Commuting Signatures and Verifiable Encryption and an Application to Non-Interactively Delegatable Credentials

Verifiable encryption allows to encrypt a signature and prove that the plaintext is valid. We introduce a new primitive called commuting signature that extends verifiable encryption in multiple ways: a signer can encrypt both signature and message and prove validity; more importantly, given a ciphertext, a signer can create a verifiably encrypted signature on the encrypted message; thus signing and encrypting commute. We instantiate commuting signatures using the proof system by Groth and Sahai (EUROCRYPT \u2708) and the automorphic signatures by Fuchsbauer (ePrint report 2009/320). As an application, we give an instantiation of delegatable anonymous credentials, a powerful primitive introduced by Belenkiy et al. (CRYPTO \u2709). Our instantiation is arguably simpler than theirs and it is the first to provide non-interactive issuing and delegation, which is a standard requirement for non-anonymous credentials. Moreover, the size of our credentials and the cost of verification are less than half of those of the only previous construction, and efficiency of issuing and delegation is increased even more significantly. All our constructions are proved secure in the standard model

New Conditional Privacy-preserving Encryption Schemes in Communication Network

Nowadays the communication networks have acted as nearly the most important fundamental infrastructure in our human society. The basic service provided by the communication networks are like that provided by the ubiquitous public utilities. For example, the cable television network provides the distribution of information to its subscribers, which is much like the water or gas supply systems which distribute the commodities to citizens. The communication network also facilitates the development of many network-based applications such as industrial pipeline controlling in the industrial network, voice over long-term evolution (VoLTE) in the mobile network and mixture reality (MR) in the computer network, etc. Since the communication network plays such a vital role in almost every aspect of our life, undoubtedly, the information transmitted over it should be guarded properly. Roughly, such information can be categorized into either the communicated message or the sensitive information related to the users. Since we already got cryptographical tools, such as encryption schemes, to ensure the confidentiality of communicated messages, it is the sensitive personal information which should be paid special attentions to. Moreover, for the benefit of reducing the network burden in some instances, it may require that only communication information among legitimated users, such as streaming media service subscribers, can be stored and then relayed in the network. In this case, the network should be empowered with the capability to verify whether the transmitted message is exchanged between legitimated users without leaking the privacy of those users. Meanwhile, the intended receiver of a transmitted message should be able to identify the exact message sender for future communication. In order to cater to those requirements, we re-define a notion named conditional user privacy preservation. In this thesis, we investigate the problem how to preserve user conditional privacy in pubic key encryption schemes, which are used to secure the transmitted information in the communication networks. In fact, even the term conditional privacy preservation has appeared in existing works before, there still have great differences between our conditional privacy preservation definition and the one proposed before. For example, in our definition, we do not need a trusted third party (TTP) to help tracing the sender of a message. Besides, the verification of a given encrypted message can be done without any secret. In this thesis, we also introduce more desirable features to our redefined notion user conditional privacy preservation. In our second work, we consider not only the conditional privacy of the message sender but also that of the intended message receiver. This work presents a new encryption scheme which can be implemented in communication networks where there exists a blacklist containing a list of blocked communication channels, and each of them is established by a pair of sender and receiver. With this encryption scheme, a verifier can confirm whether one ciphertext is belonging to a legitimated communication channel without knowing the exact sender and receiver of that ciphertext. With our two previous works, for a given ciphertext, we ensure that no one except its intended receiver can identify the sender. However, the receiver of one message may behave dishonest when it tries to retrieve the real message sender, which incurs the problem that the receiver of a message might manipulate the origin of the message successfully for its own benefit. To tackle this problem, we present a novel encryption scheme in our third work. Apart from preserving user conditional privacy, this work also enforces the receiver to give a publicly verifiable proof so as to convince others that it is honest during the process of identifying the actual message sender. In our forth work, we show our special interest in the access control encryption, or ACE for short, and find this primitive can inherently achieve user conditional privacy preservation to some extent. we present a newly constructed ACE scheme in this work, and our scheme has advantages over existing ACE schemes in two aspects. Firstly, our ACE scheme is more reliable than existing ones since we utilize a distributed sanitizing algorithm and thus avoid the so called single point failure happened in ACE systems with only one sanitizer. Then, since the ciphertext and key size of our scheme is more compact than that of the existing ACE schemes, our scheme enjoys better scalability

Malleable zero-knowledge proofs and applications

In recent years, the field of privacy-preserving technologies has experienced considerable expansion, with zero-knowledge proofs (ZKPs) playing one of the most prominent roles. Although ZKPs have been a well-established theoretical construct for three decades, recent efficiency improvements and novel privacy applications within decentralized finance have become the main drivers behind the surge of interest and investment in this area. This momentum has subsequently sparked unprecedented technical advances. Non-interactive ZKPs (NIZKs) are now regularly implemented across a variety of domains, encompassing, but not limited to, privacy-enabling cryptocurrencies, credential systems, voting, mixing, secure multi-party computation, and other cryptographic protocols. This thesis, although covering several areas of ZKP technologies and their application, focuses on one important aspect of NIZKs, namely their malleability. Malleability is a quality of a proof system that describes the potential for altering an already generated proof. Different properties may be desired in different application contexts. On the one end of the spectrum, non-malleability ensures proof immutability, an important requirement in scenarios such as prevention of replay attacks in anonymous cryptocurrencies. At the other end, some NIZKs enable proof updatability, recursively and directly, a feature that is integral for a variety of contexts, such as private smart contracts, compact blockchains, ZK rollups, ZK virtual machines, and MPC protocols generally. This work starts with a detailed analysis of the malleability and overarching security of a popular NIZK, known as Groth16. Here we adopt a more definitional approach, studying certain properties of the proof system, and its setup ceremony, that are crucial for its precise modelling within bigger systems. Subsequently, the work explores the malleability of transactions within a private cryptocurrency variant, where we show that relaxing non-malleability assumptions enables a functionality, specifically an atomic asset swap, that is useful for cryptocurrency applications. The work culminates with a study of a less general, algebraic NIZK, and particularly its updatability properties, whose applicability we present within the context of ensuring privacy for regulatory compliance purposes