Competitive Problem Solving and the Optimal Prize Schemes

Agents compete to solve a problem. Each agent knows own computational capacity as private information and simultaneously chooses either a risky or a safe problem solving method. This paper analyzes the optimal prize schemes from the perspective of the prize designer who wishes to find a solution as quick as possible. It is shown that (i) the winner- take-all scheme can induce excessive risk taking and make problem solving slower (ii) prize schemes with milder competitive pressure induce the optimal risk taking and quicker problem solving.Optimal prize scheme, Risk taking, Problem solving

Rank-Order Tournaments as Optimum Labor Contracts

This paper analyzes compensation schemes which pay according to an individual's ordinal rank in an organization rather than his output level. When workers are risk neutral, it is shown that wages based upon rank induce the same efficient allocation of resources as an incentive reward scheme based on individual output levels. Under some circumstances, risk-averse workers actually prefer to be paid on the basis of rank. In addition, if workers are heterogeneous inability, low-quality workers attempt to contaminate high-quality firms, resulting in adverse selection. However, if ability is known in advance, a competitive handicapping structure exists which allows all workers to compete efficiently in the same organization.

Online Coded Caching

We consider a basic content distribution scenario consisting of a single origin server connected through a shared bottleneck link to a number of users each equipped with a cache of finite memory. The users issue a sequence of content requests from a set of popular files, and the goal is to operate the caches as well as the server such that these requests are satisfied with the minimum number of bits sent over the shared link. Assuming a basic Markov model for renewing the set of popular files, we characterize approximately the optimal long-term average rate of the shared link. We further prove that the optimal online scheme has approximately the same performance as the optimal offline scheme, in which the cache contents can be updated based on the entire set of popular files before each new request. To support these theoretical results, we propose an online coded caching scheme termed coded least-recently sent (LRS) and simulate it for a demand time series derived from the dataset made available by Netflix for the Netflix Prize. For this time series, we show that the proposed coded LRS algorithm significantly outperforms the popular least-recently used (LRU) caching algorithm.Comment: 15 page

Procuring Knowledge

There is growing public interest in alternatives to intellectual property including, but not limited to, prizes and government grants. We argue that there is no single best mechanism for supporting research. Rather, mechanisms can only be compared within specific creative environments. We collect various historical and contemporary examples of alternative incentives, and relate them to models of the creative process. We give an explanation for why federally funded R&D has moved from an intramural activity to largely a grant process. Finally, we observe that much research is supported by a hybrid system of public and private sponsorship, and explain why this makes sense in some circumstances.

Personnel Economics: The Economist's View of Human Resources

Personnel economics drills deeply into the firm to study human resource management practices like compensation, hiring practices, training, and teamwork. Many questions are asked. Why should pay vary across workers within firms--and how "compressed" should pay be within firms? Should firms pay workers for their performance on the job or for their skills or hours of work? How are pay and promotions structured across jobs to induce optimal effort from employees? Why do firms use teams and how are teams used most effectively? How should all these human resource management practices, from incentive pay to teamwork, be combined within firms? Personnel economics offers new tools and new answers to these questions. In this paper, we display the tools and principles of personnel economics through a series of models aimed at addressing the questions posed above. We focus on the building blocks that form the foundation of personnel economics: the assumptions that both the worker and the firm are rational maximizing agents; that labor markets and product markets must reach some price-quantity equilibrium; that markets are efficient or that market failures have introduced inefficiencies; and that the use of econometrics and experimental techniques has advanced our ability to identify underlying causal relationships.

Lab Labor: What Can Labor Economists Learn from the Lab?

This paper surveys the contributions of laboratory experiments to labor economics. We begin with a discussion of methodological issues: why (and when) is a lab experiment the best approach; how do laboratory experiments compare to field experiments; and what are the main design issues? We then summarize the substantive contributions of laboratory experiments to our understanding of principal-agent interactions, social preferences, union-firm bargaining, arbitration, gender differentials, discrimination, job search, and labor markets more generally.personnel economics, principal-agent theory, laboratory experiments, labor economics

Performance Pay and Multidimensional Sorting - Productivity, Preferences and Gender

This paper studies the impact of incentives on worker self-selection in a controlled laboratory experiment. Subjects face the choice between a fixed and a variable payment scheme. Depending on the treatment, the variable payment is a piece rate, a tournament or a revenue-sharing scheme. We find that output is higher in the variable pay schemes (piece rate, tournament, and revenue sharing) compared to the fixed payment scheme. This difference is largely driven by productivity sorting. In addition personal attitudes such as willingness to take risks and relative self-assessment as well as gender affect the sorting decision in a systematic way. Moreover, self-reported effort is significantly higher in all variable pay conditions than in the fixed wage condition. Our lab findings are supported by an additional analysis using data from a large and representative sample. In sum, our findings underline the importance of multi-dimensional sorting, i.e., the tendency for different incentive schemes to systematically attract people with different individual characteristics

Slow Adaptive OFDMA Systems Through Chance Constrained Programming

Adaptive OFDMA has recently been recognized as a promising technique for providing high spectral efficiency in future broadband wireless systems. The research over the last decade on adaptive OFDMA systems has focused on adapting the allocation of radio resources, such as subcarriers and power, to the instantaneous channel conditions of all users. However, such "fast" adaptation requires high computational complexity and excessive signaling overhead. This hinders the deployment of adaptive OFDMA systems worldwide. This paper proposes a slow adaptive OFDMA scheme, in which the subcarrier allocation is updated on a much slower timescale than that of the fluctuation of instantaneous channel conditions. Meanwhile, the data rate requirements of individual users are accommodated on the fast timescale with high probability, thereby meeting the requirements except occasional outage. Such an objective has a natural chance constrained programming formulation, which is known to be intractable. To circumvent this difficulty, we formulate safe tractable constraints for the problem based on recent advances in chance constrained programming. We then develop a polynomial-time algorithm for computing an optimal solution to the reformulated problem. Our results show that the proposed slow adaptation scheme drastically reduces both computational cost and control signaling overhead when compared with the conventional fast adaptive OFDMA. Our work can be viewed as an initial attempt to apply the chance constrained programming methodology to wireless system designs. Given that most wireless systems can tolerate an occasional dip in the quality of service, we hope that the proposed methodology will find further applications in wireless communications

Tournaments with Gaps

A standard tournament contract specifies only tournament prizes. If agents’ performance is measured on a cardinal scale, the principal can complement the tournament contract by a gap which defines the minimum distance by which the best performing agent must beat the second best to receive the winner prize. We analyze a tournament with two risk averse agents. Under unlimited liability, the principal strictly benefits from a gap by partially insuring the agents and thereby reducing labor costs. If the agents are protected by limited liability, the principal sticks to the standard tournament