856 research outputs found
The Nucleolus, the Kernel, and the Bargaining Set: An Update
One of David Schmeidler’s many important contributions in his distinguished career was the introduction of the nucleolus, one of the central single-valued solution concepts in cooperative game theory. This paper is an updated survey on the nucleolus and its two related supersolutions, i.e., the kernel and the bargaining set. As a first approach to these concepts, we refer the reader to the great survey by Maschler (1992); see also the relevant chapters in Peleg and Sudholter (2003). Building on the notes of four lectures on the nucleolus and the kernel delivered by one of the authors at the Hebrew University of
Jerusalem in 1999, we have updated Maschler’s survey by adding more recent contributions to the literature. Following a similar structure, we have also added a new section that covers the bargaining set.
The nucleolus has a number of desirable properties, including nonemptiness, uniqueness, core selection, and consistency. The first way to understand it is based on an egalitarian principle among coalitions. However, by going over the axioms that characterize it, what comes across as important is its connection with coalitional stability, as formalized in the notion of the core. Indeed, if one likes a single-valued version of core stability that always yields a prediction, one should consider the nucleolus as a recommendation. The kernel, which contains the nucleolus, is based on the idea of “bilateral equilibrium” for every pair of players. And the bargaining set, which contains the
kernel, checks for the credibility of objections coming from coalitions. In this paper, section 2 presents preliminaries, section 3 is devoted to the nucleolus, section 4 to the kernel, and section 5 to the bargaining set.Iñarra acknowledges research support from the Spanish Government grant ECO2015-67519-P, and
Shimomura from Grant-in-Aid for Scientific Research (A)18H03641 and (C)19K01558
Beyond foraging: behavioral science and the future of institutional economics
Institutions affect economic outcomes, but variation in them cannot be directly linked to environmental factors such as geography, climate, or technological availabilities. Game theoretic approaches, based as they typically are on foraging only assumptions, do not provide an adequate foundation for understanding the intervening role of politics and ideology; nor does the view that culture and institutions are entirely socially constructed. Understanding what institutions are and how they influence behavior requires an approach that is in part biological, focusing on cognitive and behavioral adaptations for social interaction favored in the past by group selection. These adaptations, along with their effects on canalizing social learning, help to explain uniformities in political and social order, and are the bedrock upon which we build cultural and institutional variability
The European Commission – Appointment, Preferences, and Institutional Relations
The paper analyzes the appointment of the European Commission as a strategic game between members of the European Parliament and the Council. The focal equilibrium results in Commissioners that duplicate the policy preferences of national Council representatives. Different internal decision rules still prevent the Commission from being a Council clone in aggregate. Rather, it is predicted a priori that Commission policies are on average more in accord with the aggregate position of the Parliament than that of the Council. This prediction is confirmed for a data set covering 66 dossiers with 162 controversial EU legislative proposals passed between 1999 and 2002.European Commission, investiture procedure, voting rules, Council of Ministers, European Parliament
Monetary-Labor Interactions, International Monetary Regimes, and Central Bank Conservatism
A two-country general equilibrium model with large wage setters and conservative monetary authorities is employed to investigate the welfare implications of three international monetary regimes: i) non-cooperative, ii) cooperative, and iii) monetary union. The analysis shows that the unions’ wage claims depend on three strategic effects which are substantially different between the international policy arrangements. In contrast with recent studies, a switch from non-cooperation to monetary union is welfare improving with a sufficiently conservative central bank because unions perceive wage hikes as delivering lower terms-of-trade gains; while a switch from non-cooperation to cooperation is always beneficial because wage hikes do not yield any terms-of-trade gain. Finally, the paper qualifies Lippi’s (2003) findings.Central bank conservatism, non-atomistic wage setting, open-economy macro, monetary regime
Appointing Federal Judges: The President, the Senate, and the Prisoner\u27s Dilemma
This paper argues that the expansion of the White House\u27s role in judicial appointments since the late 1970s, at the expense of the Senate, has contributed to heightened levels of ideological conflict and gridlock over the appointment of federal appeals court judges, by making a cooperative equilibrium difficult to sustain. Presidents have greater electoral incentive to behave ideologically, and less incentive to cooperate with other players in the appointments process, than do senators, who are disciplined to a greater extent in their dealings with each other by the prospect of retaliation over repeat play. The possibility of divided government exacerbates the difficulty of achieving cooperative equilibrium by making both the benefits of cooperative behavior and the costs of retaliation highly uncertain
Clique games: a family of games with coincidence between the nucleolus and the Shapley value
We introduce a new family of cooperative games for which there is coincidence between the nucleolus and the Shapley value. These so-called clique games are such that agents are divided into cliques, with the value created by a coalition linearly increasing with the number of agents belonging to the same clique. Agents can belong to multiple cliques, but for a pair of cliques, at most a single agent belong to their intersection. Finally, if two agents do not belong to the same clique, there is at most one way to link the two agents through a chain of agents, with any two non-adjacent agents in the chain belonging to disjoint sets of cliques. We provide multiple examples for clique games. Graph-induced games, either when the graph indicates cooperation possibilities or impossibilities, provide us with opportunities to confirm existing results or discover new ones. A particular focus are the minimum cost spanning tree problems. Our result allows us to obtain new coincidence results between the nucleolus and the Shapley value, as well as other cost sharing methods for the minimum cost spanning tree problem
The Problem of Selective or Sporadic Recognition: A New Economic Rationale for the Law of Foreign Country Judgments
Conventional law and economics analysis overlooks a significant feature of the law of recognition of foreign county judgments-an area of the law that regulates the private local practical use of such judgments. The existing literature on the topic current describes two competing economic hypotheses as relevant to modeling the incentives of countries to recognize foreign county judgments. The first describes a (repeated) prisoner\u27s dilemma game. An alternative economic hypothesis argues that countries envisage cooperation as a weakL dominant strategy. This Article offers a new economic rationale based on an asymmetric information explanation. I argue that no county can identify, at any given moment, whether or not another given country is applying a recognition regime that is as cooperative as the regime applied by it, or whether the foreign jurisdiction is applying a less receptive regime. Each county therefore fears that the foreign jurisdiction is implementing either a selective recognition regime, under which the relative lack of cooperation with the forum is driven by a deliberate agenda, or a sporadic recognition regime, under which the foreign county turns out to be less receptive to the forum\u27s judgments as a result of mere coincidence. The new economic rationale has several positive and normative implications, relating to cooperation between countries. Four are discussed in this Article. First, registration of foreign judgments, as a method for localizing foreign judgments, is shown to be superior to mere recognition, inasmuch as cooperation with other countries is the goal. Second, attempts to form inter-county recognition agreements (conventions and treaties) that ignore the problem of private information are exposed as futile. Third, the reciprocity requirement, the relevance of which as a prerequisite for recognition is currently the subject of heavy debate in the US, is also shown to be unnecessay. Fourth, countries should in limited, enumerated circumstances, concede to the local legal effect of certain unrecognized foreign judgments
Neutrosophic Game Theoretic Approach to Indo-Pak Conflict over Jammu-Kashmir
The study deals with the enduring conflict between India and Pakistan over Jammu and Kashmir since 1947. The ongoing conflict is analyzed as an enduring rivalry; characterized by three major wars (1947-48), 1965, 1971, low intensity military conflict (Siachen), mini war at Kargil (1999), internal insurgency, cross border terrorism. We examine the progress and the status of the dispute, as well as the dynamics of the India Pakistan relationship by considering the influence of USA and China in crisis dynamics. We discuss the possible solutions offered by the various study groups and persons. Most of the studies were done in crisp environment. Pramanik and Roy (S. Pramanik and T.K. Roy, Game theoretic model to the Jammu-Kashmir conflict between India and Pakistan. International Journal of Mathematical Archive (IJMA), 4(8) (2013), 162-170.) studied game theoretic model toJammu and Kashmir conflict in crisp environment. In the present study we have extended the concept of the game theoric model of the Jammu and Kashmir conflict in neutrosophic envirorment. We have explored the possibilities and developed arguments for an application of principle of neutrosophic game theory to understand properly of the Jammu and Kashmir conflict in terms of goals and strategy of either side. Standard 2×2 zero-sum game theoretic model used to identify an optimal solution
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The Evolution of the Labor Market for Medical Interns and Residents: A Case Study in Game Theory
The organization of the labor market for medical interns and residents underwent a number of changes before taking its present form in 1951. The record of these changes and the problems that prompted them provides an unusual opportunity to study the forces at work in markets of this kind. The present paper begins with a brief history and then presents a game-theoretic analysis to explain the orderly operation and longevity of the current market, in contrast to the turmoil that characterized various earlier short-lived attempts to organize the market. An analysis is also given of some contemporary problems facing the market. A subsidiary theme of the paper concerns the history of ideas: the problems encountered in the organization of this market, and some of the solutions arrived at, anticipated the discussion of such issues in the literature of economics and game theory.Economic
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