Self-directedness, integration and higher cognition

In this paper I discuss connections between self-directedness, integration and higher cognition. I present a model of self-directedness as a basis for approaching higher cognition from a situated cognition perspective. According to this model increases in sensorimotor complexity create pressure for integrative higher order control and learning processes for acquiring information about the context in which action occurs. This generates complex articulated abstractive information processing, which forms the major basis for higher cognition. I present evidence that indicates that the same integrative characteristics found in lower cognitive process such as motor adaptation are present in a range of higher cognitive process, including conceptual learning. This account helps explain situated cognition phenomena in humans because the integrative processes by which the brain adapts to control interaction are relatively agnostic concerning the source of the structure participating in the process. Thus, from the perspective of the motor control system using a tool is not fundamentally different to simply controlling an arm

Behavioural Economics: Classical and Modern

In this paper, the origins and development of behavioural economics, beginning with the pioneering works of Herbert Simon (1953) and Ward Edwards (1954), is traced, described and (critically) discussed, in some detail. Two kinds of behavioural economics – classical and modern – are attributed, respectively, to the two pioneers. The mathematical foundations of classical behavioural economics is identified, largely, to be in the theory of computation and computational complexity; the corresponding mathematical basis for modern behavioural economics is, on the other hand, claimed to be a notion of subjective probability (at least at its origins in the works of Ward Edwards). The economic theories of behavior, challenging various aspects of 'orthodox' theory, were decisively influenced by these two mathematical underpinnings of the two theoriesClassical Behavioural Economics, Modern Behavioural Economics, Subjective Probability, Model of Computation, Computational Complexity. Subjective Expected Utility

Approximations of Algorithmic and Structural Complexity Validate Cognitive-behavioural Experimental Results

We apply methods for estimating the algorithmic complexity of sequences to behavioural sequences of three landmark studies of animal behavior each of increasing sophistication, including foraging communication by ants, flight patterns of fruit flies, and tactical deception and competition strategies in rodents. In each case, we demonstrate that approximations of Logical Depth and Kolmogorv-Chaitin complexity capture and validate previously reported results, in contrast to other measures such as Shannon Entropy, compression or ad hoc. Our method is practically useful when dealing with short sequences, such as those often encountered in cognitive-behavioural research. Our analysis supports and reveals non-random behavior (LD and K complexity) in flies even in the absence of external stimuli, and confirms the "stochastic" behaviour of transgenic rats when faced that they cannot defeat by counter prediction. The method constitutes a formal approach for testing hypotheses about the mechanisms underlying animal behaviour.Comment: 28 pages, 7 figures and 2 table

Mechanisms for the generation and regulation of sequential behaviour

A critical aspect of much human behaviour is the generation and regulation of sequential activities. Such behaviour is seen in both naturalistic settings such as routine action and language production and laboratory tasks such as serial recall and many reaction time experiments. There are a variety of computational mechanisms that may support the generation and regulation of sequential behaviours, ranging from those underlying Turing machines to those employed by recurrent connectionist networks. This paper surveys a range of such mechanisms, together with a range of empirical phenomena related to human sequential behaviour. It is argued that the empirical phenomena pose difficulties for most sequencing mechanisms, but that converging evidence from behavioural flexibility, error data arising from when the system is stressed or when it is damaged following brain injury, and between-trial effects in reaction time tasks, point to a hybrid symbolic activation-based mechanism for the generation and regulation of sequential behaviour. Some implications of this view for the nature of mental computation are highlighted

Between Sense and Sensibility: Declarative narrativisation of mental models as a basis and benchmark for visuo-spatial cognition and computation focussed collaborative cognitive systems

What lies between `\emph{sensing}' and `\emph{sensibility}'? In other words, what kind of cognitive processes mediate sensing capability, and the formation of sensible impressions ---e.g., abstractions, analogies, hypotheses and theory formation, beliefs and their revision, argument formation--- in domain-specific problem solving, or in regular activities of everyday living, working and simply going around in the environment? How can knowledge and reasoning about such capabilities, as exhibited by humans in particular problem contexts, be used as a model and benchmark for the development of collaborative cognitive (interaction) systems concerned with human assistance, assurance, and empowerment? We pose these questions in the context of a range of assistive technologies concerned with \emph{visuo-spatial perception and cognition} tasks encompassing aspects such as commonsense, creativity, and the application of specialist domain knowledge and problem-solving thought processes. Assistive technologies being considered include: (a) human activity interpretation; (b) high-level cognitive rovotics; (c) people-centred creative design in domains such as architecture & digital media creation, and (d) qualitative analyses geographic information systems. Computational narratives not only provide a rich cognitive basis, but they also serve as a benchmark of functional performance in our development of computational cognitive assistance systems. We posit that computational narrativisation pertaining to space, actions, and change provides a useful model of \emph{visual} and \emph{spatio-temporal thinking} within a wide-range of problem-solving tasks and application areas where collaborative cognitive systems could serve an assistive and empowering function.Comment: 5 pages, research statement summarising recent publication

The role of response mechanisms in determining reaction time performance: Piéron’s Law revisited

A response mechanism takes evaluations of the importance of potential actions and selects the most suitable. Response mechanism function is a nontrivial problem that has not received the attention it deserves within cognitive psychology. In this article, we make a case for the importance of considering response mechanism function as a constraint on cognitive processes and emphasized links with the wider problem of behavioral action selection. First, we show that, contrary to previous suggestions, a well–known model of the Stroop task (Cohen, Dunbar, & McClelland, 1990) relies on the response mechanism for a key feature of its results—the interference–facilitation asymmetry. Second, we examine a variety of response mechanisms (including that in the model of Cohen et al., 1990) and show that they all follow a law analogous to Piéron's law in relating their input to reaction time. In particular, this is true of a decision mechanism not designed to explain RT data but based on a proposed solution to the general problem of action selection and grounded in the neurobiology of the vertebrate basal ganglia. Finally, we show that the dynamics of simple artificial neurons also support a Piéron–like law

A Comparison of Different Cognitive Paradigms Using Simple Animats in a Virtual Laboratory, with Implications to the Notion of Cognition

In this thesis I present a virtual laboratory which implements five different models for controlling animats: a rule-based system, a behaviour-based system, a concept-based system, a neural network, and a Braitenberg architecture. Through different experiments, I compare the performance of the models and conclude that there is no best model, since different models are better for different things in different contexts. The models I chose, although quite simple, represent different approaches for studying cognition. Using the results as an empirical philosophical aid, I note that there is no best approach for studying cognition, since different approaches have all advantages and disadvantages, because they study different aspects of cognition from different contexts. This has implications for current debates on proper approaches for cognition: all approaches are a bit proper, but none will be proper enough. I draw remarks on the notion of cognition abstracting from all the approaches used to study it, and propose a simple classification for different types of cognition