6,195 research outputs found
Complexity of Stability-based Solution Concepts in Multi-issue and MC-net Cooperative Games
ABSTRACT MC-nets constitute a natural compact representation scheme for cooperative games in multiagent systems. In this paper, we study the complexity of several natural computational problems that concern solution concepts such as the core, the least core and the nucleolus. We characterize the complexity of these problems for a variety of subclasses of MC-nets, also considering constraints on the game such as superadditivity (where appropriate). Many of our hardness results are derived from a hardness result that we establish for a class of multi-issue cooperative games (SILT games); we suspect that this hardness result can also be used to prove hardness for other representation schemes
A Logic-Based Representation for Coalitional Games with Externalities
We consider the issue of representing coalitional games in multiagent systems that exhibit externalities from coalition formation, i.e., systems in which the gain from forming a coalition may be affected by the formation of other co-existing coalitions. Although externalities play a key role in many real-life situations, very little attention has been given to this issue in the multi-agent system literature, especially with regard to the computational aspects involved. To this end, we propose a new representation which, in the spirit of Ieong and Shoham [9], is based on Boolean expressions. The idea behind our representation is to construct much richer expressions that allow for capturing externalities induced upon coalitions. We show that the new representation is fully expressive, at least as concise as the conventional partition function game representation and, for many games, exponentially more concise. We evaluate the efficiency of our new representation by considering the problem of computing the Extended and Generalized Shapley value, a powerful extension of the conventional Shapley value to games with externalities. We show that by using our new representation, the Extended and Generalized Shapley value, which has not been studied in the computer science literature to date, can be computed in time linear in the size of the input
Cooperative Games with Bounded Dependency Degree
Cooperative games provide a framework to study cooperation among
self-interested agents. They offer a number of solution concepts describing how
the outcome of the cooperation should be shared among the players.
Unfortunately, computational problems associated with many of these solution
concepts tend to be intractable---NP-hard or worse. In this paper, we
incorporate complexity measures recently proposed by Feige and Izsak (2013),
called dependency degree and supermodular degree, into the complexity analysis
of cooperative games. We show that many computational problems for cooperative
games become tractable for games whose dependency degree or supermodular degree
are bounded. In particular, we prove that simple games admit efficient
algorithms for various solution concepts when the supermodular degree is small;
further, we show that computing the Shapley value is always in FPT with respect
to the dependency degree. Finally, we note that, while determining the
dependency among players is computationally hard, there are efficient
algorithms for special classes of games.Comment: 10 pages, full version of accepted AAAI-18 pape
Coalition structure generation in cooperative games with compact representations
This paper presents a new way of formalizing the coalition structure generation problem (CSG) so that we can apply constraint optimization techniques to it. Forming effective coalitions is a major research challenge in AI and multi-agent systems. CSG involves partitioning a set of agents into coalitions to maximize social surplus. Traditionally, the input of the CSG problem is a black-box function called a characteristic function, which takes a coalition as input and returns the value of the coalition. As a result, applying constraint optimization techniques to this problem has been infeasible. However, characteristic functions that appear in practice often can be represented concisely by a set of rules, rather than treating the function as a black box. Then we can solve the CSG problem more efficiently by directly applying constraint optimization techniques to this compact representation. We present new formalizations of the CSG problem by utilizing recently developed compact representation schemes for characteristic functions. We first characterize the complexity of CSG under these representation schemes. In this context, the complexity is driven more by the number of rules than by the number of agents. As an initial step toward developing efficient constraint optimization algorithms for solving the CSG problem, we also develop mixed integer programming formulations and show that an off-the-shelf optimization package can perform reasonably well
Efficient computation of the Shapley value for game-theoretic network centrality
The Shapley valueāprobably the most important normative payoff division scheme in coalitional gamesāhas recently been advocated as a useful measure of centrality in networks. However, although this approach has a variety of real-world applications (including social and organisational networks, biological networks and communication networks), its computational properties have not been widely studied. To date, the only practicable approach to compute Shapley value-based centrality has been via Monte Carlo simulations which are computationally expensive and not guaranteed to give an exact answer. Against this background, this paper presents the first study of the computational aspects of the Shapley value for network centralities. Specifically, we develop exact analytical formulae for Shapley value-based centrality in both weighted and unweighted networks and develop efficient (polynomial time) and exact algorithms based on them. We empirically evaluate these algorithms on two real-life examples (an infrastructure network representing the topology of the Western States Power Grid and a collaboration network from the field of astrophysics) and demonstrate that they deliver significant speedups over the Monte Carlo approach. Fo
Testing Core Membership in Public Goods Economies
This paper develops a recent line of economic theory seeking to understand
public goods economies using methods of topological analysis. Our first main
result is a very clean characterization of the economy's core (the standard
solution concept in public goods). Specifically, we prove that a point is in
the core iff it is Pareto efficient, individually rational, and the set of
points it dominates is path connected.
While this structural theorem has a few interesting implications in economic
theory, the main focus of the second part of this paper is on a particular
algorithmic application that demonstrates its utility. Since the 1960s,
economists have looked for an efficient computational process that decides
whether or not a given point is in the core. All known algorithms so far run in
exponential time (except in some artificially restricted settings). By heavily
exploiting our new structure, we propose a new algorithm for testing core
membership whose computational bottleneck is the solution of convex
optimization problems on the utility function governing the economy. It is
fairly natural to assume that convex optimization should be feasible, as it is
needed even for very basic economic computational tasks such as testing Pareto
efficiency. Nevertheless, even without this assumption, our work implies for
the first time that core membership can be efficiently tested on (e.g.) utility
functions that admit "nice" analytic expressions, or that appropriately defined
-approximate versions of the problem are tractable (by using
modern black-box -approximate convex optimization algorithms).Comment: To appear in ICALP 201
Towards real-world complexity: an introduction to multiplex networks
Many real-world complex systems are best modeled by multiplex networks of
interacting network layers. The multiplex network study is one of the newest
and hottest themes in the statistical physics of complex networks. Pioneering
studies have proven that the multiplexity has broad impact on the system's
structure and function. In this Colloquium paper, we present an organized
review of the growing body of current literature on multiplex networks by
categorizing existing studies broadly according to the type of layer coupling
in the problem. Major recent advances in the field are surveyed and some
outstanding open challenges and future perspectives will be proposed.Comment: 20 pages, 10 figure
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