Color naming reflects both perceptual structure and communicative need

Gibson et al. (2017) argued that color naming is shaped by patterns of communicative need. In support of this claim, they showed that color naming systems across languages support more precise communication about warm colors than cool colors, and that the objects we talk about tend to be warm-colored rather than cool-colored. Here, we present new analyses that alter this picture. We show that greater communicative precision for warm than for cool colors, and greater communicative need, may both be explained by perceptual structure. However, using an information-theoretic analysis, we also show that color naming across languages bears signs of communicative need beyond what would be predicted by perceptual structure alone. We conclude that color naming is shaped both by perceptual structure, as has traditionally been argued, and by patterns of communicative need, as argued by Gibson et al. - although for reasons other than those they advanced

Semiotic Dynamics Solves the Symbol Grounding Problem

Language requires the capacity to link symbols (words, sentences) through the intermediary of internal representations to the physical world, a process known as symbol grounding. One of the biggest debates in the cognitive sciences concerns the question how human brains are able to do this. Do we need a material explanation or a system explanation? John Searle's well known Chinese Room thought experiment, which continues to generate a vast polemic literature of arguments and counter-arguments, has argued that autonomously establishing internal representations of the world (called 'intentionality' in philosophical parlance) is based on special properties of human neural tissue and that consequently an artificial system, such as an autonomous physical robot, can never achieve this. Here we study the Grounded Naming Game as a particular example of symbolic interaction and investigate a dynamical system that autonomously builds up and uses the semiotic networks necessary for performance in the game. We demonstrate in real experiments with physical robots that such a dynamical system indeed leads to a successful emergent communication system and hence that symbol grounding and intentionality can be explained in terms of a particular kind of system dynamics. The human brain has obviously the right mechanisms to participate in this kind of dynamics but the same dynamics can also be embodied in other types of physical systems

On the automaticity of language processing

People speak and listen to language all the time. Given this high frequency of use, it is often suggested that at least some aspects of language processing are highly overlearned and therefore occur “automatically”. Here we critically examine this suggestion. We first sketch a framework that views automaticity as a set of interrelated features of mental processes and a matter of degree rather than a single feature that is all-or-none. We then apply this framework to language processing. To do so, we carve up the processes involved in language use according to (a) whether language processing takes place in monologue or dialogue, (b) whether the individual is comprehending or producing language, (c) whether the spoken or written modality is used, and (d) the linguistic processing level at which they occur, that is, phonology, the lexicon, syntax, or conceptual processes. This exercise suggests that while conceptual processes are relatively non-automatic (as is usually assumed), there is also considerable evidence that syntactic and lexical lower-level processes are not fully automatic. We close by discussing entrenchment as a set of mechanisms underlying automatization

Cross-modal extinction in a boy with severely autistic behaviour and high verbal intelligence

Anecdotal reports from individuals with autism suggest a loss of awareness to stimuli from one modality in the presence of stimuli from another. Here we document such a case in a detailed study of T.M., a 13-year-old boy with autism in whom significant autistic behaviors are combined with an uneven IQ profile of superior verbal and low performance abilities. Although T.M.'s speech is often unintelligible and his behavior is dominated by motor stereotypies and impulsivity, he can communicate by typing or pointing independently within a letter board. A series of experiments using simple and highly salient visual, auditory, and tactile stimuli demonstrated a hierarchy of cross-modal extinction, in which auditory information extinguished other modalities at various levels of processing. T.M. also showed deficits in shifting and sustaining attention. These results provide evidence for mono-channel perception in autism and suggest a general pattern of winner-takes-all processing in which a stronger stimulus-d riven representation dominates behavior, extinguishing weaker representations

On the Triplet Frame for Concept Analysis

The paper has two objectives: to introduce the fundamentals of a triplet model of a concept, and to show that the main concept models may be structurally treated as its partial cases. The triplet model considers a concept as a mental representation and characterizes it from three interrelated perspectives. The first deals with objects (and their attributes of various orders) subsumed under a concept. The second focuses on representing structures that depict objects and their attributes in some intelligent system. The third concentrates on the ways of establishing correspondences between objects with their attributes and appropriate representing structures

Directional adposition use in English, Swedish and Finnish

Directional adpositions such as to the left of describe where a Figure is in relation to a Ground. English and Swedish directional adpositions refer to the location of a Figure in relation to a Ground, whether both are static or in motion. In contrast, the Finnish directional adpositions edellä (in front of) and jäljessä (behind) solely describe the location of a moving Figure in relation to a moving Ground (Nikanne, 2003). When using directional adpositions, a frame of reference must be assumed for interpreting the meaning of directional adpositions. For example, the meaning of to the left of in English can be based on a relative (speaker or listener based) reference frame or an intrinsic (object based) reference frame (Levinson, 1996). When a Figure and a Ground are both in motion, it is possible for a Figure to be described as being behind or in front of the Ground, even if neither have intrinsic features. As shown by Walker (in preparation), there are good reasons to assume that in the latter case a motion based reference frame is involved. This means that if Finnish speakers would use edellä (in front of) and jäljessä (behind) more frequently in situations where both the Figure and Ground are in motion, a difference in reference frame use between Finnish on one hand and English and Swedish on the other could be expected. We asked native English, Swedish and Finnish speakers’ to select adpositions from a language specific list to describe the location of a Figure relative to a Ground when both were shown to be moving on a computer screen. We were interested in any differences between Finnish, English and Swedish speakers. All languages showed a predominant use of directional spatial adpositions referring to the lexical concepts TO THE LEFT OF, TO THE RIGHT OF, ABOVE and BELOW. There were no differences between the languages in directional adpositions use or reference frame use, including reference frame use based on motion. We conclude that despite differences in the grammars of the languages involved, and potential differences in reference frame system use, the three languages investigated encode Figure location in relation to Ground location in a similar way when both are in motion. Levinson, S. C. (1996). Frames of reference and Molyneux’s question: Crosslingiuistic evidence. In P. Bloom, M.A. Peterson, L. Nadel & M.F. Garrett (Eds.) Language and Space (pp.109-170). Massachusetts: MIT Press. Nikanne, U. (2003). How Finnish postpositions see the axis system. In E. van der Zee & J. Slack (Eds.), Representing direction in language and space. Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press. Walker, C. (in preparation). Motion encoding in language, the use of spatial locatives in a motion context. Unpublished doctoral dissertation, University of Lincoln, Lincoln. United Kingdo

Self-reported use and perception of the L1 and L2 among maximally proficient bi- and multilinguals: a quantitative and qualitative investigation

This study investigates language preferences and perceptions in the use of the native language (L1) and second language (L2) by 386 bi- and multilingual adults. Participants declared that they were maximally proficient in L1 and L2 and used both constantly. A quantitative analysis revealed that despite their maximal proficiency in the L1 and L2, participants preferred to use the L1 for communicating feelings or anger, swearing, addressing their children, performing mental calculations, and using inner speech. They also perceived their L1 to be emotionally stronger than their L2 and reported lower levels of communicative anxiety in their L1. An analysis of interview data from 20 participants confirmed these findings while adding nuance. Indeed, differences in the use of the L1 and L2 and perceptions of both are often subtle and context-specific. Participants confirmed the finding that the L1 is usually felt to be more powerful than the L2, but this did not automatically translate into a preference for the L1. Longer stretches of time in the L2 culture are linked to a gradual shift in linguistic practices and perceptions. Participants reported that their multilingualism and multiculturalism gave them a sense of empowerment and a feeling of freedom