35,979 research outputs found
Principles of Physical Layer Security in Multiuser Wireless Networks: A Survey
This paper provides a comprehensive review of the domain of physical layer
security in multiuser wireless networks. The essential premise of
physical-layer security is to enable the exchange of confidential messages over
a wireless medium in the presence of unauthorized eavesdroppers without relying
on higher-layer encryption. This can be achieved primarily in two ways: without
the need for a secret key by intelligently designing transmit coding
strategies, or by exploiting the wireless communication medium to develop
secret keys over public channels. The survey begins with an overview of the
foundations dating back to the pioneering work of Shannon and Wyner on
information-theoretic security. We then describe the evolution of secure
transmission strategies from point-to-point channels to multiple-antenna
systems, followed by generalizations to multiuser broadcast, multiple-access,
interference, and relay networks. Secret-key generation and establishment
protocols based on physical layer mechanisms are subsequently covered.
Approaches for secrecy based on channel coding design are then examined, along
with a description of inter-disciplinary approaches based on game theory and
stochastic geometry. The associated problem of physical-layer message
authentication is also introduced briefly. The survey concludes with
observations on potential research directions in this area.Comment: 23 pages, 10 figures, 303 refs. arXiv admin note: text overlap with
arXiv:1303.1609 by other authors. IEEE Communications Surveys and Tutorials,
201
Introducing Hierarchy in Energy Games
In this work we introduce hierarchy in wireless networks that can be modeled
by a decentralized multiple access channel and for which energy-efficiency is
the main performance index. In these networks users are free to choose their
power control strategy to selfishly maximize their energy-efficiency.
Specifically, we introduce hierarchy in two different ways: 1. Assuming
single-user decoding at the receiver, we investigate a Stackelberg formulation
of the game where one user is the leader whereas the other users are assumed to
be able to react to the leader's decisions; 2. Assuming neither leader nor
followers among the users, we introduce hierarchy by assuming successive
interference cancellation at the receiver. It is shown that introducing a
certain degree of hierarchy in non-cooperative power control games not only
improves the individual energy efficiency of all the users but can also be a
way of insuring the existence of a non-saturated equilibrium and reaching a
desired trade-off between the global network performance at the equilibrium and
the requested amount of signaling. In this respect, the way of measuring the
global performance of an energy-efficient network is shown to be a critical
issue.Comment: Accepted for publication in IEEE Trans. on Wireless Communication
Spectrum Coordination in Energy Efficient Cognitive Radio Networks
Device coordination in open spectrum systems is a challenging problem,
particularly since users experience varying spectrum availability over time and
location. In this paper, we propose a game theoretical approach that allows
cognitive radio pairs, namely the primary user (PU) and the secondary user
(SU), to update their transmission powers and frequencies simultaneously.
Specifically, we address a Stackelberg game model in which individual users
attempt to hierarchically access to the wireless spectrum while maximizing
their energy efficiency. A thorough analysis of the existence, uniqueness and
characterization of the Stackelberg equilibrium is conducted. In particular, we
show that a spectrum coordination naturally occurs when both actors in the
system decide sequentially about their powers and their transmitting carriers.
As a result, spectrum sensing in such a situation turns out to be a simple
detection of the presence/absence of a transmission on each sub-band. We also
show that when users experience very different channel gains on their two
carriers, they may choose to transmit on the same carrier at the Stackelberg
equilibrium as this contributes enough energy efficiency to outweigh the
interference degradation caused by the mutual transmission. Then, we provide an
algorithmic analysis on how the PU and the SU can reach such a spectrum
coordination using an appropriate learning process. We validate our results
through extensive simulations and compare the proposed algorithm to some
typical scenarios including the non-cooperative case and the
throughput-based-utility systems. Typically, it is shown that the proposed
Stackelberg decision approach optimizes the energy efficiency while still
maximizing the throughput at the equilibrium.Comment: 12 pages, 10 figures, to appear in IEEE Transactions on Vehicular
Technolog
Spectrum Sharing in RF-Powered Cognitive Radio Networks using Game Theory
We investigate the spectrum sharing problem of a radio frequency (RF)-powered
cognitive radio network, where a multi-antenna secondary user (SU) harvests
energy from RF signals radiated by a primary user (PU) to boost its available
energy before information transmission. In this paper, we consider that both
the PU and SU are rational and self-interested. Based on whether the SU helps
forward the PU's information, we develop two different operation modes for the
considered network, termed as non-cooperative and cooperative modes. In the
non-cooperative mode, the SU harvests energy from the PU and then use its
available energy to transmit its own information without generating any
interference to the primary link. In the cooperative mode, the PU employs the
SU to relay its information by providing monetary incentives and the SU splits
its energy for forwarding the PU's information as well as transmitting its own
information. Optimization problems are respectively formulated for both
operation modes, which constitute a Stackelberg game with the PU as a leader
and the SU as a follower. We analyze the Stackelberg game by deriving solutions
to the optimization problems and the Stackelberg Equilibrium (SE) is
subsequently obtained. Simulation results show that the performance of the
Stackelberg game can approach that of the centralized optimization scheme when
the distance between the SU and its receiver is large enough.Comment: Presented at PIMRC'1
Energy Efficiency in MIMO Underlay and Overlay Device-to-Device Communications and Cognitive Radio Systems
This paper addresses the problem of resource allocation for systems in which
a primary and a secondary link share the available spectrum by an underlay or
overlay approach. After observing that such a scenario models both cognitive
radio and D2D communications, we formulate the problem as the maximization of
the secondary energy efficiency subject to a minimum rate requirement for the
primary user. This leads to challenging non-convex, fractional problems. In the
underlay scenario, we obtain the global solution by means of a suitable
reformulation. In the overlay scenario, two algorithms are proposed. The first
one yields a resource allocation fulfilling the first-order optimality
conditions of the resource allocation problem, by solving a sequence of easier
fractional problems. The second one enjoys a weaker optimality claim, but an
even lower computational complexity. Numerical results demonstrate the merits
of the proposed algorithms both in terms of energy-efficient performance and
complexity, also showing that the two proposed algorithms for the overlay
scenario perform very similarly, despite the different complexity.Comment: to appear in IEEE Transactions on Signal Processin
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