3,856 research outputs found
Byzantine Attack and Defense in Cognitive Radio Networks: A Survey
The Byzantine attack in cooperative spectrum sensing (CSS), also known as the
spectrum sensing data falsification (SSDF) attack in the literature, is one of
the key adversaries to the success of cognitive radio networks (CRNs). In the
past couple of years, the research on the Byzantine attack and defense
strategies has gained worldwide increasing attention. In this paper, we provide
a comprehensive survey and tutorial on the recent advances in the Byzantine
attack and defense for CSS in CRNs. Specifically, we first briefly present the
preliminaries of CSS for general readers, including signal detection
techniques, hypothesis testing, and data fusion. Second, we analyze the spear
and shield relation between Byzantine attack and defense from three aspects:
the vulnerability of CSS to attack, the obstacles in CSS to defense, and the
games between attack and defense. Then, we propose a taxonomy of the existing
Byzantine attack behaviors and elaborate on the corresponding attack
parameters, which determine where, who, how, and when to launch attacks. Next,
from the perspectives of homogeneous or heterogeneous scenarios, we classify
the existing defense algorithms, and provide an in-depth tutorial on the
state-of-the-art Byzantine defense schemes, commonly known as robust or secure
CSS in the literature. Furthermore, we highlight the unsolved research
challenges and depict the future research directions.Comment: Accepted by IEEE Communications Surveys and Tutoiral
Game-theoretic Resource Allocation Methods for Device-to-Device (D2D) Communication
Device-to-device (D2D) communication underlaying cellular networks allows
mobile devices such as smartphones and tablets to use the licensed spectrum
allocated to cellular services for direct peer-to-peer transmission. D2D
communication can use either one-hop transmission (i.e., in D2D direct
communication) or multi-hop cluster-based transmission (i.e., in D2D local area
networks). The D2D devices can compete or cooperate with each other to reuse
the radio resources in D2D networks. Therefore, resource allocation and access
for D2D communication can be treated as games. The theories behind these games
provide a variety of mathematical tools to effectively model and analyze the
individual or group behaviors of D2D users. In addition, game models can
provide distributed solutions to the resource allocation problems for D2D
communication. The aim of this article is to demonstrate the applications of
game-theoretic models to study the radio resource allocation issues in D2D
communication. The article also outlines several key open research directions.Comment: Accepted. IEEE Wireless Comms Mag. 201
Applications of Repeated Games in Wireless Networks: A Survey
A repeated game is an effective tool to model interactions and conflicts for
players aiming to achieve their objectives in a long-term basis. Contrary to
static noncooperative games that model an interaction among players in only one
period, in repeated games, interactions of players repeat for multiple periods;
and thus the players become aware of other players' past behaviors and their
future benefits, and will adapt their behavior accordingly. In wireless
networks, conflicts among wireless nodes can lead to selfish behaviors,
resulting in poor network performances and detrimental individual payoffs. In
this paper, we survey the applications of repeated games in different wireless
networks. The main goal is to demonstrate the use of repeated games to
encourage wireless nodes to cooperate, thereby improving network performances
and avoiding network disruption due to selfish behaviors. Furthermore, various
problems in wireless networks and variations of repeated game models together
with the corresponding solutions are discussed in this survey. Finally, we
outline some open issues and future research directions.Comment: 32 pages, 15 figures, 5 tables, 168 reference
Coalition Formation Games for Collaborative Spectrum Sensing
Collaborative Spectrum Sensing (CSS) between secondary users (SUs) in
cognitive networks exhibits an inherent tradeoff between minimizing the
probability of missing the detection of the primary user (PU) and maintaining a
reasonable false alarm probability (e.g., for maintaining a good spectrum
utilization). In this paper, we study the impact of this tradeoff on the
network structure and the cooperative incentives of the SUs that seek to
cooperate for improving their detection performance. We model the CSS problem
as a non-transferable coalitional game, and we propose distributed algorithms
for coalition formation. First, we construct a distributed coalition formation
(CF) algorithm that allows the SUs to self-organize into disjoint coalitions
while accounting for the CSS tradeoff. Then, the CF algorithm is complemented
with a coalitional voting game for enabling distributed coalition formation
with detection probability guarantees (CF-PD) when required by the PU. The
CF-PD algorithm allows the SUs to form minimal winning coalitions (MWCs), i.e.,
coalitions that achieve the target detection probability with minimal costs.
For both algorithms, we study and prove various properties pertaining to
network structure, adaptation to mobility and stability. Simulation results
show that CF reduces the average probability of miss per SU up to 88.45%
relative to the non-cooperative case, while maintaining a desired false alarm.
For CF-PD, the results show that up to 87.25% of the SUs achieve the required
detection probability through MWCComment: IEEE Transactions on Vehicular Technology, to appea
Enforcement in Dynamic Spectrum Access Systems
The spectrum access rights granted by the Federal government to spectrum users come with the expectation of protection from harmful interference. As a consequence of the growth of wireless demand and services of all types, technical progress enabling smart agile radio networks, and on-going spectrum management reform, there is both a need and opportunity to use and share spectrum more intensively and dynamically. A key element of any framework for managing harmful interference is the mechanism for enforcement of those rights. Since the rights to use spectrum and to protection from harmful interference vary by band (licensed/unlicensed, legacy/newly reformed) and type of use/users (primary/secondary, overlay/underlay), it is reasonable to expect that the enforcement mechanisms may need to vary as well.\ud
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In this paper, we present a taxonomy for evaluating alternative mechanisms for enforcing interference protection for spectrum usage rights, with special attention to the potential changes that may be expected from wider deployment of Dynamic Spectrum Access (DSA) systems. Our exploration of how the design of the enforcement regime interacts with and influences the incentives of radio operators under different rights regimes and market scenarios is intended to assist in refining thinking about appropriate access rights regimes and how best to incentivize investment and growth in more efficient and valuable uses of the radio frequency spectrum
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