87,059 research outputs found
Pricing Ad Slots with Consecutive Multi-unit Demand
We consider the optimal pricing problem for a model of the rich media
advertisement market, as well as other related applications. In this market,
there are multiple buyers (advertisers), and items (slots) that are arranged in
a line such as a banner on a website. Each buyer desires a particular number of
{\em consecutive} slots and has a per-unit-quality value (dependent on
the ad only) while each slot has a quality (dependent on the position
only such as click-through rate in position auctions). Hence, the valuation of
the buyer for item is . We want to decide the allocations and
the prices in order to maximize the total revenue of the market maker.
A key difference from the traditional position auction is the advertiser's
requirement of a fixed number of consecutive slots. Consecutive slots may be
needed for a large size rich media ad. We study three major pricing mechanisms,
the Bayesian pricing model, the maximum revenue market equilibrium model and an
envy-free solution model. Under the Bayesian model, we design a polynomial time
computable truthful mechanism which is optimum in revenue. For the market
equilibrium paradigm, we find a polynomial time algorithm to obtain the maximum
revenue market equilibrium solution. In envy-free settings, an optimal solution
is presented when the buyers have the same demand for the number of consecutive
slots. We conduct a simulation that compares the revenues from the above
schemes and gives convincing results.Comment: 27page
Mechanism design for decentralized online machine scheduling
Traditional optimization models assume a central decision maker who optimizes a global system performance measure. However, problem data is often distributed among several agents, and agents take autonomous decisions. This gives incentives for strategic behavior of agents, possibly leading to sub-optimal system performance. Furthermore, in dynamic environments, machines are locally dispersed and administratively independent. Examples are found both in business and engineering applications. We investigate such issues for a parallel machine scheduling model where jobs arrive online over time. Instead of centrally assigning jobs to machines, each machine implements a local sequencing rule and jobs decide for machines themselves. In this context, we introduce the concept of a myopic best response equilibrium, a concept weaker than the classical dominant strategy equilibrium, but appropriate for online problems. Our main result is a polynomial time, online mechanism that |assuming rational behavior of jobs| results in an equilibrium schedule that is 3.281-competitive with respect to the maximal social welfare. This is only lightly worse than state-of-the-art algorithms with central coordination
On Revenue Maximization with Sharp Multi-Unit Demands
We consider markets consisting of a set of indivisible items, and buyers that
have {\em sharp} multi-unit demand. This means that each buyer wants a
specific number of items; a bundle of size less than has no value,
while a bundle of size greater than is worth no more than the most valued
items (valuations being additive). We consider the objective of setting
prices and allocations in order to maximize the total revenue of the market
maker. The pricing problem with sharp multi-unit demand buyers has a number of
properties that the unit-demand model does not possess, and is an important
question in algorithmic pricing. We consider the problem of computing a revenue
maximizing solution for two solution concepts: competitive equilibrium and
envy-free pricing.
For unrestricted valuations, these problems are NP-complete; we focus on a
realistic special case of "correlated values" where each buyer has a
valuation v_i\qual_j for item , where and \qual_j are positive
quantities associated with buyer and item respectively. We present a
polynomial time algorithm to solve the revenue-maximizing competitive
equilibrium problem. For envy-free pricing, if the demand of each buyer is
bounded by a constant, a revenue maximizing solution can be found efficiently;
the general demand case is shown to be NP-hard.Comment: page2
Computer Science and Game Theory: A Brief Survey
There has been a remarkable increase in work at the interface of computer
science and game theory in the past decade. In this article I survey some of
the main themes of work in the area, with a focus on the work in computer
science. Given the length constraints, I make no attempt at being
comprehensive, especially since other surveys are also available, and a
comprehensive survey book will appear shortly.Comment: To appear; Palgrave Dictionary of Economic
Energy-Efficient Resource Allocation in Wireless Networks: An Overview of Game-Theoretic Approaches
An overview of game-theoretic approaches to energy-efficient resource
allocation in wireless networks is presented. Focusing on multiple-access
networks, it is demonstrated that game theory can be used as an effective tool
to study resource allocation in wireless networks with quality-of-service (QoS)
constraints. A family of non-cooperative (distributed) games is presented in
which each user seeks to choose a strategy that maximizes its own utility while
satisfying its QoS requirements. The utility function considered here measures
the number of reliable bits that are transmitted per joule of energy consumed
and, hence, is particulary suitable for energy-constrained networks. The
actions available to each user in trying to maximize its own utility are at
least the choice of the transmit power and, depending on the situation, the
user may also be able to choose its transmission rate, modulation, packet size,
multiuser receiver, multi-antenna processing algorithm, or carrier allocation
strategy. The best-response strategy and Nash equilibrium for each game is
presented. Using this game-theoretic framework, the effects of power control,
rate control, modulation, temporal and spatial signal processing, carrier
allocation strategy and delay QoS constraints on energy efficiency and network
capacity are quantified.Comment: To appear in the IEEE Signal Processing Magazine: Special Issue on
Resource-Constrained Signal Processing, Communications and Networking, May
200
Rolf Mantel and the Computability of General Equilibria: On the Origins of the Sonnenschein-Mantel-Debreu Theorem
In this brief paper we revise the original motivations of Rolf Mantel to pursue a proof of Sonnenschein´s conjecture. We contend that his work on computational models of general equilibrium lead him to seek an alternative to the usual fixed point theorems used in proofs of existence. Confronted with a paper of Uzawa and his own experience in programming a national planning system he found that the use of theorems like Brouwer´s and Kakutani´s was unavoidable. To check out whether Uzawa was right he sought to find out whether the only properties required of excess demand functions to ensure the existence of equilibria in competitive markets were continuity, homogeneity and Walras´ law. In 1974, he found that this was actually the case. We will see that this result and his interpretation were informed by Mantel´s interest in economic development and planning.Fil: Tohmé, Fernando
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