1,501 research outputs found
A Distributed Merge and Split Algorithm for Fair Cooperation in Wireless Networks
This paper introduces a novel concept from coalitional game theory which
allows the dynamic formation of coalitions among wireless nodes. A simple and
distributed merge and split algorithm for coalition formation is constructed.
This algorithm is applied to study the gains resulting from the cooperation
among single antenna transmitters for virtual MIMO formation. The aim is to
find an ultimate transmitters coalition structure that allows cooperating users
to maximize their utilities while accounting for the cost of coalition
formation. Through this novel game theoretical framework, the wireless network
transmitters are able to self-organize and form a structured network composed
of disjoint stable coalitions. Simulation results show that the proposed
algorithm can improve the average individual user utility by 26.4% as well as
cope with the mobility of the distributed users.Comment: This paper is accepted for publication at the IEEE ICC Workshop on
Cooperative Communications and Networkin
Coalitional Game Theoretic Approach for Cooperative Transmission in Vehicular Networks
Cooperative transmission in vehicular networks is studied by using
coalitional game and pricing in this paper. There are several vehicles and
roadside units (RSUs) in the networks. Each vehicle has a desire to transmit
with a certain probability, which represents its data burtiness. The RSUs can
enhance the vehicles' transmissions by cooperatively relaying the vehicles'
data. We consider two kinds of cooperations: cooperation among the vehicles and
cooperation between the vehicle and RSU. First, vehicles cooperate to avoid
interfering transmissions by scheduling the transmissions of the vehicles in
each coalition. Second, a RSU can join some coalition to cooperate the
transmissions of the vehicles in that coalition. Moreover, due to the mobility
of the vehicles, we introduce the notion of encounter between the vehicle and
RSU to indicate the availability of the relay in space. To stimulate the RSU's
cooperative relaying for the vehicles, the pricing mechanism is applied. A
non-transferable utility (NTU) game is developed to analyze the behaviors of
the vehicles and RSUs. The stability of the formulated game is studied.
Finally, we present and discuss the numerical results for the 2-vehicle and
2-RSU scenario, and the numerical results verify the theoretical analysis.Comment: accepted by IEEE ICC'1
A Graph-Traversing Algorithm for Computing Some Stable Sets in Effectiveness Coalitional Games
We propose an algorithm for computing "main stable sets" recently introduced by Ciardiello, Di Liddo (2009) on effectiveness form coalitional games modeled through a directed pseudograph. The algorithm is based upon a graph traversing method exploring extended paths minimal in coalitions and we study some its interesting computational aspects for making these stability concepts as useful tools for decision theory.Algorithmic game theory; coalitional games; dominance relations; stable sets; graph theory.
Computational Intelligence Inspired Data Delivery for Vehicle-to-Roadside Communications
We propose a vehicle-to-roadside communication protocol based on distributed clustering where a coalitional game approach is used to stimulate the vehicles to join a cluster, and a fuzzy logic algorithm is employed to generate stable clusters by considering multiple metrics of vehicle velocity, moving pattern, and signal qualities between vehicles. A reinforcement learning algorithm with game theory based reward allocation is employed to guide each vehicle to select the route that can maximize the whole network performance. The protocol is integrated with a multi-hop data delivery virtualization scheme that works on the top of the transport layer and provides high performance for multi-hop end-to-end data transmissions. We conduct realistic computer simulations to show the performance advantage of the protocol over other approaches
Rivalry, Exclusion and Coalitions
Coalition formation, exclusion contest, tragedy of the commons
Transforming Energy Networks via Peer to Peer Energy Trading: Potential of Game Theoretic Approaches
Peer-to-peer (P2P) energy trading has emerged as a next-generation energy
management mechanism for the smart grid that enables each prosumer of the
network to participate in energy trading with one another and the grid. This
poses a significant challenge in terms of modeling the decision-making process
of each participant with conflicting interest and motivating prosumers to
participate in energy trading and to cooperate, if necessary, for achieving
different energy management goals. Therefore, such decision-making process
needs to be built on solid mathematical and signal processing tools that can
ensure an efficient operation of the smart grid. This paper provides an
overview of the use of game theoretic approaches for P2P energy trading as a
feasible and effective means of energy management. As such, we discuss various
games and auction theoretic approaches by following a systematic classification
to provide information on the importance of game theory for smart energy
research. Then, the paper focuses on the P2P energy trading describing its key
features and giving an introduction to an existing P2P testbed. Further, the
paper zooms into the detail of some specific game and auction theoretic models
that have recently been used in P2P energy trading and discusses some important
finding of these schemes.Comment: 38 pages, single column, double spac
Strategic thinking under social influence: Scalability, stability and robustness of allocations
This paper studies the strategic behavior of a large number of game designers and studies the scalability, stability and robustness of their allocations in a large number of homogeneous coalitional games with transferable utilities (TU). For each TU game, the characteristic function is a continuous-time stochastic process. In each game, a game designer allocates revenues based on the extra reward that a coalition has received up to the current time and the extra reward that the same coalition has received in the other games. The approach is based on the theory of mean-field games with heterogeneous groups in a multi-population regime
Collectively Incentive Compatible Tax Systems
This paper assumes that individuals possess private information both about their abilities and about their valuation of a public good. Individuals can undertake collective actions on order to manipulate the tax system and the decision on public good provision. Consequently, an implementable scheme of taxation has to be collectively incentive compatible. If preferences are additively separable, then an implementable tax systems has the following properties: (i) tax payments do not depend on public goods preferences and (ii) there is no scope for a collective manipulation of public goods preferences. For a quasilinear economy, the optimal tax system is explicitly characterized.Optimal Taxation, Public Good Provision, Revelation of Preferences, Information Aggregation
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