Acting Wide Awake: Attention and the Ethics of Emotion

In cases where two human cultures disagree over fundamental ethical values, metaethical questions about what could make one or the other position correct arise with great force. Philosophers committed to naturalistically plausible accounts of ethics have offered little hope of adjudicating such conflicts, leading some to embrace moral relativism. In my dissertation, I develop an empirically grounded response to moral relativism by turning away from debates over which action types are right and wrong and focusing instead on shared features of human emotional motivation. On my account, being motivated by ill-will is ethically bad (if it is), just because human beings who are fully and accurately aware of how unpleasant it is to be motivated in this way will agree that we ought not to act out of ill-will. Conversely, good-will is ethically good (if it is) just because we ourselves would judge it to be so, if we were fully and accurately aware of how much more ease is present in being motivated in this way. More generally, by appealing to ethical judgments that all members of our human moral community would make if they were alert and unbiased, we can make sense of the idea that individuals and groups sometimes get the normative truth wrong, and that we sometimes get it right. In this way, the experiential ease and unease that is characteristic of various emotional motivations in virtue of our shared human neurobiology can ground a circumscribed set of universal claims about which motivations we ought to act out of, while leaving many other aspects of how we ought to live open to cultural determination

What Empathy Can(not) Do. An Inquiry into the Epistemic Possibilities and Limits of Empathic Imagination.

In my dissertation, I am going to argue that empathy is a cognitive process through which we imagine another\u2019s first-person perspective in a given situation. Empathy aims at providing empathizers with an insight into \u201cwhat it feels like\u201d to be in somebody else\u2019s shoes. I call this phenomenon phenomenal insight. In light of this account, I am going to show some of empathy\u2019s major epistemic possibilities and limits. The dissertation is so structured. In Chapter I, I will engage with the literature devoted to the definition of empathy. From this debate, I extrapolate a pattern of basic features that are shared by most accounts. I then introduce the definition of empathy I will be dealing with throughout the present work. In Chapter II, I engage with the view that regards empathy as capable of providing us with an understanding of other people's reasons for action, where reasons are to be taken as constituted by a belief-desire couple. I criticize the belief-desire model and argue for the inclusion of emotions as full-right reason-giving states. I show how emotions' main source of motivation can be found in the way in which they are phenomenally experienced by subjects. I then argue for phenomenal insight as a way to grasp the reason-giving dimension of emotional states. Attached to this chapter I put an Appendix in which I explore more in detail how it is possible for us to first-personally imagine emotional states. In Chapter III, I argue that what can be empathically imagined is bound to the kind of individuals we are, i.e. to our preferences, values, dispositions, etc. When trying to imagine other people's perspectives, traces of our \u201cselves\u201d can be found in what and how we imagine. I use the case of \u201cimaginative resistance\u201d as a vivid example of this phenomenon. I further defend my claims by resorting to some relevant empirical work in social psychology and neuroscience. In Chapter IV, I engage with the debate on transformative experiences (TEs). TEs could, indeed, be interpreted as highlighting major limits of our imaginative capabilities due to the kind of selves we are. The stock of experiences we had constrains our capability to conjure up the relevant imaginings about experiences we did not personally undergo. At the same time, the kind of \u201cself\u201d we are impedes us to fully appreciate a different self\u2019s perspective. In Chapter V, I show how the challenges to empathy explored in the previous chapter can be counterbalanced. This allows me to show some surprising features of empathy that are seldom discussed in contemporary literature, namely the possibility to learn via empathy and the possibility to change via empathy. On the one hand, I show how empathy, by stretching our imagination, can provide us with phenomenal insight into experiences we did not actually undergo. On the other hand, I show how empathy, by exposing ourselves to new perspectives, can change us as individuals

Investigating Human Perceptions of Trust and Social Cues in Robots for Safe Human-Robot Interaction in Human-oriented Environments

As robots increasingly take part in daily living activities, humans will have to interact with them in domestic and other human-oriented environments. This thesis envisages a future where autonomous robots could be used as home companions to assist and collaborate with their human partners in unstructured environments without the support of any roboticist or expert. To realise such a vision, it is important to identify which factors (e.g. trust, participants’ personalities and background etc.) that influence people to accept robots’ as companions and trust the robots to look after their well-being. I am particularly interested in the possibility of robots using social behaviours and natural communications as a repair mechanism to positively influence humans’ sense of trust and companionship towards the robots. The main reason being that trust can change over time due to different factors (e.g. perceived erroneous robot behaviours). In this thesis, I provide guidelines for a robot to regain human trust by adopting certain human-like behaviours. I can expect that domestic robots will exhibit occasional mechanical, programming or functional errors, as occurs with any other electrical consumer devices. For example, these might include software errors, dropping objects due to gripper malfunctions, picking up the wrong object or showing faulty navigational skills due to unclear camera images or noisy laser scanner data respectively. It is therefore important for a domestic robot to have acceptable interactive behaviour when exhibiting and recovering from an error situation. In this context, several open questions need to be addressed regarding both individuals’ perceptions of the errors and robots, and the effects of these on people’s trust in robots. As a first step, I investigated how the severity of the consequences and the timing of a robot’s different types of erroneous behaviours during an interaction may have different impact on users’ attitudes towards a domestic robot. I concluded that there is a correlation between the magnitude of an error performed by the robot and the corresponding loss of trust of the human in the robot. In particular, people’s trust was strongly affected by robot errors that had severe consequences. This led us to investigate whether people’s awareness of robots’ functionalities may affect their trust in a robot. I found that people’s acceptance and trust in the robot may be affected by their knowledge of the robot’s capabilities and its limitations differently according the participants’ age and the robot’s embodiment. In order to deploy robots in the wild, strategies for mitigating and re-gaining people’s trust in robots in case of errors needs to be implemented. In the following three studies, I assessed if a robot with awareness of human social conventions would increase people’s trust in the robot. My findings showed that people almost blindly trusted a social and a non-social robot in scenarios with non-severe error consequences. In contrast, people that interacted with a social robot did not trust its suggestions in a scenario with a higher risk outcome. Finally, I investigated the effects of robots’ errors on people’s trust of a robot over time. The findings showed that participants’ judgement of a robot is formed during the first stage of their interaction. Therefore, people are more inclined to lose trust in a robot if it makes big errors at the beginning of the interaction. The findings from the Human-Robot Interaction experiments presented in this thesis will contribute to an advanced understanding of the trust dynamics between humans and robots for a long-lasting and successful collaboration

A Genealogy of Emancipatory Values

Analytic moral philosophers have generally failed to engage in any substantial way with the cultural history of morality. This is a shame, because a genealogy of morals can help us accomplish two important tasks. First, a genealogy can form the basis of an epistemological project, one that seeks to establish the epistemic status of our beliefs or values. Second, a genealogy can provide us with functional understanding, since a history of our beliefs, values or institutions can reveal some inherent dynamic or pattern which may be problematically obscured from our view. In this paper, I try to make good on these claims by offering a sketchy genealogy of emancipatory values, or values which call for the liberation of persons from systems of dominance and oppression. The real history of these values, I argue, is both epistemologically vindicatory and functionally enlightening

Parsing the Blues: What Depression Reveals About the Life Well-Lived

This dissertation explores the way depression illuminates –and is illuminated by – certain aspects of moral philosophy. I begin by defending, in chapter one, a cognitive theory of one important subtype of depression. The subsequent chapters then investigate what depression can teach us about the nature of well- (and ill-) being, and about the nature of moral virtue. In chapter two I ask ‘what makes depression bad for us?’ and go on to argue that reflection upon this question shows that desire-based theories of welfare are false. Then, in the next chapter, I provide a (partial) answer to that question, arguing that a central harm of depression is its undermining of the values or cares that constitute the core of a person’s self. This, in turn, vitiates effective agency and saps a person’s life of subjective meaningfulness. Given the results from the previous three chapters, I then ask, in chapter 4, whether it is ever permissible to allow those suffering from depression to choose physician-assisted suicide, and answer in the affirmative. Finally, in chapter five I take up the relationship between depression and virtue. Though the virtuous should never seek to become clinically depressed, I contend that morally virtuous people ought to preferentially attend to what it is fitting to feel negative attitudes towards, and thus, that they should be unhappy