Common Interests or Common Polities? Reinterpreting the Democratic Peace

The central claim of a rapidly growing literature in international relations is that members of pairs of democratic states are much less likely to engage each other in war or in serious disputes short of war than are members of other pairs of states. Our analysis does not support this claim. Instead, we find that the dispute rate between democracies is lower than is that of other country pairs only after World War II. Before 1914 and between the World Wars, there is no difference between the war rates of members of democratic pairs of states and those of members of other pairs of states. We also find that there is a higher incidence of serious disputes short of war between democracies than between nondemocracies before 1914. We attribute this cross-temporal variation in dispute rates to changes in patterns of common and conflicting interests across time. We use alliances as an indicator of common interests to show that cross-temporal variation in dispute rates conforms to variations in interest patterns for two of the three time periods in our sample.

Game-theoretic pragmatics under conflicting and common interests

This paper combines a literature overview of existing literature in game-theoretic pragmatics, with new models that fill some voids in the literature. We start with an overview of signaling games with a conflict of interest between sender and receiver, and show that the literature on such games can be classified into models with direct, costly, noisy and imprecise signals. We then argue that this same subdivision can be used to classify signaling games with common interests, where we fill some voids in the literature. For each of the signaling games treated, we show how equilibrium- refinement arguments and evolutionary arguments can be interpreted in the light of pragmatic inference.Signaling games, pragmatics, equilibrium refinements, evolutionary game theory

Time-consistent Fiscal Policy under Heterogeneity: Conflicting or Common Interests?

This paper studies the aggregate and distributional implications of Markov-perfect tax-spending policy in a neoclassical growth model with capitalists and workers. Focusing on the long run, our main findings are: (i) it is optimal for a benevolent government, which cares equally about its citizens, to tax capital heavily and to subsidise labour; (ii) a Pareto improving means to reduce inefficiently high capital taxation under discretion is for the government to place greater weight on the welfare of capitalists; (iii) capitalists and workers preferences, regarding the optimal amount of "capitalist bias", are not aligned implying a conflict of interests.optimal fiscal policy, Markov-perfect equilibrium, heterogeneous agents

Time-consistent fiscal policy under heterogeneity: Conflicting or common interests?

This paper studies the aggregate and distributional implications of Markov-perfect tax-spending policy in a neoclassical growth model with capitalists and workers. Focusing on the long run, our main …ndings are: (i) it is optimal for a benevolent government, which cares equally about its citizens, to tax capital heavily and to subsidise labour; (ii) a Pareto improving means to reduce inefficiently high cap- ital taxation under discretion is for the government to place greater weight on the welfare of capitalists; (iii) capitalists and workers inter- ests, regarding the optimal amount of "capitalist bias", are not aligned implying a trade-off between efficiency and equity.Optimal fiscal policy, Markov-perfect equilibrium, heterogenous agents

Geist vs Life - Scheler And Musil

Robert Musil (1880-1942), the Austrian writer, essayist and author of Der Mann ohne Eigenschaften (MoE), and Max Scheler (1874-1928), the south German realist phenomenologist, shared a number of philosophical convictions and interests. These convictions and interests distinguish them from almost all their contemporaries. They are by no means common today although more common than they were. At the centre of their work stand detailed anatomies of the human heart

Environmental Resource Management in Borderlands: Evolution from Competing Interests to Common Aversions

Great enthusiasm is attached to the emergence of cross-border regions (CBRs) as a new institutional arrangement for dealing with local cross-border environmental resource management and other issues that remain too distant from national capitals and/or too expensive to be addressed in the traditional topocraticmanner requiring instead local adhocratic methods. This study briefly discusses the perceived value of CBRs and necessary and sufficient conditions for the successful and sustainable development of such places. Then, assuming that necessary conditions can be met, the study investigates an intriguing hypothesis concerning the catalyzing of sustainable consensus for cross-border resource management based on a game theoretical approach that employs the use of dilemma of common aversion rather than the more traditional dilemma of competing common interests. Using this lens to investigate a series of events on the Pacific northwestern Canadian-American border in a part of the Fraser Lowland, we look for evidence of the emergence of an active and sustainable CBR to address local trans-border resource management issues. Although our micro-level scale fails to conclusively demonstrate such evidence, it does demonstrate the value of using this approach and suggests a number of avenues for further research

Conflicts and common interests in committees

Committees improve decisions by pooling members' independent information, but promote manipulation, obfuscation, and exaggeration of private information when members have conflicting preferences. Committee decision procedures transform continuous data into ordered ranks through voting. This coarsens the transmission of information, but controls strategic manipulations and allows some degree of information sharing. Each member becomes more cautious in casting the crucial vote than when he alone makes the decision based on own information. Increased quality of one member's information results in his casting the crucial vote more often. Committees make better decisions for members than does delegation. (JEL D71, D82, C72).postprin

Common interests, private gains: a study of co-operative floodplain aquaculture

In recent years a number of floodplain aquaculture projects have sprung up in the Daudkandi area of Comilla District. Key to this development are a number of unique organisational and financing arrangements which facilitate the development of necessary infrastructure through issuing shares to farmers who have land in the targeted floodplain area. In February 2007, a short review was carried out to better understand how floodplain aquaculture was affecting a range of local social, economic and environmental issues.Fishery management, Flood plains, Aquaculture