2,026 research outputs found
Competition in Wireless Systems via Bayesian Interference Games
We study competition between wireless devices with incomplete information
about their opponents. We model such interactions as Bayesian interference
games. Each wireless device selects a power profile over the entire available
bandwidth to maximize its data rate. Such competitive models represent
situations in which several wireless devices share spectrum without any central
authority or coordinated protocol.
In contrast to games where devices have complete information about their
opponents, we consider scenarios where the devices are unaware of the
interference they cause to other devices. Such games, which are modeled as
Bayesian games, can exhibit significantly different equilibria. We first
consider a simple scenario of simultaneous move games, where we show that the
unique Bayes-Nash equilibrium is where both devices spread their power equally
across the entire bandwidth. We then extend this model to a two-tiered spectrum
sharing case where users act sequentially. Here one of the devices, called the
primary user, is the owner of the spectrum and it selects its power profile
first. The second device (called the secondary user) then responds by choosing
a power profile to maximize its Shannon capacity. In such sequential move
games, we show that there exist equilibria in which the primary user obtains a
higher data rate by using only a part of the bandwidth.
In a repeated Bayesian interference game, we show the existence of reputation
effects: an informed primary user can bluff to prevent spectrum usage by a
secondary user who suffers from lack of information about the channel gains.
The resulting equilibrium can be highly inefficient, suggesting that
competitive spectrum sharing is highly suboptimal.Comment: 30 pages, 3 figure
Competitive Spectrum Management with Incomplete Information
This paper studies an interference interaction (game) between selfish and
independent wireless communication systems in the same frequency band. Each
system (player) has incomplete information about the other player's channel
conditions. A trivial Nash equilibrium point in this game is where players
mutually full spread (FS) their transmit spectrum and interfere with each
other. This point may lead to poor spectrum utilization from a global network
point of view and even for each user individually.
In this paper, we provide a closed form expression for a non pure-FS
epsilon-Nash equilibrium point; i.e., an equilibrium point where players choose
FDM for some channel realizations and FS for the others. We show that operating
in this non pure-FS epsilon-Nash equilibrium point increases each user's
throughput and therefore improves the spectrum utilization, and demonstrate
that this performance gain can be substantial. Finally, important insights are
provided into the behaviour of selfish and rational wireless users as a
function of the channel parameters such as fading probabilities, the
interference-to-signal ratio
Optimal Scanning Bandwidth Strategy Incorporating Uncertainty about Adversary's Characteristics
In this paper we investigate the problem of designing a spectrum scanning
strategy to detect an intelligent Invader who wants to utilize spectrum
undetected for his/her unapproved purposes. To deal with this problem we model
the situation as two games, between a Scanner and an Invader, and solve them
sequentially. The first game is formulated to design the optimal (in maxmin
sense) scanning algorithm, while the second one allows one to find the optimal
values of the parameters for the algorithm depending on parameters of the
network. These games provide solutions for two dilemmas that the rivals face.
The Invader's dilemma consists of the following: the more bandwidth the Invader
attempts to use leads to a larger payoff if he is not detected, but at the same
time also increases the probability of being detected and thus fined.
Similarly, the Scanner faces a dilemma: the wider the bandwidth scanned, the
higher the probability of detecting the Invader, but at the expense of
increasing the cost of building the scanning system. The equilibrium strategies
are found explicitly and reveal interesting properties. In particular, we have
found a discontinuous dependence of the equilibrium strategies on the network
parameters, fine and the type of the Invader's award. This discontinuity of the
fine means that the network provider has to take into account a human/social
factor since some threshold values of fine could be very sensible for the
Invader, while in other situations simply increasing the fine has minimal
deterrence impact. Also we show how incomplete information about the Invader's
technical characteristics and reward (e.g. motivated by using different type of
application, say, video-streaming or downloading files) can be incorporated
into scanning strategy to increase its efficiency.Comment: This is the last draft version of the paper. Revised version of the
paper was published in EAI Endorsed Transactions on Mobile Communications and
Applications, Vol. 14, Issue 5, 2014, doi=10.4108/mca.2.5.e6. arXiv admin
note: substantial text overlap with arXiv:1310.724
Applications of Repeated Games in Wireless Networks: A Survey
A repeated game is an effective tool to model interactions and conflicts for
players aiming to achieve their objectives in a long-term basis. Contrary to
static noncooperative games that model an interaction among players in only one
period, in repeated games, interactions of players repeat for multiple periods;
and thus the players become aware of other players' past behaviors and their
future benefits, and will adapt their behavior accordingly. In wireless
networks, conflicts among wireless nodes can lead to selfish behaviors,
resulting in poor network performances and detrimental individual payoffs. In
this paper, we survey the applications of repeated games in different wireless
networks. The main goal is to demonstrate the use of repeated games to
encourage wireless nodes to cooperate, thereby improving network performances
and avoiding network disruption due to selfish behaviors. Furthermore, various
problems in wireless networks and variations of repeated game models together
with the corresponding solutions are discussed in this survey. Finally, we
outline some open issues and future research directions.Comment: 32 pages, 15 figures, 5 tables, 168 reference
Game theory for cooperation in multi-access edge computing
Cooperative strategies amongst network players can improve network performance and spectrum utilization in future networking environments. Game Theory is very suitable for these emerging scenarios, since it models high-complex interactions among distributed decision makers. It also finds the more convenient management policies for the diverse players (e.g., content providers, cloud providers, edge providers, brokers, network providers, or users). These management policies optimize the performance of the overall network infrastructure with a fair utilization of their resources. This chapter discusses relevant theoretical models that enable cooperation amongst the players in distinct ways through, namely, pricing or reputation. In addition, the authors highlight open problems, such as the lack of proper models for dynamic and incomplete information scenarios. These upcoming scenarios are associated to computing and storage at the network edge, as well as, the deployment of large-scale IoT systems. The chapter finalizes by discussing a business model for future networks.info:eu-repo/semantics/acceptedVersio
Non-atomic Games for Multi-User Systems
In this contribution, the performance of a multi-user system is analyzed in
the context of frequency selective fading channels. Using game theoretic tools,
a useful framework is provided in order to determine the optimal power
allocation when users know only their own channel (while perfect channel state
information is assumed at the base station). We consider the realistic case of
frequency selective channels for uplink CDMA. This scenario illustrates the
case of decentralized schemes, where limited information on the network is
available at the terminal. Various receivers are considered, namely the Matched
filter, the MMSE filter and the optimum filter. The goal of this paper is to
derive simple expressions for the non-cooperative Nash equilibrium as the
number of mobiles becomes large and the spreading length increases. To that end
two asymptotic methodologies are combined. The first is asymptotic random
matrix theory which allows us to obtain explicit expressions of the impact of
all other mobiles on any given tagged mobile. The second is the theory of
non-atomic games which computes good approximations of the Nash equilibrium as
the number of mobiles grows.Comment: 17 pages, 4 figures, submitted to IEEE JSAC Special Issue on ``Game
Theory in Communication Systems'
Review on Radio Resource Allocation Optimization in LTE/LTE-Advanced using Game Theory
Recently, there has been a growing trend toward ap-plying game theory (GT) to various engineering fields in order to solve optimization problems with different competing entities/con-tributors/players. Researches in the fourth generation (4G) wireless network field also exploited this advanced theory to overcome long term evolution (LTE) challenges such as resource allocation, which is one of the most important research topics. In fact, an efficient de-sign of resource allocation schemes is the key to higher performance. However, the standard does not specify the optimization approach to execute the radio resource management and therefore it was left open for studies. This paper presents a survey of the existing game theory based solution for 4G-LTE radio resource allocation problem and its optimization
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