Nonlinear Piece In Hand Perturbation Vector Method for Enhancing Security of Multivariate Public Key Cryptosystems

Abstract. The piece in hand (PH) is a general scheme which is applicable to any reasonable type of multivariate public key cryptosystems for the purpose of enhancing their security. In this paper, we propose a new class PH method called NLPHPV (NonLinear Piece in Hand Perturbation Vector) method. Although our NLPHPV uses similar perturbation vectors as is used for the previously known internal perturbation method, this new method can avoid redundant repetitions in decryption process. With properly chosen parameter sizes, NLPHPV achieves an observable gain in security from the original multivariate public key cryptosystem. We demonstrate these by both theoretical analyses and computer simulations against major known attacks and provides the concrete sizes of security parameters, with which we even expect the grater security against potential quantum attacks

Proposal of PPS Multivariate Public Key Cryptosystems

In this paper we propose a new MPKC, called PPS, based on (i) the 2-layer nonlinear piece in hand method, (ii) PMI, and (iii) STS. The PPS is a specific MPKC obtained by applying the 2-layer nonlinear piece in hand method to STS, in the manner that the rank and randomness of the lower rank steps in the original secret polynomial vector of STS are enhanced by adding a perturbation polynomial vector and moreover PMI is used in the auxiliary part. The PPS overcomes the drawbacks of the three schemes by the advantage of the three schemes themself. Thus, PPS can be thought to be immune simultaneously from the algebraic attacks, such as the Groebner bases attacks, from the rank attacks, and from the differential attacks

Hidden Pair of Bijection Signature Scheme

A new signature system of multivariate public key cryptosys- tem is proposed. The new system, Hidden Pair of Bijection (HPB), is the advanced version of the Complementary STS system. This system real- ized both high security and quick signing. Experiments showed that the cryptanalysis of HPB by Gröbner bases has no less complexity than the random polynomial systems. It is secure against other way of cryptanalysis effective for Complementary STS. On the other hand, since it is based on bijections, signatures exist for any message, unlike other cryptosystems based on non-bijections such as HFE or Unbalanced Oil and Vinegar

Two-Face: New Public Key Multivariate Schemes

We present here new multivariate schemes that can be seen as HFE generalization having a property called `Two-Face\u27. Particularly, we present five such families of algorithms named `Dob\u27, `Simple Pat\u27, `General Pat\u27, `Mac\u27, and `Super Two-Face\u27. These families have connections between them, some of them are refinements or generalizations of others. Notably, some of these schemes can be used for public key encryption, and some for public key signature. We introduce also new multivariate quadratic permutations that may have interest beyond cryptography

A study of big field multivariate cryptography.

As the world grapples with the possibility of widespread quantum computing, the cryptosystems of the day need to be up to date. Multivariate Public Key Cryptography is a leading option for security in a post quantum society. One goal of this work is to classify the security of multivariate schemes, especially C*variants. We begin by introducing Multivariate Public Key Cryptography and will then discuss different multivariate schemes and the main types of attacks that have been proven effective against multivariate schemes. Once we have developed an appropriate background, we analyze security of different schemes against particular attacks. Specifically, we will analyze differential security of HFEv- and PFLASH schemes. We then introduce a variant of C* that may be used as an encryption scheme, not just as a signature scheme. Finally, we will analyze the security and efficiency of a (n,d,s,a,p,t) scheme in general. This allows for individuals to generally discuss security and performance of any C* variant

Complexity Estimates for the F4 Attack on the Perturbed Matsumoto-Imai Cryptosystem

Though the Perturbed Matsumoto-Imai (PMI) cryptosystem is considered insecure due to the recent differential attack of Fouque, Granboulan, and Stern, even more recently Ding and Gower showed that PMI can be repaired with the Plus (+) method of externally adding as few as 10 randomly chosen quadratic polynomials. Since relatively few extra polynomials are added, the attack complexity of a Gröbner basis attack on PMI+ will be roughly equal to that of PMI. Using Magma’s implementation of the F4 Gröbner basis algorithm, we attack PMI with parameters q = 2, 0 ≤ r ≤ 10, and 14 ≤ n ≤ 59. Here, q is the number of field elements, n the number of equations/variables, and r the perturbation dimension. Based on our experimental results, we give estimates for the running time for such an attack. We use these estimates to judge the security of some proposed schemes, and we suggest more efficient schemes. In particular, we estimate that an attack using F4 against the parameters q = 2, r = 5, n = 96 (suggested in [7]) has a time complexity of less than 2 50 3-DES computations, which would be considered insecure for practical applications

Complexity Estimates for the F4 Attack on the Perturbed Matsumoto-Imai Cryptosystem

status: publishe