408 research outputs found
Coalitional games for abstract argumentation
International audienceIn this work we address the issue of the uncertainty faced by a user participating in multiagent debate. We propose a way to compute the relative relevance of arguments for such a user, by merging the classical argumentation framework proposed in [5] into a game theoretic coalitional setting, where the worth of a collection of arguments (opinions) can be seen as the combination of the information concerning the defeat relation and the preferences over arguments of a " user ". Via a property-driven approach, we show that the Shapley value [15] for coalitional games defined over an argumentation framework, can be applied to resume all the information about the worth of opinions into an attribution of relevance for the single arguments. We also prove that, for a large family of (coalitional) argumentation frameworks, the Shapley value can be easily computed
Applying Abstract Argumentation Theory to Cooperative Game Theory
We apply ideas from abstract argumentation theory to study cooperative game
theory. Building on Dung's results in his seminal paper, we further the
correspondence between Dung's four argumentation semantics and solution
concepts in cooperative game theory by showing that complete extensions (the
grounded extension) correspond to Roth's subsolutions (respectively, the
supercore). We then investigate the relationship between well-founded
argumentation frameworks and convex games, where in each case the semantics
(respectively, solution concepts) coincide; we prove that three-player convex
games do not in general have well-founded argumentation frameworks.Comment: 15 pages, 1 tabl
Industrial Symbiotic Networks as Coordinated Games
We present an approach for implementing a specific form of collaborative
industrial practices-called Industrial Symbiotic Networks (ISNs)-as MC-Net
cooperative games and address the so called ISN implementation problem. This
is, the characteristics of ISNs may lead to inapplicability of fair and stable
benefit allocation methods even if the collaboration is a collectively desired
one. Inspired by realistic ISN scenarios and the literature on normative
multi-agent systems, we consider regulations and normative socioeconomic
policies as two elements that in combination with ISN games resolve the
situation and result in the concept of coordinated ISNs.Comment: 3 pages, Proc. of the 17th International Conference on Autonomous
Agents and Multiagent Systems (AAMAS 2018
A finer grained modeling of rational coalitions using goals
We propose an extension of Coalitional ATL (a logic for reasoning about coalitions and their formation process, see [10]) by goals. This goal framework allows for a finer grained modeling of coalitions: Coalitional frameworks, based on Dungs’s abstract argumentation framework, are used to point out conflicts between agents, and goals refer to agents’ subjective incentives to join (or not to join) coalitions. We focus on two different aspects for cooperation allowing a more practical modeling of systemsWorkshop de Agentes y Sistemas Inteligentes (WASI)Red de Universidades con Carreras en Informática (RedUNCI
Game Theory: The Language of Social Science?
The present paper tries in a largely non-technical way to discuss the aim, the basic notions and methods as well as the limits of game theory under the aspect of providing a general modelling method or language for social sciences.
Routing Games with Progressive Filling
Max-min fairness (MMF) is a widely known approach to a fair allocation of
bandwidth to each of the users in a network. This allocation can be computed by
uniformly raising the bandwidths of all users without violating capacity
constraints. We consider an extension of these allocations by raising the
bandwidth with arbitrary and not necessarily uniform time-depending velocities
(allocation rates). These allocations are used in a game-theoretic context for
routing choices, which we formalize in progressive filling games (PFGs).
We present a variety of results for equilibria in PFGs. We show that these
games possess pure Nash and strong equilibria. While computation in general is
NP-hard, there are polynomial-time algorithms for prominent classes of
Max-Min-Fair Games (MMFG), including the case when all users have the same
source-destination pair. We characterize prices of anarchy and stability for
pure Nash and strong equilibria in PFGs and MMFGs when players have different
or the same source-destination pairs. In addition, we show that when a designer
can adjust allocation rates, it is possible to design games with optimal strong
equilibria. Some initial results on polynomial-time algorithms in this
direction are also derived
Strategic Argumentation is NP-Complete
In this paper we study the complexity of strategic argumentation for dialogue
games. A dialogue game is a 2-player game where the parties play arguments. We
show how to model dialogue games in a skeptical, non-monotonic formalism, and
we show that the problem of deciding what move (set of rules) to play at each
turn is an NP-complete problem
Tasks for Agent-Based Negotiation Teams:Analysis, Review, and Challenges
An agent-based negotiation team is a group of interdependent agents that join
together as a single negotiation party due to their shared interests in the
negotiation at hand. The reasons to employ an agent-based negotiation team may
vary: (i) more computation and parallelization capabilities, (ii) unite agents
with different expertise and skills whose joint work makes it possible to
tackle complex negotiation domains, (iii) the necessity to represent different
stakeholders or different preferences in the same party (e.g., organizations,
countries, and married couple). The topic of agent-based negotiation teams has
been recently introduced in multi-agent research. Therefore, it is necessary to
identify good practices, challenges, and related research that may help in
advancing the state-of-the-art in agent-based negotiation teams. For that
reason, in this article we review the tasks to be carried out by agent-based
negotiation teams. Each task is analyzed and related with current advances in
different research areas. The analysis aims to identify special challenges that
may arise due to the particularities of agent-based negotiation teams.Comment: Engineering Applications of Artificial Intelligence, 201
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