Climate change in game theory context

The aim of this paper is to survey the game theory modelling of the behaviour of global players in mitigation and adaptation related to climate change. Three main fields are applied for the specific aspects of temperature rise: behaviour games, CPR problem and negotiation games. The game theory instruments are useful in analyzing strategies in uncertain circumstances, such as the occurrence and impacts of climate change. To analyze the international players’ relations, actions, attitude toward carbon emission, negotiation power and motives, several games are applied for the climate change in this paper. The solution is surveyed, too, for externality problem

Global Climate Change and the Funding of Adaptation

Mitigation and adaptation are the most important strategies in combating global climate change. It is expected that in a post Kyoto world industrialized countries have to engage in greenhouse gas abatement, and to support developing countries in adapting to climate change. Within the framework of a non-cooperative Nash game we analyze, whether funding adaptation is incentive compatible in the sense that it stipulates mitigation. In particular it is the aim of this paper to discuss: (1) How does foreign funding of adaptation affect mitigation and regional welfare? (2) Under which conditions is it economically rational to fund adaptation in developing regions? We find that, if strict complementarity between adaptation and mitigation exists, funding adaptation increases both global mitigation and the donors' welfare, but negatively affects the recipients' welfare. The later only benefit, if maladaptation or adaptation, which is neutral to mitigation, is funded, which, however, makes the donors worse off.Climate change; mitigation and adaptation; funding of private goods

Tools for environmental risk mitigation of acid sulphate soils

Project: Climate change adaptation tools for environmental risk mitigation of acid sulphate soils (CATERMASS) Funding: Life+ Environment policy and governance 2008-C1 Coordinator: Finnish Environment Institute (SYKE) Partners: Geological Survey of Finland (GTK), MTT Agrifood Research Finland, Finnish Game and Fisheries Research Institute (RKTL), Centre for Economic Development, Transport and the Environment, University of Helsinki, Åbo Academi University Action 3: Mitigation methods and their adaptation to changing climate condition

Paris via Brussels: A three-level game analysis of the EU’s behaviour at the 2015 Paris international climate negotiations (COP21)

The EU has been a rare example of a consistent global leadership on climate change. At a time when governments around the world are reluctant to face the challenges of climate change mitigation, the EU was widely praised for helping to push states towards an ambitious Paris Agreement. This thesis asks what influenced the EU’s behaviour at the 2015 Paris international climate negotiations (COP21). To answer this it undertakes an inductive case study of COP21 and the intra-EU negotiations that led up to it. It focuses on the EU’s positions on climate mitigation proposals and more specifically greenhouse gas reductions. The thesis argues that the three-level game, incorporating national, supranational (EU), and international (UNFCCC) negotiating games, is superior to other theoretical frameworks for explaining the EU’s behaviour. It shows that EU member states adopted positions based on political pressures at a national level, but also took into account how they would be received at a supranational level and how they could effect the international negotiations. Ignoring any one of the levels leads to an incomplete analysis of the factors influencing EU climate policy. Throughout the thesis I develop the three-level game, building on Putnam’s two-level game, as a framework for analysing the EU’s behaviour in international climate negotiations and challenge the mainstream, EU-centric explanations for EU climate policy

Visual Climate Change Communication: From Iconography To Locally Framed 3D Visualization

Climate change is an urgent problem with implications registered not only globally, but also on national and local scales. It is a particularly challenging case of environmental communication because its main cause, greenhouse gas emissions, is invisible. The predominant approach of making climate change visible is the use of iconic, often affective, imagery. Literature on the iconography of climate change shows that global iconic motifs, such as polar bears, have contributed to a public perception of the problem as spatially and temporally remote. This paper proposes an alternative approach to global climate change icons by focusing on recognizable representations of local impacts within an interactive game environment. This approach was implemented and tested in a research project based on the municipality of Delta, British Columbia. A major outcome of the research is Future Delta, an interactive educational game featuring 3D visualizations and simulation tools for climate change adaptation and mitigation future scenarios. The empirical evaluation is based on quantitative pre/post-game play questionnaires with 18 students and 10 qualitative expert interviews. The findings support the assumption that interactive 3D imagery is effective in communicating climate change. The quantitative post-questionnaires particularly highlight a shift in support of more local responsibility

The incentives to participate in and the stability of international climate coalitions: a game theoretic approach using the WITCH Model

This paper uses WITCH, an integrated assessment model with a game-theoretic structure, to explore the prospects for, and the stability of broad coalitions to achieve ambitious climate change mitigation action. Only coalitions including all large emitting regions are found to be technically able to meet a concentration stabilisation target below 550 ppm CO2eq by 2100. Once the free-riding incentives of non-participants are taken into account, only a “grand coalition” including virtually all regions can be successful. This grand coalition is profitable as a whole, implying that all countries can gain from participation provided appropriate transfers are made across them. However, neither the grand coalition nor smaller but still environmentally significant coalitions appear to be stable. This is because the collective welfare surplus from cooperation is not found to be large enough for transfers to offset the free-riding incentives of all countries simultaneously. Some factors omitted from the analysis, which might improve coalition stability, include the co-benefits from mitigation action, the costless removal of fossil fuel subsidies, as well as alternative assumptions regarding countries’ bargaining behaviour.Climate policy; Climate coalition; Game theory; Free riding.

Climate Policy without Commitment

Climate mitigation policy should be imposed over a long period, and spur development of new technologies in order to make stabilization of green house gas concentrations economically feasible. The government may announce current and future policy packages that stimulate current R&D in climate-friendly technologies. However, once climate-friendly technologies have been developed, the government may have no incentive to implement the pre-announced future policies, that is, there may be a time inconsistency problem. We show that if the government can optimally subsidize R&D today, there is no time inconsistency problem. Thus, lack of commitment is not an argument for higher current R&D subsidies. If the offered R&D subsidy is lower than the optimal subsidy, the current (sub-game perfect) climate tax should exceed the first-best climate tax.time consistency, carbon tax, climate policy, R&D, endogenous technological change

Gender equality in climate policy and practice hindered by assumptions

Gender has a powerful influence on people’s experience of, and resilience to, climate change. Global climate change policy is committed to tackling gender inequalities in mitigation and adaptation. However, progress is hindered by numerous challenges, including an enduring set of gender assumptions: women are caring and connected to the environment, women are a homogenous and vulnerable group, gender equality is a women’s issue and gender equality is a numbers game. We provide an overview of how these assumptions essentialize women’s and men’s characteristics, narrowly diagnose the causes of gender inequality, and thereby propel strategies that have unintended and even counterproductive consequences. We offer four suggestions for a more informed pursuit of gender equality in climate change policy and practice

Essays on the Economics of Climate Change

Climate change is a major environmental threat and likely one of the most important challenges of our time. In particular, climate extremes –such as heat waves– can have a significant negative effect on society. Yet, many impacts of climate change are poorly understood and binding international climate change agreements are notoriously hard to reach. This work deals with the economics of climate change in three separate essays. The first one introduces a new methodology to estimate the impacts of climate extremes on public health. The second utilizes this methodology to assess the impacts of several climate change scenarios on Europe. The third explores a way to increase cooperation on climate change mitigation policies through explicit communication of the uncertainty of future climate change impacts. In general, human mortality shows an oscillatory pattern on top of a nonlinear trend. It tends to be highest in winter and lowest in summer. The nonlinear trend follows changes in health policies, economic growth rates, and other institutional factors. The first essays shows that singular spectrum analysis can be used for the estimation of this base rate mortality and thus allows to isolate the impacts of climate extremes on human mortality. This methodology is an improvement over approaches based on fixed effects or classic spectral analysis. It makes it possible to extend climate impact analysis to regions and countries for which there are no detailed data from hospital records as only coarse monthly data on mortality are needed. The danger of climate change lies not necessarily in the shift in average temperatures, but more so the increase in frequency of extreme heat events. Yet, while heat waves become more common, cold spells become less frequent. As both types of extreme temperature events increase human morbidity and mortality, the net effect of this shift is unknown. The second essay finds that a scenario of moderate warming can have a positive net effect on some European countries, creating winners and losers. In contrast –severe warming as a result of failed climate change mitigation policies– affects all examined European countries in a negative way. There would be no winners, just losers. As a result of the uncertainty associated with it, climate change poses a different challenge than other social dilemma situations: The negative effects of climate change do not necessarily take place incrementally. While this should be a focal point for policy makers, the costs of climate change tend to be presented within an expected utility framework. Yet, the potential behavioral reactions to this uncertainty are –so far– neither explored nor accounted for in game-theoretic models of climate coalition building. The third essay finds that cooperation in a public goods game can be increased when the uncertainty is communicated explicitly. This means that uncertainty should not be hidden behind expected costs and benefits, but rather be acknowledged when the goal is to form a climate change mitigation agreement