Comprehension of wh-questions in a case of mixed dementia

We investigated processing of wh-questions and declarative sentences with differing syntactic complexity in a case of mixed dementia (FA). FA was impaired in her ability to understand syntactically complex declarative sentences and syntactically complex wh-questions beginning with which but not complex who questions. This profile, novel in dementia, is similar to that reported for people with agrammatic aphasia and discerns a ‘‘fault line’’ of the language system along a syntactic/semantic paramete

Implicit Bias Reflects the Personal and the Social

This issue’s target article by Payne, Vuletich, and Lundberg (PV&L) does exactly what one should, presenting an argument that is thought-provoking and that challenges current orthodoxy. It also addresses an issue that has increasingly confounded attitudes researchers in recent years. The construct of “implicit bias” was initially conceptualized as a latent construct that exists within persons, relatively resistant to situational influences. A plethora of theoretical models converge on the notion that implicit biases, including intergroup biases, are representations that are stored in memory (e.g., Devine,1989; Fazio, Jackson, Dunton, & Williams, 1995; Gawronski & Bodenhausen, 2006; Greenwald et al., 2002; Wilson, Lindsay, & Schooler, 2000). Although some perspectives emphasize the role of culture in contributing to implicit measures of bias, even these perspectives rely on the learning and storage of mental representations (Olson & Fazio, 2004)

A Connectionist Theory of Phenomenal Experience

When cognitive scientists apply computational theory to the problem of phenomenal consciousness, as many of them have been doing recently, there are two fundamentally distinct approaches available. Either consciousness is to be explained in terms of the nature of the representational vehicles the brain deploys; or it is to be explained in terms of the computational processes defined over these vehicles. We call versions of these two approaches vehicle and process theories of consciousness, respectively. However, while there may be space for vehicle theories of consciousness in cognitive science, they are relatively rare. This is because of the influence exerted, on the one hand, by a large body of research which purports to show that the explicit representation of information in the brain and conscious experience are dissociable, and on the other, by the classical computational theory of mind – the theory that takes human cognition to be a species of symbol manipulation. But two recent developments in cognitive science combine to suggest that a reappraisal of this situation is in order. First, a number of theorists have recently been highly critical of the experimental methodologies employed in the dissociation studies – so critical, in fact, it’s no longer reasonable to assume that the dissociability of conscious experience and explicit representation has been adequately demonstrated. Second, classicism, as a theory of human cognition, is no longer as dominant in cognitive science as it once was. It now has a lively competitor in the form of connectionism; and connectionism, unlike classicism, does have the computational resources to support a robust vehicle theory of consciousness. In this paper we develop and defend this connectionist vehicle theory of consciousness. It takes the form of the following simple empirical hypothesis: phenomenal experience consists in the explicit representation of information in neurally realized PDP networks. This hypothesis leads us to re-assess some common wisdom about consciousness, but, we will argue, in fruitful and ultimately plausible ways

Perception and Testimony as Data Providers

Assuming that the sceptical challenge might be either bypassed or answered, this still leaves unspecified how high-quality information about the external world is acquired. In this paper, I will argue that, if knowledge is accounted information, then when we apply this definition to the analysis of perceptual knowledge and knowledge by testimony (the only two sources of information about the external world), the result is that both qualify as data providers.Peer reviewe

Perception and Cognition Are Largely Independent, but Still Affect Each Other in Systematic Ways: Arguments from Evolution and the Consciousness-Attention Dissociation

The main thesis of this paper is that two prevailing theories about cognitive penetration are too extreme, namely, the view that cognitive penetration is pervasive and the view that there is a sharp and fundamental distinction between cognition and perception, which precludes any type of cognitive penetration. These opposite views have clear merits and empirical support. To eliminate this puzzling situation, we present an alternative theoretical approach that incorporates the merits of these views into a broader and more nuanced explanatory framework. A key argument we present in favor of this framework concerns the evolution of intentionality and perceptual capacities. An implication of this argument is that cases of cognitive penetration must have evolved more recently and that this is compatible with the cognitive impenetrability of early perceptual stages of processing information. A theoretical approach that explains why this should be the case is the consciousness and attention dissociation framework. The paper discusses why concepts, particularly issues concerning concept acquisition, play an important role in the interaction between perception and cognition

A psychometric measure of working memory capacity for configured body movement.

Working memory (WM) models have traditionally assumed at least two domain-specific storage systems for verbal and visuo-spatial information. We review data that suggest the existence of an additional slave system devoted to the temporary storage of body movements, and present a novel instrument for its assessment: the movement span task. The movement span task assesses individuals' ability to remember and reproduce meaningless configurations of the body. During the encoding phase of a trial, participants watch short videos of meaningless movements presented in sets varying in size from one to five items. Immediately after encoding, they are prompted to reenact as many items as possible. The movement span task was administered to 90 participants along with standard tests of verbal WM, visuo-spatial WM, and a gesture classification test in which participants judged whether a speaker's gestures were congruent or incongruent with his accompanying speech. Performance on the gesture classification task was not related to standard measures of verbal or visuo-spatial working memory capacity, but was predicted by scores on the movement span task. Results suggest the movement span task can serve as an assessment of individual differences in WM capacity for body-centric information