Communication-efficient three-party protocols for authentication and key agreement

AbstractEncrypted key exchange (EKE) authentication approaches are very important for secure communicating over public networks. In order to solve the security weaknesses three-party EKE, Yeh et al. [H.T. Yeh, H.M. Sun, T. Hwang, Efficient three-party authentication and key agreement protocols resistant to password guessing attacks, Information Science and Engineering 19 (6) (2003) 1059–1070.] proposed two secure and efficient three-party EKE protocols. Based on the protocol developed by Yeh et al., two improved EKE protocols for authentication and key agreement are proposed in this study. The computational costs of the proposed protocols are the same as those of the protocols of Yeh et al. However, the numbers of messages in the communication are fewer than those of the protocols of Yeh et al. Furthermore, the round efficient versions of our proposed protocols are also described

A-MAKE: an efficient, anonymous and accountable authentication framework for WMNs

In this paper, we propose a framework, named as A-MAKE, which efficiently provides security, privacy, and accountability for communications in wireless mesh networks. More specifically, the framework provides an anonymous mutual authentication protocol whereby legitimate users can connect to network from anywhere without being identified or tracked. No single party (e.g., network operator) can violate the privacy of a user, which is provided in our framework in the strongest sense. Our framework utilizes group signatures, where the private key and the credentials of the users are generated through a secure three-party protocol. User accountability is implemented via user revocation protocol that can be executed by two semitrusted authorities, one of which is the network operator. The assumptions about the trust level of the network operator are relaxed. Our framework makes use of much more efficient signature generation and verification algorithms in terms of computation complexity than their counterparts in literature, where signature size is comparable to the shortest signatures proposed for similar purposes so far

Session Initiation Protocol Attacks and Challenges

In recent years, Session Initiation Protocol (SIP) has become widely used in current internet protocols. It is a text-based protocol much like Hyper Text Transport Protocol (HTTP) and Simple Mail Transport Protocol (SMTP). SIP is a strong enough signaling protocol on the internet for establishing, maintaining, and terminating session. In this paper the areas of security and attacks in SIP are discussed. We consider attacks from diverse related perspectives. The authentication schemes are compared, the representative existing solutions are highlighted, and several remaining research challenges are identified. Finally, the taxonomy of SIP threat will be presented