Consistency of circuit lower bounds with bounded theories

Proving that there are problems in $\mathsf{P}^\mathsf{NP}$ that require boolean circuits of super-linear size is a major frontier in complexity theory. While such lower bounds are known for larger complexity classes, existing results only show that the corresponding problems are hard on infinitely many input lengths. For instance, proving almost-everywhere circuit lower bounds is open even for problems in $\mathsf{MAEXP}$. Giving the notorious difficulty of proving lower bounds that hold for all large input lengths, we ask the following question: Can we show that a large set of techniques cannot prove that $\mathsf{NP}$ is easy infinitely often? Motivated by this and related questions about the interaction between mathematical proofs and computations, we investigate circuit complexity from the perspective of logic. Among other results, we prove that for any parameter $k \geq 1$ it is consistent with theory $T$ that computational class ${\mathcal C} \not \subseteq \textit{i.o.}\mathrm{SIZE}(n^k)$, where $(T, \mathcal{C})$ is one of the pairs: $T = \mathsf{T}^1_2$ and ${\mathcal C} = \mathsf{P}^\mathsf{NP}$, $T = \mathsf{S}^1_2$ and ${\mathcal C} = \mathsf{NP}$, $T = \mathsf{PV}$ and ${\mathcal C} = \mathsf{P}$. In other words, these theories cannot establish infinitely often circuit upper bounds for the corresponding problems. This is of interest because the weaker theory $\mathsf{PV}$ already formalizes sophisticated arguments, such as a proof of the PCP Theorem. These consistency statements are unconditional and improve on earlier theorems of [KO17] and [BM18] on the consistency of lower bounds with $\mathsf{PV}$

Infinity

This essay surveys the different types of infinity that occur in pure and applied mathematics, with emphasis on: 1. the contrast between potential infinity and actual infinity; 2. Cantor's distinction between transfinite sets and absolute infinity; 3. the constructivist view of infinite quantifiers and the meaning of constructive proof; 4. the concept of feasibility and the philosophical problems surrounding feasible arithmetic; 5. Zeno's paradoxes and modern paradoxes of physical infinity involving supertasks

Why Philosophers Should Care About Computational Complexity

One might think that, once we know something is computable, how efficiently it can be computed is a practical question with little further philosophical importance. In this essay, I offer a detailed case that one would be wrong. In particular, I argue that computational complexity theory---the field that studies the resources (such as time, space, and randomness) needed to solve computational problems---leads to new perspectives on the nature of mathematical knowledge, the strong AI debate, computationalism, the problem of logical omniscience, Hume's problem of induction, Goodman's grue riddle, the foundations of quantum mechanics, economic rationality, closed timelike curves, and several other topics of philosophical interest. I end by discussing aspects of complexity theory itself that could benefit from philosophical analysis.Comment: 58 pages, to appear in "Computability: G\"odel, Turing, Church, and beyond," MIT Press, 2012. Some minor clarifications and corrections; new references adde

Bayesian Updating, Model Class Selection and Robust Stochastic Predictions of Structural Response

A fundamental issue when predicting structural response by using mathematical models is how to treat both modeling and excitation uncertainty. A general framework for this is presented which uses probability as a multi-valued conditional logic for quantitative plausible reasoning in the presence of uncertainty due to incomplete information. The fundamental probability models that represent the structure’s uncertain behavior are specified by the choice of a stochastic system model class: a set of input-output probability models for the structure and a prior probability distribution over this set that quantifies the relative plausibility of each model. A model class can be constructed from a parameterized deterministic structural model by stochastic embedding utilizing Jaynes’ Principle of Maximum Information Entropy. Robust predictive analyses use the entire model class with the probabilistic predictions of each model being weighted by its prior probability, or if structural response data is available, by its posterior probability from Bayes’ Theorem for the model class. Additional robustness to modeling uncertainty comes from combining the robust predictions of each model class in a set of competing candidates weighted by the prior or posterior probability of the model class, the latter being computed from Bayes’ Theorem. This higherlevel application of Bayes’ Theorem automatically applies a quantitative Ockham razor that penalizes the data-fit of more complex model classes that extract more information from the data. Robust predictive analyses involve integrals over highdimensional spaces that usually must be evaluated numerically. Published applications have used Laplace's method of asymptotic approximation or Markov Chain Monte Carlo algorithms