Combinatorial simplex algorithms can solve mean payoff games

A combinatorial simplex algorithm is an instance of the simplex method in which the pivoting depends on combinatorial data only. We show that any algorithm of this kind admits a tropical analogue which can be used to solve mean payoff games. Moreover, any combinatorial simplex algorithm with a strongly polynomial complexity (the existence of such an algorithm is open) would provide in this way a strongly polynomial algorithm solving mean payoff games. Mean payoff games are known to be in NP and co-NP; whether they can be solved in polynomial time is an open problem. Our algorithm relies on a tropical implementation of the simplex method over a real closed field of Hahn series. One of the key ingredients is a new scheme for symbolic perturbation which allows us to lift an arbitrary mean payoff game instance into a non-degenerate linear program over Hahn series.Comment: v1: 15 pages, 3 figures; v2: improved presentation, introduction expanded, 18 pages, 3 figure

The tropical shadow-vertex algorithm solves mean payoff games in polynomial time on average

We introduce an algorithm which solves mean payoff games in polynomial time on average, assuming the distribution of the games satisfies a flip invariance property on the set of actions associated with every state. The algorithm is a tropical analogue of the shadow-vertex simplex algorithm, which solves mean payoff games via linear feasibility problems over the tropical semiring $(\mathbb{R} \cup \{-\infty\}, \max, +)$. The key ingredient in our approach is that the shadow-vertex pivoting rule can be transferred to tropical polyhedra, and that its computation reduces to optimal assignment problems through Pl\"ucker relations.Comment: 17 pages, 7 figures, appears in 41st International Colloquium, ICALP 2014, Copenhagen, Denmark, July 8-11, 2014, Proceedings, Part

Equilibria, Fixed Points, and Complexity Classes

Many models from a variety of areas involve the computation of an equilibrium or fixed point of some kind. Examples include Nash equilibria in games; market equilibria; computing optimal strategies and the values of competitive games (stochastic and other games); stable configurations of neural networks; analysing basic stochastic models for evolution like branching processes and for language like stochastic context-free grammars; and models that incorporate the basic primitives of probability and recursion like recursive Markov chains. It is not known whether these problems can be solved in polynomial time. There are certain common computational principles underlying different types of equilibria, which are captured by the complexity classes PLS, PPAD, and FIXP. Representative complete problems for these classes are respectively, pure Nash equilibria in games where they are guaranteed to exist, (mixed) Nash equilibria in 2-player normal form games, and (mixed) Nash equilibria in normal form games with 3 (or more) players. This paper reviews the underlying computational principles and the corresponding classes

Approximate Convex Optimization by Online Game Playing

Lagrangian relaxation and approximate optimization algorithms have received much attention in the last two decades. Typically, the running time of these methods to obtain a $\epsilon$ approximate solution is proportional to $\frac{1}{\epsilon^2}$. Recently, Bienstock and Iyengar, following Nesterov, gave an algorithm for fractional packing linear programs which runs in $\frac{1}{\epsilon}$ iterations. The latter algorithm requires to solve a convex quadratic program every iteration - an optimization subroutine which dominates the theoretical running time. We give an algorithm for convex programs with strictly convex constraints which runs in time proportional to $\frac{1}{\epsilon}$. The algorithm does NOT require to solve any quadratic program, but uses gradient steps and elementary operations only. Problems which have strictly convex constraints include maximum entropy frequency estimation, portfolio optimization with loss risk constraints, and various computational problems in signal processing. As a side product, we also obtain a simpler version of Bienstock and Iyengar's result for general linear programming, with similar running time. We derive these algorithms using a new framework for deriving convex optimization algorithms from online game playing algorithms, which may be of independent interest

Tropicalizing the simplex algorithm

We develop a tropical analog of the simplex algorithm for linear programming. In particular, we obtain a combinatorial algorithm to perform one tropical pivoting step, including the computation of reduced costs, in O(n(m+n)) time, where m is the number of constraints and n is the dimension.Comment: v1: 35 pages, 7 figures, 4 algorithms; v2: improved presentation, 39 pages, 9 figures, 4 algorithm

Complexity Theory, Game Theory, and Economics: The Barbados Lectures

This document collects the lecture notes from my mini-course "Complexity Theory, Game Theory, and Economics," taught at the Bellairs Research Institute of McGill University, Holetown, Barbados, February 19--23, 2017, as the 29th McGill Invitational Workshop on Computational Complexity. The goal of this mini-course is twofold: (i) to explain how complexity theory has helped illuminate several barriers in economics and game theory; and (ii) to illustrate how game-theoretic questions have led to new and interesting complexity theory, including recent several breakthroughs. It consists of two five-lecture sequences: the Solar Lectures, focusing on the communication and computational complexity of computing equilibria; and the Lunar Lectures, focusing on applications of complexity theory in game theory and economics. No background in game theory is assumed.Comment: Revised v2 from December 2019 corrects some errors in and adds some recent citations to v1 Revised v3 corrects a few typos in v