A Comparative Study of Market-Based and Threshold-Based Task Allocation

In this paper we compare the costs and benefits of market-based and thresholdbased approaches to task allocation in real world conditions, where information and communication may be limited or inaccurate. We have performed extensive comparative experiments in an event-handling domain. Our results indicate that when information is accurate, market-based approaches are more efficient; when it is not, threshold-based approaches offer the same quality of allocation at a fraction of the expense. Additionally, both approaches are robust to low communication and task perception ranges in our experimental domain

Gender Differences in Job Assignment and Promotion in a Complexity Ladder of Jobs

This paper studies gender differences in the allocation of workers across tasks of different complexity using panel data from a representative sample of Finnish metalworkers during 1990- 2000. Finnish metal industry data provide a continuous measure of the complexity of the worker’s tasks that can be used to construct a complexity ladder of jobs. We study whether women have to pass a higher productivity threshold to be promoted to more complex tasks. Gender differences in promotion rates, duration to promotion, and productivity among promoted and not promoted workers are estimated. It is found that women move up the ladder less than men, women have to wait longer to get promoted, and that women are on average more productive than men in the groups of both promoted and not-promoted workers. These productivity differentials are not observed within tasks at the initial task assignment. We interpret this as evidence on higher female promotion thresholds.Careers; Job ladders; Job complexity; Gender and wages

Information acquisition, referral, and organization

Each of two experts may provide a service to a client. Experts' cost comparative advantage depends on an unknown state, but an expert may exert effort to get a private signal about it. In a market, an expert may refer the client to the other for a fee. In equilibrium, only one expert exerts effort and refers, and the equilibrium allocation is inefficient. Referral efficiency can be restored when experts form an organization, in which a referring expert must bear the referred expert's cost. However, the referred expert shirks from work effort because of the lack of cost responsibility.2018-11-1

Multitasking, Competition and Provider Payment

Many important dimensions of quality health care are difficult to observe, monitor, and motivate. This paper examines how competition among providers interacts with payment system incentives when the allocation of provider effort among multiple such dimensions or ‘tasks’ is noncontractible. The framework highlights that an optimal provider payment system, including optimal risk adjustment, should take account of provider multitasking.payment incentives, competition, multitasking, capitation, managed care, rationing, risk adjustment

Distributed and Centralized Task Allocation: When and Where to Use Them

Self-organisation is frequently advocated as the solution for managing large, dynamic systems. Distributed algorithms are implicitly designed for infinitely large problems, while small systems are regarded as being controllable using traditional, centralised approaches. Many real-world systems, however, do not fit conveniently into these "small" or "large" categories, resulting in a range of cases where the optimal solution is ambiguous. This difficulty is exacerbated by enthusiasts of either approach constructing problems that suit their preferred control architecture. We address this ambiguity by building an abstract model of task allocation in a community of specialised agents. We are inspired by the problem of work distribution in distributed satellite systems, but the model is also relevant to the resource allocation problems in distributed robotics, autonomic computing and wireless sensor networks. We compare the behaviour of a self-organising, market-based task allocation strategy to a classical approach that uses a central controller with global knowledge. The objective is not to prove one mechanism inherently superior to the other; instead we are interested in the regions of problem space where each of them dominates. Simulation is used to explore the trade-off between energy consumption and robustness in a system of intermediate size, with fixed communication costs and varying rates of component failure. We identify boundaries between regions in the parameter space where one or the other architecture will be favoured. This allows us to derive guidelines for system designers, thus contributing to the development of a disciplined approach to controlling distributed systems using self-organising mechanisms

First in Village or Second in Rome

Though individuals prefer to join groups with high quality peers, there are also advantages from being high up in the pecking order within the group. We show that sorting of agents in this environment results in an overlapping interval structure in the type space. Segregation and mixing coexist in a stable equilibrium. A greater degree of egalitarianism within organizations leads to greater segregation across organizations. Policies that are effective for lower-quality organizations to attract talent may be counterproductive for higher-quality organizations to retain talent. The degree and the pattern of segregation are shown to depend also on whether higher types are less concerned with relative ranking within the organization, on relative size of organizations, and on the extent of idiosyncratic preferences for other organizational attributes.

The use of portfolio credit risk models in Central Banks.

This report summarises the findings of the task force. It is organised as follows. Section 2 starts with a discussion of the relevance of credit risk for central banks. It is followed by a short introduction to credit risk models, parameters and systems in Section 3, focusing on models used by members of the task force. Section 4 presents the results of the simulation exercise undertaken by the task force. The lessons from these simulations as well as other conclusions are discussed in Section 5.

Disclosure to a Credulous Audience: The Role of Limited Attention

In our model, informed players decide whether or not to disclose, and observers allocate attention among disclosed signals, and toward reasoning through the implications of a failure to disclose. In equilibrium disclosure is incomplete, and observers are unrealistically optimistic. Nevertheless, regulation requiring greater disclosure can reduce observers' belief accuracies and welfare. A stronger tendency to neglect disclosed signals increases disclosure, whereas a stronger tendency to neglect failures to disclose reduces disclosure. Observer beliefs are influenced by the salience of disclosed signals, and disclosure in one arena can crowd out disclosure in other fundamentally unrelated arenas.disclosure; disclosure regulation; limited attention; credulity