3,042 research outputs found

    Making the third mission possible: investigating academic staff experiences of community-engaged learning

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    Community-engaged Learning (CEL) is an intentional and structured pedagogical approach, which links learning objectives with community needs. Most of the existing literature is centred on Service-learning practice in the United States. To date, there have been no in-depth studies on the experiences and perspectives of practitioners who engage with CEL in a UK or more specifically, a Scottish Higher Education context. The thesis presents data collected from a qualitative study utilising documentary analysis of government and institutional literature and 23 in-depth interviews with University practitioners, managers and leaders. I explored factors which influence the perspectives and experiences of CEL practitioners at one Scottish, research-intensive Russell Group university. Adopting a research ontology informed by Margaret Archer’s Morphogenetic, Critical Realist approach, I analyse the data collected through the lens of an emancipatory Neo-Aristotelian virtue-ethics framework and argue that CEL practice at this university contributes to, what the evidence suggests is, its ultimate purpose: promoting and cultivating individual flourishing and emancipatory critical thinking for the common good. Focussing on university-community engagement, the findings suggest that there are some inconsistencies between how the University is portrayed in public-facing literature compared to the level of institutional support individual practitioners of CEL report receiving. I conclude that failure to adequately support CEL activity in the future could negatively impact the sustainability and quality of community engagement at Alba University

    Ransomware: Victim Insights on Harms to Individuals, Organisations and Society

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    Ransomware incidents remain a scourge on UK society. Based on interviews with victims and incident responders, this paper outlines the harm ransomware causes to organisations, individuals, the UK economy, national security and wider society. The research reveals a wide range of harms caused by ransomware, including physical, financial, reputational, psychological and social harms. We set out a framework of: First-order harms: Harms to any organisation and their staff directly targeted by a ransomware operation. Second-order harms: Harms to any organisation or individuals that are indirectly affected by a ransomware incident. Third-order harms: The cumulative effect of ransomware incidents on wider society, the economy and national security. Building on an existing taxonomy of cyber harms, 1. this framework will enable policymakers, practitioners and researchers to categorise more case studies on ransomware incidents and to better explain new and existing types of harm to the UK and other countries. Ransomware is a risk for organisations of all sizes. The findings from this paper highlight that ransomware can create significant financial costs and losses for organisations, which in some cases can threaten their very existence. Ransomware can also create reputational harm for businesses that rely on continuous operations or hold very sensitive data – although customers and the general public can be more forgiving than some victims believe. The harms from ransomware go beyond financial and reputational costs for organisations. Interviews with victims and incident responders revealed that ransomware creates physical and psychological harms for individuals and groups, including members of staff, healthcare patients and schoolchildren. Ransomware can ruin lives. Incidents highlighted in this paper have caused individuals to lose their jobs, evoked feelings of shame and self-blame, extended to private and family life, and contributed to serious health issues. The harm and cumulative effects caused by ransomware attacks have implications for wider society and national security, including supply chain disruption, a loss of trust in law enforcement, reduced faith in public services, and the normalisation of cybercrime. Ransomware also creates a strategic advantage for the hostile states harbouring the cyber-criminals who conduct such operations. Downstream harm to individuals from ransomware is more severe when attacks encrypt IT infrastructure, rather than steal and leak data. There is no evidence from this research that the ransomware ecosystem is exploiting stolen or leaked personal data in a systemic way for fraud or other financially motivated cybercrimes. At present, exploiting stolen data for other activities is less profitable than extortion-based crime that takes away victims’ access to their systems and data. This finding may inform victim decision-making on when they should and should not consider paying a ransom demand

    From abuse to trust and back again

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    oai:westminsterresearch.westminster.ac.uk:w7qv

    Communicating a Pandemic

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    This edited volume compares experiences of how the Covid-19 pandemic was communicated in the Nordic countries – Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway, and Sweden. The Nordic countries are often discussed in terms of similarities concerning an extensive welfare system, economic policies, media systems, and high levels of trust in societal actors. However, in the wake of a global pandemic, the countries’ coping strategies varied, creating certain question marks on the existence of a “Nordic model”. The chapters give a broad overview of crisis communication in the Nordic countries during the first year of the Covid-19 pandemic by combining organisational and societal theoretical perspectives and encompassing crisis response from governments, public health authorities, lobbyists, corporations, news media, and citizens. The results show several similarities, such as political and governmental responses highlighting solidarity and the need for exceptional measures, as expressed in press conferences, social media posts, information campaigns, and speeches. The media coverage relied on experts and was mainly informative, with few critical investigations during the initial phases. Moreover, surveys and interviews show the importance of news media for citizens’ coping strategies, but also that citizens mostly trusted both politicians and health authorities during the crisis. This book is of interest to all who are looking to understand societal crisis management on a comprehensive level. The volume contains chapters from leading experts from all the Nordic countries and is edited by a team with complementary expertise on crisis communication, political communication, and journalism, consisting of Bengt Johansson, Øyvind Ihlen, Jenny Lindholm, and Mark Blach-Ørsten. Publishe

    Social media intelligence: The national security–privacy nexus

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    Globally, changes in technology have always shaped the intelligence collection environment. South Africa is no exception. The emergence of satellite imagery had a significant influence on geographic intelligence (GEOINT) capabilities and, similarly, the emergence of the telegram and later the telephone had an equally significant effect on the signals intelligence (SIGINT) environment. With communications being revolutionised by mobile technology, such as recording, geo-positioning and photography, collection and distribution are ubiquitous. Smart mobile communication technology is also the driver of social media everywhere – at all ages, for state and non-state purposes, non-stop. More recently, social media intelligence (SOCMINT) became a key content domain for exploitation by the intelligence community. Examples of the successful exploitation of SOCMINT can be found internationally. It would be surprising if South Africa is not yet a statistic in terms of this phenomenon. Initially, many organisations viewed (and some still do) SOCMINT as an open-source intelligence (OSINT) tool. However, when considering the South African (SA) intelligence landscape, the concepts ‘democracy’, ‘transparency’ and ‘intelligence oversight’ are calibrating factors to bear in mind. It is also important to consider the influence of the national legislative framework governing the use of SOCMINT in South Africa. It then becomes clear that issues – such as the right to privacy – mean that SOCMINT is probably no longer covered by the scope of the OSINT definition and that intelligence organisations collecting social media content and producing SOCMINT should adhere to the legislative framework governing the collection and use of social media content and the production of SOCMINT. This article argues that SOCMINT and OSINT should be separate collection domains to protect the imperative of the right to privacy and national security requirements in a balanced manner by means of unambiguous national regulation in the interest of all citizens

    To Intervene or not to Intervene:Young adults’ views on When and How to Intervene in Online Harassment

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    Incidents of online harassment are increasing and can have significant consequences for victims. Witnesses (‘digital bystanders’) can be crucial in identifying and challenging harassment. This study considered when and how young adults intervene online, with the aim of understanding the applicability of existing theoretical models (i.e., Bystander Intervention Model; Response Decision-Making Framework). Thematic analysis of eight focus groups (UK community sample, N=67, 18-25 years) resulted in five themes: Noticing and Interpreting the Harassment, Perceived Responsibility for Helping, Consequences of Intervening, Perceived Ability to Make a Difference, and Deciding How to Help. The online context amplified offline preferences, such as greater preference for anonymity and perceived costs of intervention (e.g., social costs). Intervention strategies varied in visibility and effort, preferring ‘indirect’ micro-interventions focused on supporting victims. A new, merged model specific to digital bystanders is proposed, with implications for the design and messaging on Social Networking Sites (SNS) discussed

    NEMISA Digital Skills Conference (Colloquium) 2023

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    The purpose of the colloquium and events centred around the central role that data plays today as a desirable commodity that must become an important part of massifying digital skilling efforts. Governments amass even more critical data that, if leveraged, could change the way public services are delivered, and even change the social and economic fortunes of any country. Therefore, smart governments and organisations increasingly require data skills to gain insights and foresight, to secure themselves, and for improved decision making and efficiency. However, data skills are scarce, and even more challenging is the inconsistency of the associated training programs with most curated for the Science, Technology, Engineering, and Mathematics (STEM) disciplines. Nonetheless, the interdisciplinary yet agnostic nature of data means that there is opportunity to expand data skills into the non-STEM disciplines as well.College of Engineering, Science and Technolog

    When risk does not trigger policy change: the case of Georgia's approach to the protection of critical infrastructure

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    As the world becomes more dependent on technology and interconnected systems, the need for robust critical infrastructure protection measures has become increasingly important for countries worldwide. Protecting critical infrastructure, such as pipelines, railways, networks of telecommunication, and many more, is vital for safeguarding essential systems and services from different threats, such as cyber-attacks, physical threats, natural disasters, and so on, ensuring the continuity of daily life and national security. Against this background, this study seeks to explore the continuity of policy in Georgia regarding critical infrastructure protection, or in fact the absence of a policy for critical infrastructure protection, since in time period of interest for this study, no such policy has been developed. The fact that there is no legal framework that regulates this issue seems puzzling, given both the rising significance of this all over the world and the security threats faced by Georgia in the last two decades. In order to understand the reasons behind the continued absence of a legal framework for critical infrastructure protection, this thesis employs the theories of policy change and non-change to look for possible factors hindering policy change in Georgia. Utilizing elite and expert interviews together with legal documents of Georgia, this thesis came to the conclusion that the prime reason for the enduring absence of a policy framework regarding critical infrastructure protection, are historical legacies of Georgian policy-making, which contains in itself several themes and topics such as general neglect towards security issues and path-dependent nature of institutions. This means that the historical institutionalist account seems particularly well suited to account for the enduring absence of such a policy framework in Georgia

    Europe\u27s Digital Constitution

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    This Article uncovers the fundamental values underlying the European Union’s expansive set of digital regulations, which in aggregate can be viewed as Europe’s “digital constitution.” This constitution engrains Europe’s human-centric, rights-preserving, democracy-enhancing, and redistributive vision for the digital economy into binding law. This vision stands in stark contrast to the United States, which has traditionally placed its faith in markets and tech companies’ self-regulation. As a result, American tech companies today are regulated primarily by Brussels and not by Washington. By highlighting the distinctiveness and the global reach of the European digital constitution, this Article challenges the common narrative that portrays the European Union as a powerless bystander in a digital world dominated by the United States and China. By offering both a normative defense and a nuanced criticism of Europe’s digital constitution, the Article contributes to ongoing scholarly debates on whether digital regulation compromises innovation and technological progress and whether governments or tech companies take precedence in governing digital societies. It also asks whether the United States should welcome EU regulation of U.S. tech companies as exerting a positive externality protecting the digital rights of American citizens or resent it as imposing a negative externality that compromises the U.S. government’s democratic right to regulate — or refrain from regulating—its own tech companies. This Article also examines whether Europe’s digital constitution is fit for the current era of tech wars and geopolitical conflict or if the pursuit of European “digital sovereignty” ought to be woven into its tenets — even if such an evolution would risk veering Europe towards digital protectionism and further enshrining techno-nationalism as a global norm
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