12,682 research outputs found
Gaming security by obscurity
Shannon sought security against the attacker with unlimited computational
powers: *if an information source conveys some information, then Shannon's
attacker will surely extract that information*. Diffie and Hellman refined
Shannon's attacker model by taking into account the fact that the real
attackers are computationally limited. This idea became one of the greatest new
paradigms in computer science, and led to modern cryptography.
Shannon also sought security against the attacker with unlimited logical and
observational powers, expressed through the maxim that "the enemy knows the
system". This view is still endorsed in cryptography. The popular formulation,
going back to Kerckhoffs, is that "there is no security by obscurity", meaning
that the algorithms cannot be kept obscured from the attacker, and that
security should only rely upon the secret keys. In fact, modern cryptography
goes even further than Shannon or Kerckhoffs in tacitly assuming that *if there
is an algorithm that can break the system, then the attacker will surely find
that algorithm*. The attacker is not viewed as an omnipotent computer any more,
but he is still construed as an omnipotent programmer.
So the Diffie-Hellman step from unlimited to limited computational powers has
not been extended into a step from unlimited to limited logical or programming
powers. Is the assumption that all feasible algorithms will eventually be
discovered and implemented really different from the assumption that everything
that is computable will eventually be computed? The present paper explores some
ways to refine the current models of the attacker, and of the defender, by
taking into account their limited logical and programming powers. If the
adaptive attacker actively queries the system to seek out its vulnerabilities,
can the system gain some security by actively learning attacker's methods, and
adapting to them?Comment: 15 pages, 9 figures, 2 tables; final version appeared in the
Proceedings of New Security Paradigms Workshop 2011 (ACM 2011); typos
correcte
Security, Privacy and Safety Risk Assessment for Virtual Reality Learning Environment Applications
Social Virtual Reality based Learning Environments (VRLEs) such as vSocial
render instructional content in a three-dimensional immersive computer
experience for training youth with learning impediments. There are limited
prior works that explored attack vulnerability in VR technology, and hence
there is a need for systematic frameworks to quantify risks corresponding to
security, privacy, and safety (SPS) threats. The SPS threats can adversely
impact the educational user experience and hinder delivery of VRLE content. In
this paper, we propose a novel risk assessment framework that utilizes attack
trees to calculate a risk score for varied VRLE threats with rate and duration
of threats as inputs. We compare the impact of a well-constructed attack tree
with an adhoc attack tree to study the trade-offs between overheads in managing
attack trees, and the cost of risk mitigation when vulnerabilities are
identified. We use a vSocial VRLE testbed in a case study to showcase the
effectiveness of our framework and demonstrate how a suitable attack tree
formalism can result in a more safer, privacy-preserving and secure VRLE
system.Comment: Tp appear in the CCNC 2019 Conferenc
Developing Artificial Intelligence Agents for a Turn-Based Imperfect Information Game
Artificial intelligence (AI) is often employed to play games, whether to entertain human opponents, devise and test strategies, or obtain other analytical data. Games with hidden information require specific approaches by the player. As a result, the AI must be equipped with methods of operating without certain important pieces of information while being aware of the resulting potential dangers. The computer game GNaT was designed as a testbed for AI strategies dealing specifically with imperfect information. Its development and functionality are described, and the results of testing several strategies through AI agents are discussed
Towards optimal multi-objective models of network security: survey
Information security is an important aspect of a successful business today. However, financial difficulties and budget cuts create a problem of selecting appropriate security measures and keeping networked systems up and running. Economic models proposed in the literature do not address the challenging problem of security countermeasure selection. We have made a classification of security models, which can be used to harden a system in a cost effective manner based on the methodologies used. In addition, we have specified the challenges of the simplified risk assessment approaches used in the economic models and have made recommendations how the challenges can be addressed in order to support decision makers
Toward optimal multi-objective models of network security: Survey
Information security is an important aspect of a successful business today. However, financial difficulties and budget cuts create a problem of selecting appropriate security measures and keeping networked systems up and running. Economic models proposed in the literature do not address the challenging problem of security countermeasure selection. We have made a classification of security models, which can be used to harden a system in a cost effective manner based on the methodologies used. In addition, we have specified the challenges of the simplified risk assessment approaches used in the economic models and have made recommendations how the challenges can be addressed in order to support decision makers
DAG-Based Attack and Defense Modeling: Don't Miss the Forest for the Attack Trees
This paper presents the current state of the art on attack and defense
modeling approaches that are based on directed acyclic graphs (DAGs). DAGs
allow for a hierarchical decomposition of complex scenarios into simple, easily
understandable and quantifiable actions. Methods based on threat trees and
Bayesian networks are two well-known approaches to security modeling. However
there exist more than 30 DAG-based methodologies, each having different
features and goals. The objective of this survey is to present a complete
overview of graphical attack and defense modeling techniques based on DAGs.
This consists of summarizing the existing methodologies, comparing their
features and proposing a taxonomy of the described formalisms. This article
also supports the selection of an adequate modeling technique depending on user
requirements
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