Complexity Theory, Adaptation, and Administrative Law

Recently, commentators have applied insights from complexity theory to legal analysis generally and to administrative law in particular. This Article focuses on one of the central problems that complexity. theory addresses, the importance and mechanisms of adaptation within complex systems. In Part I, the Article uses three features of complex adaptive systems-emergence from self-assembly, nonlinearity, and sensitivity to initial conditions-and explores the extent to which they may add value as a matter of positive analysis to the understanding of change within legal systems. In Part H, the Article focuses on three normative claims in public law scholarship that depend explicitly or implicitly on notions of adaptation: that states offer advantages over the federal government because experimentation can make them more adaptive, that federal agencies should themselves become more experimentalist using the tool of adaptive management, and that administrative agencies shou Id adopt collaborative mechanisms in policymaking. Using two analytic tools found in the complexity literature, the genetic algorithm and evolutionary game theory, the Article tests the extent to which these three normative claims are borne out

Dispensing with Channel Estimation…

In this article, we investigate the feasibility of noncoherent detection schemes in wireless communication systems as a low-complexity alternative to the family of coherent schemes. The noncoherent schemes require no channel knowledge at the receiver for the detection of the received signal, while the coherent schemes require channel inherently complex estimation, which implies that pilot symbols have to be transmitted resulting in a wastage of the available bandwidth as well as the transmission power

Evolutionary Neural Gas (ENG): A Model of Self Organizing Network from Input Categorization

Despite their claimed biological plausibility, most self organizing networks have strict topological constraints and consequently they cannot take into account a wide range of external stimuli. Furthermore their evolution is conditioned by deterministic laws which often are not correlated with the structural parameters and the global status of the network, as it should happen in a real biological system. In nature the environmental inputs are noise affected and fuzzy. Which thing sets the problem to investigate the possibility of emergent behaviour in a not strictly constrained net and subjected to different inputs. It is here presented a new model of Evolutionary Neural Gas (ENG) with any topological constraints, trained by probabilistic laws depending on the local distortion errors and the network dimension. The network is considered as a population of nodes that coexist in an ecosystem sharing local and global resources. Those particular features allow the network to quickly adapt to the environment, according to its dimensions. The ENG model analysis shows that the net evolves as a scale-free graph, and justifies in a deeply physical sense- the term gas here used.Comment: 16 pages, 8 figure

Simulating counting oracles with cooperation

We prove that monodirectional shallow chargeless P systems with active membranes and minimal cooperation working in polynomial time precisely characterise P#P k , the complexity class of problems solved in polynomial time by deterministic Turing machines with a polynomial number of parallel queries to an oracle for a counting problem

The world of strategies with memory

As part of a generalized ”prisoners’ dilemma”, is considered that the evolution of a population with a full set of behavioral strategies limited only by the depth of memory. Each subsequent generation of the population successively loses the most disadvantageous strategies of behavior of the previous generation. It is shown that an increase in memory in a population is evolutionarily beneficial. The winners of evolutionary selection invariably refer to agents with maximum memory. The concept of strategy complexity is introduced. It is shown that strategies that win in natural selection have maximum or near maximum complexity. Despite the fact that at a separate stage of evolution, according to the payout matrix, the individual gain, while refusing to cooperate, exceeded the gain obtained while cooperating. The winning strategies always belonged to the so-called respectable strategies that are clearly prone to cooperation