Utility Cost of Formal Privacy for Releasing National Employer-Employee Statistics

National statistical agencies around the world publish tabular summaries based on combined employer-employee (ER-EE) data. The privacy of both individuals and business establishments that feature in these data are protected by law in most countries. These data are currently released using a variety of statistical disclosure limitation (SDL) techniques that do not reveal the exact characteristics of particular employers and employees, but lack provable privacy guarantees limiting inferential disclosures. In this work, we present novel algorithms for releasing tabular summaries of linked ER-EE data with formal, provable guarantees of privacy. We show that state-of-the-art differentially private algorithms add too much noise for the output to be useful. Instead, we identify the privacy requirements mandated by current interpretations of the relevant laws, and formalize them using the Pufferfish framework. We then develop new privacy definitions that are customized to ER-EE data and satisfy the statutory privacy requirements. We implement the experiments in this paper on production data gathered by the U.S. Census Bureau. An empirical evaluation of utility for these data shows that for reasonable values of the privacy-loss parameter ϵ≥1, the additive error introduced by our provably private algorithms is comparable, and in some cases better, than the error introduced by existing SDL techniques that have no provable privacy guarantees. For some complex queries currently published, however, our algorithms do not have utility comparable to the existing traditiona

Inferential Privacy Guarantees for Differentially Private Mechanisms

The correlations and network structure amongst individuals in datasets today---whether explicitly articulated, or deduced from biological or behavioral connections---pose new issues around privacy guarantees, because of inferences that can be made about one individual from another's data. This motivates quantifying privacy in networked contexts in terms of "inferential privacy"---which measures the change in beliefs about an individual's data from the result of a computation---as originally proposed by Dalenius in the 1970's. Inferential privacy is implied by differential privacy when data are independent, but can be much worse when data are correlated; indeed, simple examples, as well as a general impossibility theorem of Dwork and Naor, preclude the possibility of achieving non-trivial inferential privacy when the adversary can have arbitrary auxiliary information. In this paper, we ask how differential privacy guarantees translate to guarantees on inferential privacy in networked contexts: specifically, under what limitations on the adversary's information about correlations, modeled as a prior distribution over datasets, can we deduce an inferential guarantee from a differential one? We prove two main results. The first result pertains to distributions that satisfy a natural positive-affiliation condition, and gives an upper bound on the inferential privacy guarantee for any differentially private mechanism. This upper bound is matched by a simple mechanism that adds Laplace noise to the sum of the data. The second result pertains to distributions that have weak correlations, defined in terms of a suitable "influence matrix". The result provides an upper bound for inferential privacy in terms of the differential privacy parameter and the spectral norm of this matrix

Revisiting the Economics of Privacy: Population Statistics and Confidentiality Protection as Public Goods

This paper has been replaced with http://digitalcommons.ilr.cornell.edu/ldi/37. We consider the problem of the public release of statistical information about a population–explicitly accounting for the public-good properties of both data accuracy and privacy loss. We first consider the implications of adding the public-good component to recently published models of private data publication under differential privacy guarantees using a Vickery-Clark-Groves mechanism and a Lindahl mechanism. We show that data quality will be inefficiently under-supplied. Next, we develop a standard social planner’s problem using the technology set implied by (ε, δ)-differential privacy with (α, β)-accuracy for the Private Multiplicative Weights query release mechanism to study the properties of optimal provision of data accuracy and privacy loss when both are public goods. Using the production possibilities frontier implied by this technology, explicitly parameterized interdependent preferences, and the social welfare function, we display properties of the solution to the social planner’s problem. Our results directly quantify the optimal choice of data accuracy and privacy loss as functions of the technology and preference parameters. Some of these properties can be quantified using population statistics on marginal preferences and correlations between income, data accuracy preferences, and privacy loss preferences that are available from survey data. Our results show that government data custodians should publish more accurate statistics with weaker privacy guarantees than would occur with purely private data publishing. Our statistical results using the General Social Survey and the Cornell National Social Survey indicate that the welfare losses from under-providing data accuracy while over-providing privacy protection can be substantial

An Economic Analysis of Privacy Protection and Statistical Accuracy as Social Choices

Statistical agencies face a dual mandate to publish accurate statistics while protecting respondent privacy. Increasing privacy protection requires decreased accuracy. Recognizing this as a resource allocation problem, we propose an economic solution: operate where the marginal cost of increasing privacy equals the marginal benefit. Our model of production, from computer science, assumes data are published using an efficient differentially private algorithm. Optimal choice weighs the demand for accurate statistics against the demand for privacy. Examples from U.S. statistical programs show how our framework can guide decision-making. Further progress requires a better understanding of willingness-to-pay for privacy and statistical accuracy