Classical Mathematics for a Constructive World

Interactive theorem provers based on dependent type theory have the flexibility to support both constructive and classical reasoning. Constructive reasoning is supported natively by dependent type theory and classical reasoning is typically supported by adding additional non-constructive axioms. However, there is another perspective that views constructive logic as an extension of classical logic. This paper will illustrate how classical reasoning can be supported in a practical manner inside dependent type theory without additional axioms. We will see several examples of how classical results can be applied to constructive mathematics. Finally, we will see how to extend this perspective from logic to mathematics by representing classical function spaces using a weak value monad.Comment: v2: Final copy for publicatio

Agent-Based Modeling: The Right Mathematics for the Social Sciences?

This study provides a basic introduction to agent-based modeling (ABM) as a powerful blend of classical and constructive mathematics, with a primary focus on its applicability for social science research.� The typical goals of ABM social science researchers are discussed along with the culture-dish nature of their computer experiments. The applicability of ABM for science more generally is also considered, with special attention to physics. Finally, two distinct types of ABM applications are summarized in order to illustrate concretely the duality of ABM: Real-world systems can not only be simulated with verisimilitude using ABM; they can also be efficiently and robustly designed and constructed on the basis of ABM principles. �

Quantum Immortality and Non-Classical Logic

The Everett Box is a device in which an observer and a lethal quantum apparatus are isolated from the rest of the universe. On a regular basis, successive trials occur, in each of which an automatic measurement of a quantum superposition inside the apparatus either causes instant death or does nothing to the observer. From the observer's perspective, the chances of surviving $m$ trials monotonically decreases with increasing $m$. As a result, if the observer is still alive for sufficiently large $m$ she must reject any interpretation of quantum mechanics which is not the many-worlds interpretation (MWI), since surviving $m$ trials becomes vanishingly unlikely in a single world, whereas a version of the observer will necessarily survive in the branching MWI universe. Here we ask whether this conclusion still holds if rather than a classical understanding of limits built on classical logic we instead require our physics to satisfy a computability requirement by investigating the Everett Box in a model of a computational universe running on a variety of constructive logic, Recursive Constructive Mathematics. We show that although the standard Everett argument rejecting non-MWI interpretations is no longer valid, we can show that Everett's conclusion still holds within a computable universe. Thus we argue that Everett's argument is strengthened and any counter-argument must be strengthened, since it holds not only in classical logic (with embedded notions of continuity and infinity) but also in a computable logic.Comment: 12 page

An Objection to Naturalism and Atheism from Logic

I proffer a success argument for classical logical consequence. I articulate in what sense that notion of consequence should be regarded as the privileged notion for metaphysical inquiry aimed at uncovering the fundamental nature of the world. Classical logic breeds necessitism. I use necessitism to produce problems for both ontological naturalism and atheism

Do Goedel's incompleteness theorems set absolute limits on the ability of the brain to express and communicate mental concepts verifiably?

Classical interpretations of Goedel's formal reasoning imply that the truth of some arithmetical propositions of any formal mathematical language, under any interpretation, is essentially unverifiable. However, a language of general, scientific, discourse cannot allow its mathematical propositions to be interpreted ambiguously. Such a language must, therefore, define mathematical truth verifiably. We consider a constructive interpretation of classical, Tarskian, truth, and of Goedel's reasoning, under which any formal system of Peano Arithmetic is verifiably complete. We show how some paradoxical concepts of Quantum mechanics can be expressed, and interpreted, naturally under a constructive definition of mathematical truth.Comment: 73 pages; this is an updated version of the NQ essay; an HTML version is available at http://alixcomsi.com/Do_Goedel_incompleteness_theorems.ht

On algorithm and robustness in a non-standard sense

In this paper, we investigate the invariance properties, i.e. robust- ness, of phenomena related to the notions of algorithm, finite procedure and explicit construction. First of all, we provide two examples of objects for which small changes completely change their (non)computational behavior. We then isolate robust phenomena in two disciplines related to computability