18,709 research outputs found
The Parity Argument for Extended Consciousness
Andy Clark and David Chalmers (1998) argue that certain mental states and processes can be partially constituted by objects located beyond oneâs brain and body: this is their extended mind thesis (EM). But they maintain that consciousness relies on processing that is too high in speed and bandwidth to be realized outside the body (see Chalmers, 2008, and Clark, 2009). I evaluate Clarkâs and Chalmersâ reason for denying that consciousness extends while still supporting unconscious state extension. I argue that their reason is not well grounded and does not hold up against foreseeable advances in technology. I conclude that their current position needs re-evaluation. If their original parity argument works as a defence of EM, they have yet to identify a good reason why it does not also work as a defence of extended consciousness. I end by advancing a parity argument for extended consciousness and consider some possible replies
LAJOS JĂNOSSYâS REFORMULATION OF RELATIVITY THEORY IN THE CONTEXTS OF âDIALECTICAL MATERIALISMâ AND TRADITIONAL SCIENTIFIC RATIONALISM
The late Hungarian physicist Lajos JĂĄnossy is respected in international physics first of all for his results achieved in the field of cosmic radiations, but his work in the alternative, Lorentzian tradition of relativity theory is also of historical importance. As an adopted son
of the Hungarian Marxist philosopher, Georg LukĂĄcs, he was socialised in a left-wing spirit. He formulated a philosophical criticism of Einsteinâs theory in terms of dialectical materialism in the 1950s and 1960s. In contrast to the new Soviet thesis valid in Soviet ideology
from 1955, he insisted that the positivist, Machian epistemological foundation determinatively influenced the physical level of Einsteinâs relativity theory and distorted its real physical meaning. He also rejected the anti-commonsense character of Einsteinâs new concepts
of space and time and argued for the necessity of a commonsense-conform physics. However, in contrast to the Soviet critics of relativity theory of the Stalinist period, JĂĄnossy never used ideology to destroy the scientific authenticity of Einsteinâs theory, but, accepting the Einsteinian-Lorentzian mathematics as one of the great achievements of the history of physics, he announced and successfully implemented a positive program of a commonsense-conform, non-positivist, Lorentz-based reformulation of the theory. The socialcultural background of JĂĄnossyâs reformulation of relativity theory is characterised by the strain of two contradictory elements: on the one hand, his left wing, Marxist commitment,on the other, his socialization in Western, âbourgeoisâ science and culture. Through a Marxist, âdialectical materialistâ criticism of the positivist, Machian aspects of Einsteinâs theory as well as through his work for a commonsenseâconform physics, JĂĄnossy defended not only Marxism but also the classical tradition of scientific rationalism as an essential element of European culture
Extended minds and prime mental conditions: probing the parallels
Two very different forms of externalism about mental states appear prima facie unrelated: Williamsonâs (1995, 2000) claim that knowledge is a mental state, and Clark & Chalmersâ (1998) extended mind hypothesis. I demonstrate, however, that the two approaches justify their radically externalist by appealing to the same argument from explanatory generality. I argue that if one accepts either Williamsonâs claims or Clark & Chalmersâ claims on considerations of explanatory generality then, ceteris paribus, one should accept the other. This conclusion has implications for philosophy of mind, epistemology, and cognitive science
A Discussion on Empirical Micro-Bases of Hayekâs Methodological Individualism
There are essential differences in âmethodological individualism(MI)â between neoclassic economics and Hayekâs theory. On basis of The Sensory Order, this paper shows relations between Hayekâs MI and it, the micro-bases of Hayekâs MI from contemporarily empirical disciplines, and some viewpoints verified by succeeding ones; then points out some questions that need to be answered henceforth between Hayekâs theory and interdisciplinary studies in modern economics. It is concluded that Hayekâs MI has its empirical micro-bases, and that his interdisciplinary exploration in the youth can help advance modern economics.methodological individualism; Hayek; the sensory order; empirical micro-bases; interdisciplinary research in economics
Seeing Voices: Potential Neuroscience Contributions to a Reconstruction of Legal Insanity
Part I of this Article explains the insanity defense in the United States. Next, Part II discusses some of the brain-based research about mental illness, focusing on schizophrenia research. Then, Part III looks at traumatic brain injury and the relationship among injury, cognition, and behavior. Finally, Part IV explains how a new neuroscience-informed standard might better inform our moral decision making about legal insanity
Hidden covariation detection produces faster, not slower, social judgments
In Lewickiâs (1986a) demonstration of Hidden Co-variation Detection (HCD), responses were slower to faces that corresponded with a co-variation encountered previously than to faces with novel co-variations. This slowing contrasts with the typical finding that priming leads to faster responding, and might suggest that HCD is a unique type of implicit process. We extended Lewickiâs (1986a) methodology and showed that participants exposed to nonsalient
co-variations between hair length and personality were subsequently faster to respond to faces with those co-variations than to faces without, despite lack of awareness of the critical co-variations. This result confirms that people can detect subtle relationships between features of stimuli and that, as with other types of implicit cognition, this detection facilitates responding.</p
Cassirerâs Revision of Cohen
Ernst Cassirer has been proclaimed a follower of Hermann Cohen. However, Cassirer modified the basic concepts of Cohenâs theory of knowledge, so that Cassirerâs philosophical positions in many aspects actually stand in opposition to Cohenâs. Although Cassirer did follow Cohenâs methodology coherently, in that path he refuted the main positions of his teacher. Cohenâs philosophical task was forwarding Kantâs critical method to construct a theory of knowledge. He aimed not only to renew Kantâs method in the way he interpreted it, but also to revise, in accordance with Kantâs method, the uncritical positions of Kant's own theory of knowledge. Cohenâs methodology was intended to achieve this goal. In following his teacherâs task, however, Cassirer developed a set of functional concepts which coherently reveal and overturn the uncritical positions in the theory of knowledge, including the one essential for Cohen himself. Consequently, it may be said, Cassirer ârevisesâ Cohenâs system in a same way that Cohen revised Kant
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