Compromise Solutions Based on Bankruptcy

In this paper we introduce a new family of compromise solutions for the class of compromise admissible games.These solutions extend bankruptcy rules.In particular, we show that the compromise extension of the run-to-the-bank rule coincides with the barycentre of the core cover and characterise this rule by consistency.We also provide a characterisation of the TAL-family of rules.bankruptcy;games

Compromise Solutions Based on Bankruptcy

In this paper we introduce a new family of compromise solutions for the class of compromise admissible games.These solutions extend bankruptcy rules.In particular, we show that the compromise extension of the run-to-the-bank rule coincides with the barycentre of the core cover and characterise this rule by consistency.We also provide a characterisation of the TAL-family of rules.

Allocation rules incorporating interval uncertainty

This paper provides several answers to the question “How to cope with rationing problems with interval data?” Interval allocation rules which are efficient and reasonable are designed, with special attention to interval bankruptcy problems with standard claims and allocation rules incorporating the interval uncertainty of the estate.allocation rules, bankruptcy, interval uncertainty

Compromise Solutions for Bankruptcy Situations with References

This paper deals with bankruptcy situations in which in addition to the claims, an exogenously given reference point for the allocation of the estate is present.We introduce and analyse two types of compromise solutions and show that they coincide with the T value of two corresponding TU games.We apply our solutions to a real-life case of allocating university money to degree courses.bankruptcy;allocation;t-value;games

How to Cope with Division Problems under Interval Uncertainty of Claims?

The paper deals with division situations where individual claims can vary within closed intervals.Uncertainty of claims is removed by compromising in a consistent way the upper and lower bounds of the claim intervals.Deterministic division problems with compromise claims are then considered and classical division rules from the bankruptcy literature are used to generate several procedures leading to e .cient and reasonable rules for division problems under interval uncertainty of claims.uncertainty;claims;division problems

Shapley-like values for interval bankruptcy games

In this paper interval bankruptcy games arising from bankruptcy situations with interval claims are introduced. For this class of cooperative games two (marginal-based) Shapley-like values are considered and the relation between them is studied.

The river sharing problem: A review of the technical literature for policy economists

Water is essential for life. However, the basic problem of water resource allocation has been that water tends to be over-allocated. Demand for water exceeds the available supply. Essentially, the water economy is bankrupt. Bankruptcy problems have been almost exhaustively studied in the literature on economic theory-primarily from the perspective of cooperative game theory. The main concern of this literature has been how to fairly divide up the assets of a bankrupt entity. In water resource economics cooperative game theory has often been employed as a means of analyzing water resource allocation. It was only recently that the problem of directional flow was incorporated into such analyses. This has come to be known as the “river sharing problem” in the theoretical literature. Accounting for the direction of flow in water resource allocation problems has profound implications for policies that wish to facilitate both fair and efficient water allocations. This is the case whether proposed policies are interventionist or market based in nature. There is now a considerable literature on the allocation and distribution of water resources characterized by unidirectional flow. In this paper I critically review and appraise this literature with a view to making it more accessible to applied and policy economists. A key feature of the paper is that the connection between the bankruptcy literature, which has recently also realized the importance of flow, and the river sharing literature is discussed. The current state of the art in game theoretic models of water resource allocation with directional flow is discussed and implications and consequences for water resource policy highlightedRiver sharing problem, Bankruptcy, Cooperative game theory, Water resouyrce allocation, distributive justice