Asset Price Inflation and Monetary Policy

It is crucial that central banks and regulatory authorities be aware of effects of asset price inflation on the stability of the financial system. Lending activity based on asset collateral during the boom is hazardous to the health of lenders when the boom collapses. One way that authorities can curb the distortion of lenders' portfolios during asset price booms is to have in place capital requirements that increase with the growth of credit extensions collateralized by assets whose prices have escalated. If financial institutions avoid this pitfall, their soundness will not be impaired when assets backing loans fall in value. Rather than trying to gauge the effects of asset prices on core inflation, central banks may be better advised to be alert to the weakening of financial balance sheets in the aftermath of a fall in value of asset collateral backing loans.

Interbank lending, credit risk premia and collateral

We study the functioning of secured and unsecured inter-bank markets in the presence of credit risk. The model generates empirical predictions that are in line with developments during the 2007-2009 financial crises. Interest rates decouple across secured and unsecured markets following an adverse shock to credit risk. The scarcity of underlying collateral may amplify the volatility of interest rates in secured markets. We use the model to discuss various policy responses to the crisis. JEL Classification: G01, G21, E58collateral, Credit risk, financial crisis, Interbank Market, liquidity

Capital Misallocation and Aggregate Factor Productivity

TFP, misallocation, sectoral shocks, collateral, reputation

Capital misallocation and aggregate factor productivity

We propose a sectoral–shift theory of aggregate factor productivity for a class of economies with AK technologies, limited loan enforcement, a constant production possibilities frontier, and finitely many sectors producing the same good. Both the growth rate and total factor productivity in these economies respond to random and persistent endogenous fluctuations in the sectoral distribution of physical capital which, in turn, responds to persistent and reversible exogenous shifts in relative sector productivities. Surplus capital from less productive sectors is lent to more productive ones in the form of secured collateral loans, as in Kiyotaki–Moore (1997), and also as unsecured reputational loans suggested in Bulow–Rogoff (1989). Endogenous debt limits slow down capital reallocation, preventing the equalization of risk– adjusted equity yields across sectors. Economy–wide factor productivity and the aggregate growth rate are both negatively correlated with the dispersion of sectoral rates of return, sectoral TFP and sectoral growth rates. If sector productivities follow a symmetric two–state Markov process, many of our economies converge to a limit cycle alternating between mild expansions and abrupt contractions. We also find highly periodic and volatile limit cycles in economies with small amounts of collateral.Industrial productivity

Mortgage lending in Korea : an example of a countercyclical macroprudential approach

Regulatory regimes are actively discussing macroprudential policy. Korea pursued a countercyclical macroprudential approach to prevent the overheating of mortgage lending and to minimize the risk of loan default. The Korean financial supervisory authority made adjustments in response to both the condition of the housing market and trends in mortgage loans. The lessons learned from the Korean experience are applicable to other situations. First, regulations regarding loan-to-value and debt-to-income ratios and other restrictions on mortgage lending can be employed as an important part of a countercyclical framework. Next, measures need to be applied in a timely manner and according to the specific conditions of each country. Finally, authorities should preemptively prepare macroprudential instruments before banks enter a period of rapid mortgage lending to avoid reckless mortgage lending operations and weaken any speculative motive in the housing market.Access to Finance,Debt Markets,Bankruptcy and Resolution of Financial Distress,Banks&Banking Reform,Housing Finance

The role of guarantees in bank lending

Guarantees play an important role in debt contracts. They alter the risk for the lender, transform borrowersÂ’ incentives and, possibly, modify the equilibrium allocation of financial resources. This paper studies the role of guarantees on bank loans, using a sample of over 50,000 individual lines of credit granted by Italian banks. Two empirical models are used. The first directly verifies the relationship between ex-ante publicly available information on borrowersÂ’ default riskiness and the presence of guarantees on their bank loans; the second compares the interest rates charged on secured and unsecured loans made by different banks to the same borrower, thus perfectly controlling for idiosyncratic riskiness and singling out the direct effect of the presence of guarantees on credit risk. The empirical results show that real guarantees (physical assets or equities that the lender can sell if the borrower defaults), which are often internal, are mainly used to provide a priority to some creditors. Personal guarantees (contractual obligations of third parties to make payments in case of default, e.g. suretyships), which can only be external, are used instead as incentive devices against moral hazard problems. Controlling for borrowersÂ’ characteristics, both real and personal guarantees reduce ex-ante credit risk.Bank loans, collateral, guarantee

Money versus Credit Rationing: Evidence for the National Banking Era, 1880-1914

In this paper we examine the evidence for two competing views of how monetary and financial disturbances influenced the real economy during the national banking era, 1880-1914. According to the monetarist view, monetary disturbances affected the real economy through changes on the liability side of the banking system's balance sheet independent of the composition of bank portfolios. According to the credit rationing view, equilibrium credit rationing in a world of asymmetric information can explain short-run fluctuations in real output. Using structural VARs we incorporate monetary variables in credit models and credit variables in monetarist models, with inconclusive results. To resolve this ambiguity, we invoke the institutional features of the national banking era. Most of the variation in bank loans is accounted for by loans secured by stock, which in turn reflect volatility in the stock market. When account is taken of the stock market, the influence of credit in the VAR model is greatly reduced, while the influence of money remains robust. The breakdown of the composition of bank loans into stock market loans (traded in open asset markets) and other business loans (a possible setting for credit rationing) reveals that other business loans remained remarkably stable over the business cycle.

Scarce Collateral and Bank Reserves

If collateral for bank loans is scarce and as a result access to secured loans is restricted, the allocation of resources is inefficient. Anticipating future borrowing constraints, individuals over-invest in collateralized types of capital, whereas consumption and investment expenditures are inefficiently low while individuals are borrowing constrained. The dual counterpart of this misallocation of resources is inefficiently low interest rates. In this situation, bank reserves play a positive welfare role by increasing not only bank lending rates, but also, paradoxically, bank deposit rates. As a result, in economies with scarce collateral the optimal reserves requirement ratio is positive.collateral, banking, reserves, borrowing constraint, reserves requirement.

The collateral frameworks of the Eurosystem, the Federal Reserve System and the Bank of England and the financial market turmoil

In response to the turmoil in global financial markets which began in the second half of 2007, central banks have changed the way in which they implement monetary policy. This has drawn particular attention to the type of collateral used for backing central banks’ temporary open market operations and the range of counterparties which can participate in these operations. This paper provides an overview of the features of the different operational and collateral frameworks of three central banks that have been significantly affected by the crisis: the Eurosystem, the Federal Reserve System and the Bank of England. The paper describes the factors that shaped the three frameworks prior to the turmoil. It then describes the actions the three central banks took in response to the turmoil and analyses to what extent these actions were dependent on the initial design of the operational and collateral framework. JEL Classification: E52, E58, G01, G20.Collateral Framework, Central Bank Repo Auctions, Collateral, Open Market Operations, Financial Market Turmoil 2007-2009.