Quantum Communication Complexity of Distributed Set Joins

Computing set joins of two inputs is a common task in database theory. Recently, Van Gucht, Williams, Woodruff and Zhang [PODS 2015] considered the complexity of such problems in the natural model of (classical) two-party communication complexity and obtained tight bounds for the complexity of several important distributed set joins. In this paper we initiate the study of the quantum communication complexity of distributed set joins. We design a quantum protocol for distributed Boolean matrix multiplication, which corresponds to computing the composition join of two databases, showing that the product of two n times n Boolean matrices, each owned by one of two respective parties, can be computed with widetilde-O(sqrt{n} ell^{3/4}) qubits of communication, where ell denotes the number of non-zero entries of the product. Since Van Gucht et al. showed that the classical communication complexity of this problem is widetilde-Theta(n sqrt{ell}), our quantum algorithm outperforms classical protocols whenever the output matrix is sparse. We also show a quantum lower bound and a matching classical upper bound on the communication complexity of distributed matrix multiplication over F_2. Besides their applications to database theory, the communication complexity of set joins is interesting due to its connections to direct product theorems in communication complexity. In this work we also introduce a notion of all-pairs product theorem, and relate this notion to standard direct product theorems in communication complexity

Randomized Query Complexity of Sabotaged and Composed Functions

We study the composition question for bounded-error randomized query complexity: Is R(f circ g) = Omega(R(f)R(g))? We show that inserting a simple function h, whose query complexity is onlyTheta(log R(g)), in between f and g allows us to prove R(f circ h circ g) = Omega(R(f)R(h)R(g)). We prove this using a new lower bound measure for randomized query complexity we call randomized sabotage complexity, RS(f). Randomized sabotage complexity has several desirable properties, such as a perfect composition theorem, RS(f circ g) >= RS(f) RS(g), and a composition theorem with randomized query complexity, R(f circ g) = Omega(R(f) RS(g)). It is also a quadratically tight lower bound for total functions and can be quadratically superior to the partition bound, the best known general lower bound for randomized query complexity. Using this technique we also show implications for lifting theorems in communication complexity. We show that a general lifting theorem from zero-error randomized query to communication complexity implies a similar result for bounded-error algorithms for all total functions

Simulation Theorems via Pseudorandom Properties

We generalize the deterministic simulation theorem of Raz and McKenzie [RM99], to any gadget which satisfies certain hitting property. We prove that inner-product and gap-Hamming satisfy this property, and as a corollary we obtain deterministic simulation theorem for these gadgets, where the gadget's input-size is logarithmic in the input-size of the outer function. This answers an open question posed by G\"{o}\"{o}s, Pitassi and Watson [GPW15]. Our result also implies the previous results for the Indexing gadget, with better parameters than was previously known. A preliminary version of the results obtained in this work appeared in [CKL+17]

A Nearly Optimal Lower Bound on the Approximate Degree of AC0^0

The approximate degree of a Boolean function $f \colon \{-1, 1\}^n \rightarrow \{-1, 1\}$ is the least degree of a real polynomial that approximates $f$ pointwise to error at most $1/3$. We introduce a generic method for increasing the approximate degree of a given function, while preserving its computability by constant-depth circuits. Specifically, we show how to transform any Boolean function $f$ with approximate degree $d$ into a function $F$ on $O(n \cdot \operatorname{polylog}(n))$ variables with approximate degree at least $D = \Omega(n^{1/3} \cdot d^{2/3})$. In particular, if $d= n^{1-\Omega(1)}$, then $D$ is polynomially larger than $d$. Moreover, if $f$ is computed by a polynomial-size Boolean circuit of constant depth, then so is $F$. By recursively applying our transformation, for any constant $\delta > 0$ we exhibit an AC$^0$ function of approximate degree $\Omega(n^{1-\delta})$. This improves over the best previous lower bound of $\Omega(n^{2/3})$ due to Aaronson and Shi (J. ACM 2004), and nearly matches the trivial upper bound of $n$ that holds for any function. Our lower bounds also apply to (quasipolynomial-size) DNFs of polylogarithmic width. We describe several applications of these results. We give: * For any constant $\delta > 0$, an $\Omega(n^{1-\delta})$ lower bound on the quantum communication complexity of a function in AC$^0$. * A Boolean function $f$ with approximate degree at least $C(f)^{2-o(1)}$, where $C(f)$ is the certificate complexity of $f$. This separation is optimal up to the $o(1)$ term in the exponent. * Improved secret sharing schemes with reconstruction procedures in AC$^0$.Comment: 40 pages, 1 figur

Attack-Resilient Supervisory Control of Discrete-Event Systems

In this work, we study the problem of supervisory control of discrete-event systems (DES) in the presence of attacks that tamper with inputs and outputs of the plant. We consider a very general system setup as we focus on both deterministic and nondeterministic plants that we model as finite state transducers (FSTs); this also covers the conventional approach to modeling DES as deterministic finite automata. Furthermore, we cover a wide class of attacks that can nondeterministically add, remove, or rewrite a sensing and/or actuation word to any word from predefined regular languages, and show how such attacks can be modeled by nondeterministic FSTs; we also present how the use of FSTs facilitates modeling realistic (and very complex) attacks, as well as provides the foundation for design of attack-resilient supervisory controllers. Specifically, we first consider the supervisory control problem for deterministic plants with attacks (i) only on their sensors, (ii) only on their actuators, and (iii) both on their sensors and actuators. For each case, we develop new conditions for controllability in the presence of attacks, as well as synthesizing algorithms to obtain FST-based description of such attack-resilient supervisors. A derived resilient controller provides a set of all safe control words that can keep the plant work desirably even in the presence of corrupted observation and/or if the control words are subjected to actuation attacks. Then, we extend the controllability theorems and the supervisor synthesizing algorithms to nondeterministic plants that satisfy a nonblocking condition. Finally, we illustrate applicability of our methodology on several examples and numerical case-studies