially in proving universal negative propositions. In Computable Economic an eclectic approach is adopted where the main criterion is numerical content for economic entities. In this sense both the computable and the constructive traditions are freely and indiscriminately invoked and utilised in the formalization of economic entities. Some of the mathematical methods and concepts of computable economics are surveyed in a pedagogical mode. The context is that of a digital economy embedded in an information society

AD in Fortran, Part 1: Design

We propose extensions to Fortran which integrate forward and reverse Automatic Differentiation (AD) directly into the programming model. Irrespective of implementation technology, embedding AD constructs directly into the language extends the reach and convenience of AD while allowing abstraction of concepts of interest to scientific-computing practice, such as root finding, optimization, and finding equilibria of continuous games. Multiple different subprograms for these tasks can share common interfaces, regardless of whether and how they use AD internally. A programmer can maximize a function F by calling a library maximizer, XSTAR=ARGMAX(F,X0), which internally constructs derivatives of F by AD, without having to learn how to use any particular AD tool. We illustrate the utility of these extensions by example: programs become much more concise and closer to traditional mathematical notation. A companion paper describes how these extensions can be implemented by a program that generates input to existing Fortran-based AD tools

Morphisms of open games

We define a notion of morphisms between open games, exploiting a surprising connection between lenses in computer science and compositional game theory. This extends the more intuitively obvious definition of globular morphisms as mappings between strategy profiles that preserve best responses, and hence in particular preserve Nash equilibria. We construct a symmetric monoidal double category in which the horizontal 1-cells are open games, vertical 1-morphisms are lenses, and 2-cells are morphisms of open games. States (morphisms out of the monoidal unit) in the vertical category give a flexible solution concept that includes both Nash and subgame perfect equilibria. Products in the vertical category give an external choice operator that is reminiscent of products in game semantics, and is useful in practical examples. We illustrate the above two features with a simple worked example from microeconomics, the market entry game

Nash Social Welfare Approximation for Strategic Agents

The fair division of resources is an important age-old problem that has led to a rich body of literature. At the center of this literature lies the question of whether there exist fair mechanisms despite strategic behavior of the agents. A fundamental objective function used for measuring fair outcomes is the Nash social welfare, defined as the geometric mean of the agent utilities. This objective function is maximized by widely known solution concepts such as Nash bargaining and the competitive equilibrium with equal incomes. In this work we focus on the question of (approximately) implementing the Nash social welfare. The starting point of our analysis is the Fisher market, a fundamental model of an economy, whose benchmark is precisely the (weighted) Nash social welfare. We begin by studying two extreme classes of valuations functions, namely perfect substitutes and perfect complements, and find that for perfect substitutes, the Fisher market mechanism has a constant approximation: at most 2 and at least e1e. However, for perfect complements, the Fisher market does not work well, its bound degrading linearly with the number of players. Strikingly, the Trading Post mechanism---an indirect market mechanism also known as the Shapley-Shubik game---has significantly better performance than the Fisher market on its own benchmark. Not only does Trading Post achieve an approximation of 2 for perfect substitutes, but this bound holds for all concave utilities and becomes arbitrarily close to optimal for Leontief utilities (perfect complements), where it reaches $(1+\epsilon)$ for every $\epsilon > 0$. Moreover, all the Nash equilibria of the Trading Post mechanism are pure for all concave utilities and satisfy an important notion of fairness known as proportionality

Deflation for semismooth equations

Variational inequalities can in general support distinct solutions. In this paper we study an algorithm for computing distinct solutions of a variational inequality, without varying the initial guess supplied to the solver. The central idea is the combination of a semismooth Newton method with a deflation operator that eliminates known solutions from consideration. Given one root of a semismooth residual, deflation constructs a new problem for which a semismooth Newton method will not converge to the known root, even from the same initial guess. This enables the discovery of other roots. We prove the effectiveness of the deflation technique under the same assumptions that guarantee locally superlinear convergence of a semismooth Newton method. We demonstrate its utility on various finite- and infinite-dimensional examples drawn from constrained optimization, game theory, economics and solid mechanics.Comment: 24 pages, 3 figure