299 research outputs found

    Fast Iterative Combinatorial Auctions via Bayesian Learning

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    Iterative combinatorial auctions (CAs) are often used in multi-billion dollar domains like spectrum auctions, and speed of convergence is one of the crucial factors behind the choice of a specific design for practical applications. To achieve fast convergence, current CAs require careful tuning of the price update rule to balance convergence speed and allocative efficiency. Brero and Lahaie (2018) recently introduced a Bayesian iterative auction design for settings with single-minded bidders. The Bayesian approach allowed them to incorporate prior knowledge into the price update algorithm, reducing the number of rounds to convergence with minimal parameter tuning. In this paper, we generalize their work to settings with no restrictions on bidder valuations. We introduce a new Bayesian CA design for this general setting which uses Monte Carlo Expectation Maximization to update prices at each round of the auction. We evaluate our approach via simulations on CATS instances. Our results show that our Bayesian CA outperforms even a highly optimized benchmark in terms of clearing percentage and convergence speed.Comment: 9 pages, 2 figures, AAAI-1

    Fourier Analysis-based Iterative Combinatorial Auctions

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    Recent advances in Fourier analysis have brought new tools to efficiently represent and learn set functions. In this paper, we bring the power of Fourier analysis to the design of combinatorial auctions (CAs). The key idea is to approximate bidders' value functions using Fourier-sparse set functions, which can be computed using a relatively small number of queries. Since this number is still too large for real-world CAs, we propose a new hybrid design: we first use neural networks to learn bidders' values and then apply Fourier analysis to the learned representations. On a technical level, we formulate a Fourier transform-based winner determination problem and derive its mixed integer program formulation. Based on this, we devise an iterative CA that asks Fourier-based queries. We experimentally show that our hybrid ICA achieves higher efficiency than prior auction designs, leads to a fairer distribution of social welfare, and significantly reduces runtime. With this paper, we are the first to leverage Fourier analysis in CA design and lay the foundation for future work in this area

    Machine Learning-powered Course Allocation

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    We introduce a machine learning-powered course allocation mechanism. Concretely, we extend the state-of-the-art Course Match mechanism with a machine learning-based preference elicitation module. In an iterative, asynchronous manner, this module generates pairwise comparison queries that are tailored to each individual student. Regarding incentives, our machine learning-powered course match (MLCM) mechanism retains the attractive strategyproofness in the large property of Course Match. Regarding welfare, we perform computational experiments using a simulator that was fitted to real-world data. Our results show that, compared to Course Match, MLCM increases average student utility by 4%-9% and minimum student utility by 10%-21%, even with only ten comparison queries. Finally, we highlight the practicability of MLCM and the ease of piloting it for universities currently using Course Match
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