Weak and Strong Computational Creativity

In the spirit of Searle’s definition of weak and strong artificial intelligence, this paper presents a discussion on weak computational creativity in swarm intelligence systems. It addresses the concepts of freedom and constraint and their impact on the creativity of the underlying systems. An analogy is drawn on mapping these two ‘prerequisites’ of creativity onto the two well-known phases of exploration and exploitation in swarm intelligence algorithms, followed by the visualisation of the behaviour of the swarms whose performance are evaluated in the context of arguments presented. The paper also discusses that the strong computational creativity is presented in ways emphasising that genuine creativity implies ‘genuine under- standing’ and other cognitive states, along with autonomy – asserting that without ‘Strong Embodiment’, computational systems are not genuinely autonomous

Creativity and Autonomy in Swarm Intelligence Systems

This work introduces two swarm intelligence algorithms -- one mimicking the behaviour of one species of ants (\emph{Leptothorax acervorum}) foraging (a `Stochastic Diffusion Search', SDS) and the other algorithm mimicking the behaviour of birds flocking (a `Particle Swarm Optimiser', PSO) -- and outlines a novel integration strategy exploiting the local search properties of the PSO with global SDS behaviour. The resulting hybrid algorithm is used to sketch novel drawings of an input image, exploliting an artistic tension between the local behaviour of the `birds flocking' - as they seek to follow the input sketch - and the global behaviour of the `ants foraging' - as they seek to encourage the flock to explore novel regions of the canvas. The paper concludes by exploring the putative `creativity' of this hybrid swarm system in the philosophical light of the `rhizome' and Deleuze's well known `Orchid and Wasp' metaphor

Are the robots coming? Designing with autonomy & control for musical creativity & performance

This paper1 expands upon our previous work, and starts to unpack notions of autonomy and control in musical composition and performance-based systems. The term autonomous has become synonymous with technologies such as “autonomous vehicles” and “drones”, while notions of control have mainly been raised in respect to the “control” of industrial systems and in respect to protocols. This position piece disrupts these notions and provides a platform, introducing a more radical proposition in respect to the representation of autonomy and control of features that can be used to design systems that support musical composition and performance. This paper supports a growing interest within the Design, HCI and Artificial Intelligence communities, leading us to think about Human Like Computing systems and the development of a Computational Creativity Continuum

From Biological to Synthetic Neurorobotics Approaches to Understanding the Structure Essential to Consciousness (Part 3)

This third paper locates the synthetic neurorobotics research reviewed in the second paper in terms of themes introduced in the first paper. It begins with biological non-reductionism as understood by Searle. It emphasizes the role of synthetic neurorobotics studies in accessing the dynamic structure essential to consciousness with a focus on system criticality and self, develops a distinction between simulated and formal consciousness based on this emphasis, reviews Tani and colleagues' work in light of this distinction, and ends by forecasting the increasing importance of synthetic neurorobotics studies for cognitive science and philosophy of mind going forward, finally in regards to most- and myth-consciousness

A Standardised Procedure for Evaluating Creative Systems: Computational Creativity Evaluation Based on What it is to be Creative

Computational creativity is a flourishing research area, with a variety of creative systems being produced and developed. Creativity evaluation has not kept pace with system development with an evident lack of systematic evaluation of the creativity of these systems in the literature. This is partially due to difficulties in defining what it means for a computer to be creative; indeed, there is no consensus on this for human creativity, let alone its computational equivalent. This paper proposes a Standardised Procedure for Evaluating Creative Systems (SPECS). SPECS is a three-step process: stating what it means for a particular computational system to be creative, deriving and performing tests based on these statements. To assist this process, the paper offers a collection of key components of creativity, identified empirically from discussions of human and computational creativity. Using this approach, the SPECS methodology is demonstrated through a comparative case study evaluating computational creativity systems that improvise music