A Century in the Making: The Glorious Revolution, the American Revolution, and the Origins of the U.S. Constitution’s Eighth Amendment

The sixteen words in the U.S. Constitution’s Eighth Amendment have their roots in England’s Glorious Revolution of 1688–89. This Article traces the historical events that initially gave rise to the prohibitions against excessive bail, excessive fines, and cruel and unusual punishments. Those three proscriptions can be found in the English Declaration of Rights and in its statutory counterpart, the English Bill of Rights. In particular, the Article describes the legal cases and draconian punishments during the Stuart dynasty that led English and Scottish parliamentarians to insist on protections against cruelty and excessive governmental actions. In describing the grotesque punishments of Titus Oates and others during the reign of King James II, the Article sheds light on the origins of the language of Section 10 of the English Bill of Rights. That language became a model for similarly worded provisions in early American constitutions and declarations of rights, including the Virginia Declaration of Rights, that were linguistic forerunners of the Eighth Amendment. The U.S. Constitution’s Eighth Amendment, ratified in 1791, became the law of the land more than 100 years after the Glorious Revolution, though that provision of the U.S. Bill of Rights was shaped by the Enlightenment as well as by early American understandings of English law and custom. The Article describes the seventeenth-century origins of the Eighth Amendment’s prohibitions and the Enlightenment’s impact on eighteenth-century thinkers, while highlighting how existing American prohibitions against excessive bail, excessive fines, and cruel and unusual punishments are now understood to bar acts inconsistent with “the evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing society.” The Article concludes by outlining the implications of the Eighth Amendment’s history for modern American jurisprudence. In doing so, it provides a critique of the U.S. Supreme Court’s recent Eighth Amendment decision in Bucklew v. Precythe

A Century in the Making: The Glorious Revolution, the American Revolution, and the Origins of the U.S. Constitution’s Eighth Amendment

The sixteen words in the U.S. Constitution’s Eighth Amendment have their roots in England’s Glorious Revolution of 1688–89. This Article traces the historical events that initially gave rise to the prohibitions against excessive bail, excessive fines, and cruel and unusual punishments. Those three proscriptions can be found in the English Declaration of Rights and in its statutory counterpart, the English Bill of Rights. In particular, the Article describes the legal cases and draconian punishments during the Stuart dynasty that led English and Scottish parliamentarians to insist on protections against cruelty and excessive governmental actions. In describing the grotesque punishments of Titus Oates and others during the reign of King James II, the Article sheds light on the origins of the language of Section 10 of the English Bill of Rights. That language became a model for similarly worded provisions in early American constitutions and declarations of rights, including the Virginia Declaration of Rights, that were linguistic forerunners of the Eighth Amendment. The U.S. Constitution’s Eighth Amendment, ratified in 1791, became the law of the land more than 100 years after the Glorious Revolution, though that provision of the U.S. Bill of Rights was shaped by the Enlightenment as well as by early American understandings of English law and custom. The Article describes the seventeenthcentury origins of the Eighth Amendment’s prohibitions and the Enlightenment’s impact on eighteenth-century thinkers, while highlighting how existing American prohibitions against excessive bail, excessive fines, and cruel and unusual punishments are now understood to bar acts inconsistent with “the evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing society.” The Article concludes by outlining the implications of the Eighth Amendment’s history for modern American jurisprudence. In doing so, it provides a critique of the U.S. Supreme Court’s recent Eighth Amendment decision in Bucklew v. Precythe

Social support for women with chronic pelvic pain

Social support has been shown to reduce the effects of stress and help individuals to cope. However, research suggests that the effects of social support depend on whether there is a match between the type of support offered and the needs of a particular situation, and from whom the support is offered. The aim of this study as a whole was to examine the social support experiences particular to women who are faced with the distressing problem of chronic pelvic pain (CPP). The literature review (chapter one) revealed that although pain is defined as a subjective experience, research in this field has rarely been concerned with the experience of CPP from the perspective of the women who suffer it. The first study (chapter two) therefore aimed to gain a detailed description of social support transactions as experienced by women with CPP. Eight women with CPP were interviewed about what has been helpful and unhelpful in terms of social support from their partners, families, friends, acquaintances, doctors, nurses and other women with CPP. Interpretative phenomenological analysis (IPA) of interview transcripts revealed both helpful and unhelpful efforts at support from the various support providers. Findings are discussed in relation to extant literature and in terms of their clinical implications. The second study (chapter three) was concerned specifically with social support from partners. Standardised measures of pain experience, social support and psychological well being were administered to 29 women with CPP. Correlational analysis revealed significant associations between particular perceptions of partner support behaviours and depression and pain severity. Finally, the research review (chapter four) reflects on the extent to which this research project fulfils evolving criteria for the assessment of qualitative research

The Temporo-Mandibular Syndrome

Abstract Not Provided

A randomised comparison of bolus phenylephrine and ephedrine for the management of spinal hypotension in patients with severe preeclampsia and a non-reassuring fetal heart rate trace

Background: Studies in healthy patients undergoing elective caesarean delivery show that ephedrine used for spinal hypotension is associated with increased fetal acidosis compared with phenylephrine. This has not been investigated prospectively in severe preeclampsia. Methods: Patients with severe preeclampsia requiring caesarean delivery for a non- reassuring fetal heart tracing were randomised to receive bolus ephedrine (7.5-15 mg) or phenylephrine (50-100 μg) for spinal hypotension. The primary outcome was umbilical arterial base deficit. Secondary outcomes were umbilical arterial (UA) and venous (UV) pH and lactate level, venous base deficit, and Apgar scores. Results: A total of 133 women were included;; 64 required vasopressor treatment and were randomised to 2 groups of 32 with similar patient characteristics. Pre- delivery blood pressure changes were similar in the 2 groups. There was no difference in mean [SD] UA base deficit (-4.9 [3.7] vs -6.0 [4.6] mmol·L⁻¹ for ephedrine and phenylephrine respectively;; P = 0.29). Mean [SD] pH (UA and UV) and lactate levels were also similar between groups (7.25 [0.08] vs 7.22 [0.10], 7.28 [0.07] vs 7.27 [0.10], and 3.41 [2.18] vs 3.28 [2.44] mmol·L⁻¹ respectively). In addition, UV PO₂ was higher in the ephedrine group (2.8 [0.7] vs 2.4 [0.62]) kPa, P = 0.02). There was no difference in 1- or 5-minute Apgar scores, numbers of neonates with 1-minute Apgar scores < 7 (10/32 [31%] vs 12/32 [38%]), or with a pH < 7.2 (6/31 [19%] vs 8/29 [28%]). Conclusions: In patients with severe preeclampsia and fetal compromise, fetal acid-base status is independent of the use of bolus ephedrine vs phenylephrine to treat spinal hypotension