Goal-oriented Dialog as a Collaborative Subordinated Activity involving Collective Acceptance

International audienceModeling dialog as a collaborative activity consists notably in specifying the content of the Conversational Common Ground and the kind of social mental state involved. In previous work (Saget, 2006), we claim that Collective Acceptance is the proper social attitude for modeling Conversational Common Ground in the particular case of goal-oriented dialog. In this paper, a formalization of Collective Acceptance is shown, besides elements in order to integrate this attitude in a rational model of dialog are provided; and finally, a model of referential acts as being part of a collaborative activity is presented. The particular case of reference has been chosen in order to exemplify our claims

Social Constructivism of Language and Meaning

To systematically answer two questions “how does language work?” and “where does linguistic meaning come from?” this paper argues for Social Constructivism of Language and Meaning (SCLM for short) which consists of six theses: (1) the primary function of language is communication rather than representation, so language is essentially a social phenomenon. (2) Linguistic meaning originates in the causal interaction of humans with the world, and in the social interaction of people with people. (3) Linguistic meaning consists in the correlation of language to the world established by collective intentions of a language community. (4) Linguistic meaning is based on the conventions produced by a language community in their long process of communication. (5) Semantic knowledge is empirical and encyclopedic knowledge distilled and condensed, and the uses of language accepted by a linguistic community. (6) Language and meaning change rapidly or slowly as the communicative practice of a linguistic community does. The crucial point of SCLM is to focus on the triadic relation among language, humans (a linguistic community) and the world, rather than the dyadic relation between language and the world

Apperceptive patterning: Artefaction, extensional beliefs and cognitive scaffolding

In “Psychopower and Ordinary Madness” my ambition, as it relates to Bernard Stiegler’s recent literature, was twofold: 1) critiquing Stiegler’s work on exosomatization and artefactual posthumanism—or, more specifically, nonhumanism—to problematize approaches to media archaeology that rely upon technical exteriorization; 2) challenging how Stiegler engages with Giuseppe Longo and Francis Bailly’s conception of negative entropy. These efforts were directed by a prevalent techno-cultural qualifier: the rise of Synthetic Intelligence (including neural nets, deep learning, predictive processing and Bayesian models of cognition). This paper continues this project but first directs a critical analytic lens at the Derridean practice of the ontologization of grammatization from which Stiegler emerges while also distinguishing how metalanguages operate in relation to object-oriented environmental interaction by way of inferentialism. Stalking continental (Kapp, Simondon, Leroi-Gourhan, etc.) and analytic traditions (e.g., Carnap, Chalmers, Clark, Sutton, Novaes, etc.), we move from artefacts to AI and Predictive Processing so as to link theories related to technicity with philosophy of mind. Simultaneously drawing forth Robert Brandom’s conceptualization of the roles that commitments play in retrospectively reconstructing the social experiences that lead to our endorsement(s) of norms, we compliment this account with Reza Negarestani’s deprivatized account of intelligence while analyzing the equipollent role between language and media (both digital and analog)

From Biological to Synthetic Neurorobotics Approaches to Understanding the Structure Essential to Consciousness (Part 3)

This third paper locates the synthetic neurorobotics research reviewed in the second paper in terms of themes introduced in the first paper. It begins with biological non-reductionism as understood by Searle. It emphasizes the role of synthetic neurorobotics studies in accessing the dynamic structure essential to consciousness with a focus on system criticality and self, develops a distinction between simulated and formal consciousness based on this emphasis, reviews Tani and colleagues' work in light of this distinction, and ends by forecasting the increasing importance of synthetic neurorobotics studies for cognitive science and philosophy of mind going forward, finally in regards to most- and myth-consciousness

ON THE INTENTIONALITY AND IMPERFECT BUT MINIMAL RATIONALITY OF HUMAN SPEAKERS

I will criticize the current logical analysis of attitudes due to J. Hintikka (1971) according to which human agents are either perfectly rational or completely irrational. I will present the principles of a general logic of first level attitudes and actions that accounts for our intentionality and imperfect but minimal rationality. First level attitudes and actions are attitudes and actions of individual agents at a single moment of time. In my approach psychological modes of propositional attitudes have other components than their basic Cartesian category of cognition and volition. I will formulate a recursive definition of the set of all psychological modes. I will also analyze the nature of complex first level attitudes such as conditional attitudes and sums and denegations of attitudes which are irreducible to propositional attitudes. My primary purpose here will be first to explicate inductively conditions of possession and of satisfaction of all first level attitudes and to integrate my logic of attitudes within a general theory of first level actions explicating the primacy of intentional actions, their conditions of success and fundamental laws of action generation. For that purpose I will use a non classical predicative propositional logic and consider subjective as well as objective possibilities. Agents of voluntary actions and illocutionary acts have intentions and other first level attitudes. I will explain why logically equivalent propositions are not the content of the same attitudes and intentional actions and why human agents are neither logically omniscient nor perfectly rational but always remain minimally rational in the exercise of thought and the use of language. For more information see my next book Speech Acts in Dialogue

Folk Theory of Mind: Conceptual Foundations of Social Cognition

The human ability to represent, conceptualize, and reason about mind and behavior is one of the greatest achievements of human evolution and is made possible by a “folk theory of mind” — a sophisticated conceptual framework that relates different mental states to each other and connects them to behavior. This chapter examines the nature and elements of this framework and its central functions for social cognition. As a conceptual framework, the folk theory of mind operates prior to any particular conscious or unconscious cognition and provides the “framing” or interpretation of that cognition. Central to this framing is the concept of intentionality, which distinguishes intentional action (caused by the agent’s intention and decision) from unintentional behavior (caused by internal or external events without the intervention of the agent’s decision). A second important distinction separates publicly observable from publicly unobservable (i.e., mental) events. Together, the two distinctions define the kinds of events in social interaction that people attend to, wonder about, and try to explain. A special focus of this chapter is the powerful tool of behavior explanation, which relies on the folk theory of mind but is also intimately tied to social demands and to the perceiver’s social goals. A full understanding of social cognition must consider the folk theory of mind as the conceptual underpinning of all (conscious and unconscious) perception and thinking about the social world

Zur Möglichkeit einer angemessenen Philosophie der Globalisierung

The notion of globalization is used in different contexts and in different meanings; the notion mixes fact and fiction – existent and non-existent. The notion of globalization refers to, for example, economic, political and cultural processes which exceed nation-state borders. There is no philosophical, i.e. conceptual foundation of globalization. Western philosophical metanarratives are interpreted locally; there is no global interpretation of the metanarratives. Etymologically, ‘understanding’ means standing between differences, for example, between fact and fiction. Logic of expertise is logic of standing between hopes and reality – between non-existent and existent. The logic of expertise is a general theory of realizing. As a truly general theory, the logic of expertise is boundary-crossing-global. Therefore, logic of expertise formulates a foundation of a philosophy of globalization.Pojam globalizacije koristi se u različitim kontekstima i u različitim značenjima; pojam miješa činjenice i fikciju – postojeće i nepostojeće. Pojam globalizacije odnosi se na, primjerice, ekonomske, političke i kulturne procese koji nadilaze granice nacionalnih država. Nema filozofskog, odnosno konceptualnog utemeljenja globalizacije. Zapadni filozofski metanarativi interpretiraju se lokalno; ne postoji globalna interpretacija metanarativa. Etimološki ‘razumijevanje’ (understanding) znači stajanje između razlika, na primjer između činjenica i fikcije. Logika stručnosti je logika stajanja između nada i realnosti – između nepostojećeg i postojećeg. Logika stručnosti je opća teorija razumijevanja. Kao istinski opća teorija, logika stručnosti globalno nadilazi granice. Prema tome, logika stručnosti oblikuje temelj za filozofiju globalizacije.La notion de mondialisation est utilisée dans différents contextes et a des sens différents ; elle mélange les faits et la fiction, l’existant et le non-existant. La notion de mondialisation renvoie à des processus économiques, politiques et culturels qui dépassent les frontières des États-nations. Il n’y a pas de fondement philosophique, c’est-à-dire conceptuel, de la mondialisation : les méta-récits occidentaux sont interprétés au niveau local ; il n’y a pas d’interprétation globale du méta-récit. D’un point de vue étymologique, « l’entendement » implique une position entre les divergences, par exemple, entre les faits et la fiction. La logique de l’expertise est une logique se situant entre l’espoir et la réalité, entre l’existant et le non-existant. La logique de l’expertise est une théorie générale de l’entendement. En tant que théorie générale, la logique de l’expertise dépasse les frontières au niveau global. Ainsi, la logique de l’expertise forme le fondement de la philosophie de la mondialisation.Der Begriff der Globalisierung wird in unterschiedlichen Kontexten in jeweils unterschiedlicher Bedeutung benutzt; in ihm kommt es zu einer Verwischung von Tatsachen und Fiktion – von Existentem und Nichtexistentem. Der Globalisierungsbegriff bezieht sich etwa auf staatsübergreifende wirtschaftliche, politische und kulturelle Prozesse. Eine philosophische bzw. konzeptuelle Begründung der Globalisierung gibt es nicht. Westliche philosophische Metanarrative werden lokal interpretiert; eine globale Interpretation von Metanarrativen gibt es nicht. Etymologisch bedeutet ‘Verstehen’: zwischen den Unterschieden stehen, etwa zwischen Tatsachen und Fiktion. Die Logik des Sachwissens ist eine Logik des Stands zwischen Hoffnung und Realität – zwischen Nichtexistentem und Existentem. Die Logik des Sachwissens ist eine generelle Theorie des Verstehens. Als eine wahrhaft allgemeine Theorie ist die Logik des Sachwissens weltweit grenzüberschreitend. Demnach bildet die Logik des Sachwissens die Grundlage für eine Philosophie der Globalisierung

Language and Consciousness; How Language Implies Self-awareness

The relationship between language and consciousness has been debated since ancient times, but the details have never been fully articulated. Certainly, there are animals that possess the same essential auditory and vocal systems as humans, but acquiring language is seemingly uniquely human. In this essay, we investigate the relationship between language and consciousness by demonstrating how language usage implies the self-awareness of the user. We show that the self-awareness faculty encompasses the language faculty and how this self-awareness, that is uniquely human, enables us to create social realities through utilizing the social character of the language. We conclude that it is self-awareness that empowers humans to form collective intentionality and to structure societies. Establishing the relationship between self-awareness, language and society sheds light on connections between philosophy of mind, philosophy of language and philosophy of society