Prospects for computational steering of evolutionary computation

Currently, evolutionary computation (EC) typically takes place in batch mode: algorithms are run autonomously, with the user providing little or no intervention or guidance. Although it is rarely possible to specify in advance, on the basis of EC theory, the optimal evolutionary algorithm for a particular problem, it seems likely that experienced EC practitioners possess considerable tacit knowledge of how evolutionary algorithms work. In situations such as this, computational steering (ongoing, informed user intervention in the execution of an otherwise autonomous computational process) has been profitably exploited to improve performance and generate insights into computational processes. In this short paper, prospects for the computational steering of evolutionary computation are assessed, and a prototype example of computational steering applied to a coevolutionary algorithm is presented

Nash Equilibria, collusion in games and the coevolutionary particle swarm algorithm

In recent work, we presented a deterministic algorithm to investigate collusion between players in a game where the players’ payoff functions are subject to a variational inequality describing the equilibrium of a transportation system. In investigating the potential for collusion between players, the diagonalization algorithm returned a local optimum. In this paper, we apply a coevolutionary particle swarm optimization (PSO) algorithm developed in earlier research in an attempt to return the global maximum. A numerical experiment is used to verify the performance of the algorithm in overcoming local optimum

A Coevolutionary Particle Swarm Algorithm for Bi-Level Variational Inequalities: Applications to Competition in Highway Transportation Networks

A climate of increasing deregulation in traditional highway transportation, where the private sector has an expanded role in the provision of traditional transportation services, provides a background for practical policy issues to be investigated. One of the key issues of interest, and the focus of this chapter, would be the equilibrium decision variables offered by participants in this market. By assuming that the private sector participants play a Nash game, the above problem can be described as a Bi-Level Variational Inequality (BLVI). Our problem differs from the classical Cournot-Nash game because each and every player’s actions is constrained by another variational inequality describing the equilibrium route choice of users on the network. In this chapter, we discuss this BLVI and suggest a heuristic coevolutionary particle swarm algorithm for its resolution. Our proposed algorithm is subsequently tested on example problems drawn from the literature. The numerical experiments suggest that the proposed algorithm is a viable solution method for this problem

Promoting cooperation in social dilemmas via simple coevolutionary rules

We study the evolution of cooperation in structured populations within popular models of social dilemmas, whereby simple coevolutionary rules are introduced that may enhance players abilities to enforce their strategy on the opponent. Coevolution thus here refers to an evolutionary process affecting the teaching activity of players that accompanies the evolution of their strategies. Particularly, we increase the teaching activity of a player after it has successfully reproduced, yet we do so depending on the disseminated strategy. We separately consider coevolution affecting either only the cooperators or only the defectors, and show that both options promote cooperation irrespective of the applied game. Opposite to intuitive reasoning, however, we reveal that the coevolutionary promotion of players spreading defection is, in the long run, more beneficial for cooperation than the likewise promotion of cooperators. We explain the contradictory impact of the two considered coevolutionary rules by examining the differences between resulting heterogeneities that segregate participating players, and furthermore, demonstrate that the influential individuals completely determine the final outcome of the games. Our findings are immune to changes defining the type of considered social dilemmas and highlight that the heterogeneity of players, resulting in a positive feedback mechanism, is a fundamental property promoting cooperation in groups of selfish individuals.Comment: 13 pages, 6 figures; accepted for publication in European Physical Journal

Sustainable Cooperative Coevolution with a Multi-Armed Bandit

This paper proposes a self-adaptation mechanism to manage the resources allocated to the different species comprising a cooperative coevolutionary algorithm. The proposed approach relies on a dynamic extension to the well-known multi-armed bandit framework. At each iteration, the dynamic multi-armed bandit makes a decision on which species to evolve for a generation, using the history of progress made by the different species to guide the decisions. We show experimentally, on a benchmark and a real-world problem, that evolving the different populations at different paces allows not only to identify solutions more rapidly, but also improves the capacity of cooperative coevolution to solve more complex problems.Comment: Accepted at GECCO 201

Evidence of coevolution in multi-objective evolutionary algorithms

This paper demonstrates that simple yet important characteristics of coevolution can occur in evolutionary algorithms when only a few conditions are met. We find that interaction-based fitness measurements such as fitness (linear) ranking allow for a form of coevolutionary dynamics that is observed when 1) changes are made in what solutions are able to interact during the ranking process and 2) evolution takes place in a multi-objective environment. This research contributes to the study of simulated evolution in a at least two ways. First, it establishes a broader relationship between coevolution and multi-objective optimization than has been previously considered in the literature. Second, it demonstrates that the preconditions for coevolutionary behavior are weaker than previously thought. In particular, our model indicates that direct cooperation or competition between species is not required for coevolution to take place. Moreover, our experiments provide evidence that environmental perturbations can drive coevolutionary processes; a conclusion that mirrors arguments put forth in dual phase evolution theory. In the discussion, we briefly consider how our results may shed light onto this and other recent theories of evolution

Novelty Search in Competitive Coevolution

One of the main motivations for the use of competitive coevolution systems is their ability to capitalise on arms races between competing species to evolve increasingly sophisticated solutions. Such arms races can, however, be hard to sustain, and it has been shown that the competing species often converge prematurely to certain classes of behaviours. In this paper, we investigate if and how novelty search, an evolutionary technique driven by behavioural novelty, can overcome convergence in coevolution. We propose three methods for applying novelty search to coevolutionary systems with two species: (i) score both populations according to behavioural novelty; (ii) score one population according to novelty, and the other according to fitness; and (iii) score both populations with a combination of novelty and fitness. We evaluate the methods in a predator-prey pursuit task. Our results show that novelty-based approaches can evolve a significantly more diverse set of solutions, when compared to traditional fitness-based coevolution.Comment: To appear in 13th International Conference on Parallel Problem Solving from Nature (PPSN 2014