Geographic Variation in Informed Consent Law: Two Standards for Disclosure of Treatment Risks

We analyzed 714 jury verdicts in informed consent cases tried in 25 states in 1985–2002 to determine whether the applicable standard of care (“patient” vs. “professional” standard) affected the outcome. Verdicts for plaintiffs were significantly more frequent in states with a patient standard than in states with a professional standard (27 percent vs. 17 percent, P = 0.02). This difference in outcomes did not hold for other types of medical malpractice litigation (36 percent vs. 37 percent, P = 0.8). The multivariate odds of a plaintiff’s verdict were more than twice as high in states with a patient standard than in states with a professional standard (odds ratio = 2.15, 95% confidence interval = 1.32–3.50). The law’s expectations of clinicians with respect to risk disclosure appear to vary geographically

The Scottish Criminal Jury: A Very Peculiar Institution

Duff describes and discusses the Scottish criminal jury. While the exact origins of the Scottish criminal jury are obscure, it is clear that it developed in tandem with, although in a different fashion from, its English counterpart

Doctrinal Issues in Evidence and Proof

The word evidence ordinarily means the statements, events, items, or sensory perceptions that suggest the existence or nonexistence of, or truth or falsity of, another fact. Thus, one may say, “hoofbeats are evidence a horse may be passing.” Proof is similar in meaning but may connote more certainty. Evidence can also mean the study of either (1) how people make such inferences (especially when conjoined with the word proof) or (2) how law regulates information admissibility in the judicial context. Evidence in the latter sense is the name of a standard law school course in common law countries and a subject that is on all American state examinations for admission to the bar. As a subject in law, then, evidence traditionally encompasses only the legal rules and regulations governing the admissibility of evidence, inference, and argument, on questions of fact, in civil and criminal judicial trials. Surprising for American lawyers, most civil law countries do not have a separate basic course on evidence but, rather, fold it into the introductory course on procedure

Innocence, Harmless Error, and Federal Wrongful Conviction Law

This Article examines the body of law emerging in cases brought by former criminal defendants once exonerated, often through DNA testing, which may fundamentally reshape our criminal justice system. Federal wrongful conviction actions share a novel construction - they rely on criminal procedure rights incorporated as an element in a civil rights lawsuit. During a criminal trial, remedies for violations of procedural rights are often seen as truth defeating, because they exclude evidence possibly probative of guilt. In a civil wrongful conviction action, that remedial paradigm is reversed. The exonerated defendant instead seeks to remedy government misconduct that was truth defeating and concealed evidence of innocence. This Article contends that in a civil case, the harmless error rules that limit remedies for violations of criminal procedure rights do not apply. Further, though not generally recognized as such, the Supreme Court has created internal harmless error rules to accompany each of the relevant fair trial claims: the Brady v. Maryland right to have exculpatory evidence disclosed; the right to effective assistance of counsel; the right to be free from suggestive eyewitness identification procedures; and the right not to be subject to a coerced confession. Civil claims suggest the transformative result that for each right, harmless error insulation is stripped away. This Article concludes by reflecting on how wrongful conviction suits may spearhead wide-ranging reform of our criminal justice system and renew substantive development of the constitutional right to a fair trial

The Abolitionist’s Dilemma: Establishing the Standards for the Evolving Standards of Decency

[Excerpt] “For those who believe that the death penalty should be declared unconstitutional and that the U.S. Supreme Court is the institution that should make that declaration, these are interesting times. On one hand, the Rehnquist Court, which had previously not been a reliable friend of criminal defendants, in 2002, ruled that it was unconstitutional to execute mentally retarded defendants, and in 2005 it came to the same conclusion as to defendants who committed a capital crime before his or her eighteenth birthday. On the other hand, close scrutiny of these opinions evidences that the Court all but casts aside methodology to reach the apparently desired outcome. The Court’s rulings that neither juveniles nor mentally retarded defendants could be executed were welcome pronouncements to death penalty abolitionists—that is, those who advocate for and work toward the legal prohibition of capital punishment. However, that is not the end of the story.