Markov Perfect Industry Dynamics with Many Firms

We propose an approximation method for analyzing Ericson and Pakes (1995)-style dynamic models of imperfect competition. We develop a simple algorithm for computing an ``oblivious equilibrium,'' in which each firm is assumed to make decisions based only on its own state and knowledge of the long run average industry state, but where firms ignore current information about competitors' states. We prove that, as the market becomes large, if the equilibrium distribution of firm states obeys a certain ``light-tail'' condition, then oblivious equilibria closely approximate Markov perfect equilibria. We develop bounds that can be computed to assess the accuracy of the approximation for any given applied problem. Through computational experiments, we find that the method often generates useful approximations for industries with hundreds of firms and in some cases even tens of firms.

Mean Field Equilibrium in Dynamic Games with Complementarities

We study a class of stochastic dynamic games that exhibit strategic complementarities between players; formally, in the games we consider, the payoff of a player has increasing differences between her own state and the empirical distribution of the states of other players. Such games can be used to model a diverse set of applications, including network security models, recommender systems, and dynamic search in markets. Stochastic games are generally difficult to analyze, and these difficulties are only exacerbated when the number of players is large (as might be the case in the preceding examples). We consider an approximation methodology called mean field equilibrium to study these games. In such an equilibrium, each player reacts to only the long run average state of other players. We find necessary conditions for the existence of a mean field equilibrium in such games. Furthermore, as a simple consequence of this existence theorem, we obtain several natural monotonicity properties. We show that there exist a "largest" and a "smallest" equilibrium among all those where the equilibrium strategy used by a player is nondecreasing, and we also show that players converge to each of these equilibria via natural myopic learning dynamics; as we argue, these dynamics are more reasonable than the standard best response dynamics. We also provide sensitivity results, where we quantify how the equilibria of such games move in response to changes in parameters of the game (e.g., the introduction of incentives to players).Comment: 56 pages, 5 figure

The Computational Power of Optimization in Online Learning

We consider the fundamental problem of prediction with expert advice where the experts are "optimizable": there is a black-box optimization oracle that can be used to compute, in constant time, the leading expert in retrospect at any point in time. In this setting, we give a novel online algorithm that attains vanishing regret with respect to $N$ experts in total $\widetilde{O}(\sqrt{N})$ computation time. We also give a lower bound showing that this running time cannot be improved (up to log factors) in the oracle model, thereby exhibiting a quadratic speedup as compared to the standard, oracle-free setting where the required time for vanishing regret is $\widetilde{\Theta}(N)$. These results demonstrate an exponential gap between the power of optimization in online learning and its power in statistical learning: in the latter, an optimization oracle---i.e., an efficient empirical risk minimizer---allows to learn a finite hypothesis class of size $N$ in time $O(\log{N})$. We also study the implications of our results to learning in repeated zero-sum games, in a setting where the players have access to oracles that compute, in constant time, their best-response to any mixed strategy of their opponent. We show that the runtime required for approximating the minimax value of the game in this setting is $\widetilde{\Theta}(\sqrt{N})$, yielding again a quadratic improvement upon the oracle-free setting, where $\widetilde{\Theta}(N)$ is known to be tight

Dynamic Multi-Arm Bandit Game Based Multi-Agents Spectrum Sharing Strategy Design

For a wireless avionics communication system, a Multi-arm bandit game is mathematically formulated, which includes channel states, strategies, and rewards. The simple case includes only two agents sharing the spectrum which is fully studied in terms of maximizing the cumulative reward over a finite time horizon. An Upper Confidence Bound (UCB) algorithm is used to achieve the optimal solutions for the stochastic Multi-Arm Bandit (MAB) problem. Also, the MAB problem can also be solved from the Markov game framework perspective. Meanwhile, Thompson Sampling (TS) is also used as benchmark to evaluate the proposed approach performance. Numerical results are also provided regarding minimizing the expectation of the regret and choosing the best parameter for the upper confidence bound