1,286 research outputs found
Computing large market equilibria using abstractions
Computing market equilibria is an important practical problem for market
design (e.g. fair division, item allocation). However, computing equilibria
requires large amounts of information (e.g. all valuations for all buyers for
all items) and compute power. We consider ameliorating these issues by applying
a method used for solving complex games: constructing a coarsened abstraction
of a given market, solving for the equilibrium in the abstraction, and lifting
the prices and allocations back to the original market. We show how to bound
important quantities such as regret, envy, Nash social welfare, Pareto
optimality, and maximin share when the abstracted prices and allocations are
used in place of the real equilibrium. We then study two abstraction methods of
interest for practitioners: 1) filling in unknown valuations using techniques
from matrix completion, 2) reducing the problem size by aggregating groups of
buyers/items into smaller numbers of representative buyers/items and solving
for equilibrium in this coarsened market. We find that in real data
allocations/prices that are relatively close to equilibria can be computed from
even very coarse abstractions
A Primer on the Tools and Concepts of Computable Economics
Computability theory came into being as a result of Hilbert's attempts to meet Brouwer's challenges, from an intuitionistc and constructive standpoint, to formalism as a foundation for mathematical practice. Viewed this way, constructive mathematics should be one vision of computability theory. However, there are fundamental differences between computability theory and constructive mathematics: the Church-Turing thesis is a disciplining criterion in the former and not in the latter; and classical logic - particularly, the law of the excluded middle - is not accepted in the latter but freely invoked in the former, especially in proving universal negative propositions. In Computable Economic an eclectic approach is adopted where the main criterion is numerical content for economic entities. In this sense both the computable and the constructive traditions are freely and indiscriminately invoked and utilised in the formalization of economic entities. Some of the mathematical methods and concepts of computable economics are surveyed in a pedagogical mode. The context is that of a digital economy embedded in an information society
AD in Fortran, Part 1: Design
We propose extensions to Fortran which integrate forward and reverse
Automatic Differentiation (AD) directly into the programming model.
Irrespective of implementation technology, embedding AD constructs directly
into the language extends the reach and convenience of AD while allowing
abstraction of concepts of interest to scientific-computing practice, such as
root finding, optimization, and finding equilibria of continuous games.
Multiple different subprograms for these tasks can share common interfaces,
regardless of whether and how they use AD internally. A programmer can maximize
a function F by calling a library maximizer, XSTAR=ARGMAX(F,X0), which
internally constructs derivatives of F by AD, without having to learn how to
use any particular AD tool. We illustrate the utility of these extensions by
example: programs become much more concise and closer to traditional
mathematical notation. A companion paper describes how these extensions can be
implemented by a program that generates input to existing Fortran-based AD
tools
Morphisms of open games
We define a notion of morphisms between open games, exploiting a surprising
connection between lenses in computer science and compositional game theory.
This extends the more intuitively obvious definition of globular morphisms as
mappings between strategy profiles that preserve best responses, and hence in
particular preserve Nash equilibria. We construct a symmetric monoidal double
category in which the horizontal 1-cells are open games, vertical 1-morphisms
are lenses, and 2-cells are morphisms of open games. States (morphisms out of
the monoidal unit) in the vertical category give a flexible solution concept
that includes both Nash and subgame perfect equilibria. Products in the
vertical category give an external choice operator that is reminiscent of
products in game semantics, and is useful in practical examples. We illustrate
the above two features with a simple worked example from microeconomics, the
market entry game
Nash Social Welfare Approximation for Strategic Agents
The fair division of resources is an important age-old problem that has led
to a rich body of literature. At the center of this literature lies the
question of whether there exist fair mechanisms despite strategic behavior of
the agents. A fundamental objective function used for measuring fair outcomes
is the Nash social welfare, defined as the geometric mean of the agent
utilities. This objective function is maximized by widely known solution
concepts such as Nash bargaining and the competitive equilibrium with equal
incomes. In this work we focus on the question of (approximately) implementing
the Nash social welfare. The starting point of our analysis is the Fisher
market, a fundamental model of an economy, whose benchmark is precisely the
(weighted) Nash social welfare. We begin by studying two extreme classes of
valuations functions, namely perfect substitutes and perfect complements, and
find that for perfect substitutes, the Fisher market mechanism has a constant
approximation: at most 2 and at least e1e. However, for perfect complements,
the Fisher market does not work well, its bound degrading linearly with the
number of players.
Strikingly, the Trading Post mechanism---an indirect market mechanism also
known as the Shapley-Shubik game---has significantly better performance than
the Fisher market on its own benchmark. Not only does Trading Post achieve an
approximation of 2 for perfect substitutes, but this bound holds for all
concave utilities and becomes arbitrarily close to optimal for Leontief
utilities (perfect complements), where it reaches for every
. Moreover, all the Nash equilibria of the Trading Post mechanism
are pure for all concave utilities and satisfy an important notion of fairness
known as proportionality
Deflation for semismooth equations
Variational inequalities can in general support distinct solutions. In this
paper we study an algorithm for computing distinct solutions of a variational
inequality, without varying the initial guess supplied to the solver. The
central idea is the combination of a semismooth Newton method with a deflation
operator that eliminates known solutions from consideration. Given one root of
a semismooth residual, deflation constructs a new problem for which a
semismooth Newton method will not converge to the known root, even from the
same initial guess. This enables the discovery of other roots. We prove the
effectiveness of the deflation technique under the same assumptions that
guarantee locally superlinear convergence of a semismooth Newton method. We
demonstrate its utility on various finite- and infinite-dimensional examples
drawn from constrained optimization, game theory, economics and solid
mechanics.Comment: 24 pages, 3 figure
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