14,094 research outputs found
Thinking Twice about Virtue and Vice: Philosophical Situationism and the Vicious Minds Hypothesis
This paper provides an empirical defense of credit theories of knowing against Mark Alfanoâs challenges to them based on his theses of inferential cognitive situationism and of epistemic situationism. In order to support the claim that credit theories can treat many cases of cognitive success through heuristic cognitive strategies as credit-conferring, the paper develops the compatibility between virtue epistemologies qua credit theories, and dual-process theories in cognitive psychology. It also a response to Lauren Olin and John Dorisâ âvicious mindsâ thesis, and their âtradeoff problemâ for virtue theories. A genuine convergence between virtue epistemology and dual-process theory is called for, while acknowledging that this effort may demand new and more empirically well-informed projects on both sides of the division between Conservative virtue epistemology (including the credit theory of knowing) and Autonomous virtue epistemology (including projects for providing guidance to epistemic agents)
The Fallacy of the Homuncular Fallacy
A leading theoretical framework for naturalistic explanation of mind holds that we explain the mind by positing progressively "stupider" capacities ("homunculi") until the mind is "discharged" by means of capacities that are not intelligent at all. The so-called homuncular fallacy involves violating this procedure by positing the same capacities at subpersonal levels. I argue that the homuncular fallacy is not a fallacy, and that modern-day homunculi are idle posits. I propose an alternative view of what naturalism requires that reflects how the cognitive sciences are actually integrating mind and matter
Review Essay: Andy Clark, Natural-Born Cyborgs: Minds, Technologies, and the Future of Human Intelligence.
Review Essay: Andy Clark, Natural-Born Cyborgs: Minds, Technologies, and the Future of Human Intelligence
Cog and the Creativity of God
The construction of a humanoid robot may be within reach. The science of artificial intelligence (AI) offers new understandings to contemporary Christian theology. First of all, the emerging field of embodied intelligence discloses the wholeness of the human being, correcting the tendency in Christian theology toward an anthropological dualism of body and soul. Secondly, artificial intelligence offers fresh understandings of the human mind, with implications for how human creativity reflects the creativity of God
Sosa versus Kornblith on Grades of Knowledge
In a series of works Ernest Sosa (see Sosa 1991, 2007, 2009, 2010, 2011, 2015, 2017) has defended the view that there are two kinds or âgradesâ of knowledge, animal and reflective. One of the most persistent critics of Sosaâs attempts to bifurcate knowledge is Hilary Kornblith (see Kornblith 2004, 2009, 2012). Our aim in this paper is to outline and evaluate Kornblithâs criticisms. We will argue that, while they raise a range of difficult (exegetical and substantive) questions about Sosaâs âbi-levelâ epistemology, Sosa has the resources to adequately respond to all of them. Thus, this paper is a (qualified) defence of Sosaâs bi-level epistemology
The Development and Validation of the Healthcare Professional Humanization Scale (HUMAS) for Nursing
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