Logical openness in Cognitive Models

It is here proposed an analysis of symbolic and sub-symbolic models for studying cognitive processes, centered on emergence and logical openness notions. The Theory of logical openness connects the Physics of system/environment relationships to the system informational structure. In this theory, cognitive models can be ordered according to a hierarchy of complexity depending on their logical openness degree, and their descriptive limits are correlated to Gödel-Turing Theorems on formal systems. The symbolic models with low logical openness describe cognition by means of semantics which fix the system/environment relationship (cognition in vitro), while the sub-symbolic ones with high logical openness tends to seize its evolutive dynamics (cognition in vivo). An observer is defined as a system with high logical openness. In conclusion, the characteristic processes of intrinsic emergence typical of “bio-logic” - emerging of new codes-require an alternative model to Turing-computation, the natural or bio-morphic computation, whose essential features we are going here to outline

Computability and dynamical systems

In this paper we explore results that establish a link between dynamical systems and computability theory (not numerical analysis). In the last few decades, computers have increasingly been used as simulation tools for gaining insight into dynamical behavior. However, due to the presence of errors inherent in such numerical simulations, with few exceptions, computers have not been used for the nobler task of proving mathematical results. Nevertheless, there have been some recent developments in the latter direction. Here we introduce some of the ideas and techniques used so far, and suggest some lines of research for further work on this fascinating topic

Nature as a Network of Morphological Infocomputational Processes for Cognitive Agents

This paper presents a view of nature as a network of infocomputational agents organized in a dynamical hierarchy of levels. It provides a framework for unification of currently disparate understandings of natural, formal, technical, behavioral and social phenomena based on information as a structure, differences in one system that cause the differences in another system, and computation as its dynamics, i.e. physical process of morphological change in the informational structure. We address some of the frequent misunderstandings regarding the natural/morphological computational models and their relationships to physical systems, especially cognitive systems such as living beings. Natural morphological infocomputation as a conceptual framework necessitates generalization of models of computation beyond the traditional Turing machine model presenting symbol manipulation, and requires agent-based concurrent resource-sensitive models of computation in order to be able to cover the whole range of phenomena from physics to cognition. The central role of agency, particularly material vs. cognitive agency is highlighted

Computational Natural Philosophy: A Thread from Presocratics through Turing to ChatGPT

Modern computational natural philosophy conceptualizes the universe in terms of information and computation, establishing a framework for the study of cognition and intelligence. Despite some critiques, this computational perspective has significantly influenced our understanding of the natural world, leading to the development of AI systems like ChatGPT based on deep neural networks. Advancements in this domain have been facilitated by interdisciplinary research, integrating knowledge from multiple fields to simulate complex systems. Large Language Models (LLMs), such as ChatGPT, represent this approach's capabilities, utilizing reinforcement learning with human feedback (RLHF). Current research initiatives aim to integrate neural networks with symbolic computing, introducing a new generation of hybrid computational models.Comment: 17 page

Changing the Environment Based on Empowerment as Intrinsic Motivation

This is an open access article distributed under the Creative Commons Attribution License CC BY 3.0 which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original work is properly cited.One aspect of intelligence is the ability to restructure your own environment so that the world you live in becomes more beneficial to you. In this paper we investigate how the information-theoretic measure of agent empowerment can provide a task-independent, intrinsic motivation to restructure the world. We show how changes in embodiment and in the environment change the resulting behaviour of the agent and the artefacts left in the world. For this purpose, we introduce an approximation of the established empowerment formalism based on sparse sampling, which is simpler and significantly faster to compute for deterministic dynamics. Sparse sampling also introduces a degree of randomness into the decision making process, which turns out to beneficial for some cases. We then utilize the measure to generate agent behaviour for different agent embodiments in a Minecraft-inspired three dimensional block world. The paradigmatic results demonstrate that empowerment can be used as a suitable generic intrinsic motivation to not only generate actions in given static environments, as shown in the past, but also to modify existing environmental conditions. In doing so, the emerging strategies to modify an agent’s environment turn out to be meaningful to the specific agent capabilities, i.e., de facto to its embodiment.Peer reviewedFinal Published versio

Driven progressive evolution of genome sequence complexity in Cyanobacteria

Progressive evolution, or the tendency towards increasing complexity, is a controversial issue in biology, which resolution entails a proper measurement of complexity. Genomes are the best entities to address this challenge, as they encode the historical information of a species’ biotic and environmental interactions. As a case study, we have measured genome sequence complexity in the ancient phylum Cyanobacteria. To arrive at an appropriate measure of genome sequence complexity, we have chosen metrics that do not decipher biological functionality but that show strong phylogenetic signal. Using a ridge regression of those metrics against root-to-tip distance, we detected positive trends towards higher complexity in three of them. Lastly, we applied three standard tests to detect if progressive evolution is passive or driven—the minimum, ancestor– descendant, and sub-clade tests. These results provide evidence for driven progressive evolution at the genome-level in the phylum Cyanobacteria.Generalitat Valenciana Prometeo/2018/A/133European Union (EU)Fulbright fellowship (Spanish Minister of Science, Innovation and Universities)SAF2015-65878-RAGL2017-88702-C2-2-RPGC2018-099344-B-I0

Frameworks, models, and case studies

This thesis focuses on models of conceptual change in science and philosophy. In particular, I developed a new bootstrapping methodology for studying conceptual change, centered around the formalization of several popular models of conceptual change and the collective assessment of their improved formal versions via nine evaluative dimensions. Among the models of conceptual change treated in the thesis are Carnap’s explication, Lakatos’ concept-stretching, Toulmin’s conceptual populations, Waismann’s open texture, Mark Wilson’s patches and facades, Sneed’s structuralism, and Paul Thagard’s conceptual revolutions. In order to analyze and compare the conception of conceptual change provided by these different models, I rely on several historical reconstructions of episodes of scientific conceptual change. The historical episodes of scientific change that figure in this work include the emergence of the morphological concept of fish in biological taxonomies, the development of scientific conceptions of temperature, the Church-Turing thesis and related axiomatizations of effective calculability, the history of the concept of polyhedron in 17th and 18th century mathematics, Hamilton’s invention of the quaternions, the history of the pre-abstract group concepts in 18th and 19th century mathematics, the expansion of Newtonian mechanics to viscous fluids forces phenomena, and the chemical revolution. I will also present five different formal and informal improvements of four specific models of conceptual change. I will first present two different improvements of Carnapian explication, a formal and an informal one. My informal improvement of Carnapian explication will consist of a more fine-grained version of the procedure that adds an intermediate, third step to the two steps of Carnapian explication. I will show how this novel three-step version of explication is more suitable than its traditional two-step relative to handle complex cases of explications. My second, formal improvement of Carnapian explication will be a full explication of the concept of explication itself within the theory of conceptual spaces. By virtue of this formal improvement, the whole procedure of explication together with its application procedures and its pragmatic desiderata will be reconceptualized as a precise procedure involving topological and geometrical constraints inside the theory of conceptual spaces. My third improved model of conceptual change will consist of a formal explication of Darwinian models of conceptual change that will make vast use of Godfrey-Smith’s population-based Darwinism for targeting explicitly mathematical conceptual change. My fourth improvement will be dedicated instead to Wilson’s indeterminate model of conceptual change. I will show how Wilson’s very informal framework can be explicated within a modified version of the structuralist model-theoretic reconstructions of scientific theories. Finally, the fifth improved model of conceptual change will be a belief-revision-like logical framework that reconstructs Thagard’s model of conceptual revolution as specific revision and contraction operations that work on conceptual structures. At the end of this work, a general conception of conceptual change in science and philosophy emerges, thanks to the combined action of the three layers of my methodology. This conception takes conceptual change to be a multi-faceted phenomenon centered around the dynamics of groups of concepts. According to this conception, concepts are best reconstructed as plastic and inter-subjective entities equipped with a non-trivial internal structure and subject to a certain degree of localized holism. Furthermore, conceptual dynamics can be judged from a weakly normative perspective, bound to be dependent on shared values and goals. Conceptual change is then best understood, according to this conception, as a ubiquitous phenomenon underlying all of our intellectual activities, from science to ordinary linguistic practices. As such, conceptual change does not pose any particular problem to value-laden notions of scientific progress, objectivity, and realism. At the same time, this conception prompts all our concept-driven intellectual activities, including philosophical and metaphilosophical reflections, to take into serious consideration the phenomenon of conceptual change. An important consequence of this conception, and of the analysis that generated it, is in fact that an adequate understanding of the dynamics of philosophical concepts is a prerequisite for analytic philosophy to develop a realistic and non-idealized depiction of itself and its activities